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ABSTRACT 
The development of graffiti into an accepted art form, street art, is a cause of 
concern for South African property owners. The current position in South African 
property law regarding the original acquisition of ownership suggests that the 
creation of street art on movable property belonging to another could result in the 
transfer of ownership. Ownership of the movable may transfer via accessio to the 
street artist provided that the artwork changes the nature of the movable. This would 
occur even if the street artist does not act in good faith because bona fides is not a 
requirement for the original acquisition of ownership via accessio. This anomaly 
requires that the South African law on accession in the case of pictura be developed 
such that good faith be a requirement for the transfer of ownership in this format. 
With the development and growing popularity of the art form the likelihood of this 
legal anomaly is becoming a greater possibility. Indeed, the popularity of British 
street artist, Banksy, has provided numerous examples of contested ownership, 
albeit within English law. Banksy artworks are collectable and financially valuable. 
Consequently, not only are they desirable but many of his street artworks are 
considered to be examples of British cultural heritage and as such may be worthy 
of protection and preservation. These cases highlight the growing need in South 
Africa to clearly identify who South African street artworks belong to and, to identify 
any South African street art that warrants cultural heritage protection.  
The legislation regarding the protection of South African cultural heritage resources 
has not yet been extended to any street artworks. Yet there are examples of street 
art in South Africa that meet the requirements for cultural heritage status or which 
have the characteristics of cultural heritage resources. The extension of cultural 
heritage resource status to South African street artworks that are culturally 
significant could assist in the protection and preservation of these resources. 
However, the effectiveness of the cultural heritage legislation, in particular the 
National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999, is limited. There are several 
problematic aspects in this Act. This is of great concern as the issues effect all South 
Africa’s cultural heritage resources (not just street art which may qualify for such 
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status). However, these issues could be responded to through amendments to the 
legislation.  
Significantly, the National Heritage Resources Act seeks to deprive private owners 
of their property as it seeks to regulate what owners can do with cultural heritage 
property which they own. However, as it stands there are far too many challengeable 
issues in this legislation to justifiably deprive this property in terms of s25 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  This renders significant portions 
of the National Heritage Resources Act inoperable. Consequently, the amendment 
of this legislation is necessary to ensure the purpose of the legislation i.e. to ensure 
the protection and preservation of the South Africa’s cultural heritage resources 
through the deprivation of property rights or indeed, if necessary, through the 
expropriation of property. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In 2014 an artwork that came to be known as Spy Booth was found on the wall of a 
privately-owned grade II listed (historic) house in Cheltenham, UK.1 Acknowledged 
as the work of world-renowned graffiti artist Banksy, the artwork garnered the 
interest of the artworld, collectors and the public.2 The artwork was valued at £1 
million.3 In order to preserve the work in situ Cheltenham locals set up a fund 
dedicated to this cause, local councils took an interest in preserving the artwork, 
and a foreign collector made an offer on the work (seeking to remove it for their 
private collection).4 Whilst these deliberations were in progress the artwork was 
defaced with spray paint.5 Consequently, the artwork was awarded the same 
protection as the house by Historic England (England’s heritage authority). This was 
achieved by granting retroactive planning permission for changes to be made to the 
historic building.6 The granting of such status intended to prevent the private 
property owner from selling the artwork to a private collector (thus ensuring the 
artwork was publicly viewable), to require the home owner to preserve the artwork 
 
1  Huws http://www.catrinfflurhuws.cymru/site/documents/spyfought.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 
2019) 3. For a discussion on the grade listings of historic buildings in the UK and what this 
entails see Historic England https://historicengland.org.uk/advice/your-home/owning-historic-
property/listed-building/ (Date of use: 15 April 2019). See also Huws 
http://www.catrinfflurhuws.cymru/site/documents/spyfought.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 2019) 3. 
2  Morris https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/jun/10/banksy-creator-spy-booth-wall-
art-gchq (Date of use: 15 April 2019). For information on Banksy see Banksy www.banksy.co.uk 
(Date of use: 20 December 2018). See also Banksy Wall and Piece and Ellsworth-Jones 
Banksy. 
3  Neuendorf https://news.artnet.com/art-world/banksy-spy-booth-mural-worthless-460628 (Date 
of use: 18 April 2019). 
4  Huws http://www.catrinfflurhuws.cymru/site/documents/spyfought.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 
2019) 3-4.  
5  Huws http://www.catrinfflurhuws.cymru/site/documents/spyfought.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 
2019) 4. 
6  Historic England https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1333239 (Date of use: 24 
January 2017). See also BBC News http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-gloucestershire-
32252609 (Date of use: 24 January 2017). A grade II listed building in England is a particularly 
important building of ore than special interest. 
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and to make funding available to assist with this if requested.7  However, despite 
the listed status, the artwork was unintentionally destroyed during house repairs.8 
In 2014 another Banksy artwork called Mobile Lovers was found on a publicly 
viewable plywood door at a youth club in Bristol, UK. Within 24 hours of its 
appearance the door was removed, and the artwork placed inside the youth club 
with a small donation being requested to view the artwork.9 The club’s manager 
informed the media that the artwork had been intended as a gift to the club and that 
the piece would be sold to raise funds for the club. However, the Bristol City Council 
contested the club’s actions and the artwork was relocated to the Bristol Museum 
where it was put on public display.10 In order to resolve whether the artwork 
belonged to the youth club or the people of Bristol (represented by the Bristol 
Museum and Bristol City Council) the parties appealed to Banksy via the media 
about his intentions for the piece. Banksy responded indicating that the youth club 
manager was the intended owner of the artwork.11 Pursuant to this, the artwork was 
sold to a private collector for £403 000.00, with the proceeds of the sale going to the 
youth club.12 
Spy Booth and Mobile Lovers exemplify the growing popularity of street art. The 
artworks are a symbol of changing attitudes towards graffiti and street art and of its 
acceptance of as a recognised and collectable form of art. They also highlight how 
important graffiti and street art can be to the communities in which they are located; 
that they can be a form of cultural heritage. Further, the artworks are indicative of 
the significant financial values of certain street artworks.  Unfortunately, both cases 
also exemplify some of the risks that culturally significant street art can be exposed 
 
7  Hansen 2018 City 286. 
8  BBC News http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-gloucestershire-37153440 (Date of use: 24 
January 2017). 
9  Hansen 2018 City 287. 
10  Hansen 2018 City 288-289. The display included information about Banksy, the artwork and 
encouraged donations to the youth club. See also Salib 2015 The University of Chicago Law 
Review 2293-2294. 
11  Hansen 2018 City 292. 
12  Hansen 2018 City 295. Gander  
https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/news/banksy-mobile-lovers-sold-owner-
of-youth-club-where-artwork-appeared-in-bristol-received-death-9695327.html (Date of use: 16 
April 2019). The current location of the artwork is unknown. 
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to. Indeed, Spy Booth is lost because it was destroyed by the owner albeit accidently 
and Mobile Lovers, whilst not lost, is no longer accessible by the local community 
because it is privately owned. 
These cases highlight the contested ground that is street art; contested between the 
rights of private owners to do what they want with their property and the interest of 
the state and the public in preserving, protecting cultural heritage resources (in the 
form of street art) and in ensuring access to those resources. Spy Booth and Mobile 
Lovers raise the question of who owns culturally significant street art, or rather who 
should own culturally significant street art.13   
Admittedly, both these cases are English and concern English law regarding 
property and cultural heritage. However, street art is a growing phenomenon and 
South African street artists are being acknowledged both locally and internationally 
and their work is becoming if not already valuable. For example, South African street 
artists Faith47 (see an example of her street art below at Figure 1), Falko One, and 
Mars are well-known in South Africa and the international street art scene.14 
Consequently, it is beneficial to consider the question of ownership of street art in 
South Africa so that cases such as these can be resolved. Therefore, culturally 
significant South African street art can be preserved and protected and public 
access to these resources can be ensured. 
 
13  Huws notes that there are various potential owners of the street art, namely: the street artist, 
the owners of the properties on which the artworks are located, the city councils for the sites, a 
private collector who purchases the artwork and the local community. Huws 
http://www.catrinfflurhuws.cymru/site/documents/spyfought.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 2019) 5-
19.  
14  Jacquet https://streetart360.net/2019/05/02/25-south-african-street-artists-not-to-be-missed/ 
(Date of use: 6 May 2020).  
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Figure 1: Faith47’s All Shall Be Equal Before the Law 
 
1.2 The development of street art 
It is difficult to comprehensively define graffiti as it is a form of expression and 
communication which includes, ‘a vast array of media technique, subject, matter, 
form and meanings.’15 Moreover, sometimes, graffiti does not fall within the 
traditional ideas of what constitutes art.16 Graffiti has always involved drawing or 
painting, and, after the development of written language, writing. Graffiti can take 
many forms; from the common spray-painted tag to murals, paste-ups, stickers, 
mosaic, sculpture, scratching, and etching amongst others.17 Graffiti may feature on 
private and public property, and it may also appear in art galleries and museum 
collections.18  
Human beings have been practising graffiti for thousands of years.19 The term graffiti 
derives from the Italian graffiare meaning, ‘to scratch’.20 This, in turn, probably 
 
15  Frederick 2009 Archaeologies 212. 
16  McAuliffe and Iveson 2011 Geography Compass 132. 
17  In general, see Lewisohn Street Art 15 – 23. 
18  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 639 – 641. 
19  Howarth Graffiti 551. 
20  Buckley Handwriting 3 and Howarth Graffiti 551. 
5 
 
 
derives from the Greek graphein meaning, ‘to write’.21 Evidence of graffiti has been 
found on the Pyramid of Khufu in Giza, Egypt (circa 2560 BCE), in the ruins of 
Pompeii in Italy (circa 700 BCE – 79 BCE); and at the ruins of the ancient Mayan 
city of Tikal in Guatemala (circa 100 BCE – 700 CE); amongst many other examples 
of ancient graffiti.22 Many famous people have participated in the creation of graffiti; 
the English poet Lord Byron tagged his name repeatedly at the Temple of Sunium 
in Greece (and at many other historical sites), and the German poet Goethe etched 
his name into the Strasbourg cathedral in Germany, to name just two examples.23 
Graffiti is understood to have developed into an identifiable art form around the 
1970s in urban areas of the USA.24 In New York tagging became popular and a 
proliferation of quickly scrawled tags appeared throughout the city.25 These tags 
then evolved into different styles of lettering as artists sought to distinguish 
themselves. These styles include bubble letters, Celtic style, Broadway/Manhattan 
style, Wild Style, two dimensional and three-dimensional lettering amongst others.26 
There was much competition amongst artists and graffiti ‘gangs’ to create more 
elaborate and more detailed work.27 As the tags became more intricate, the 
locations graffiti writers tagged became more daring, perhaps this also helped an 
artist to stand out from the crowd. New York train cars was a particularly popular 
location for graffiti writers. Motifs began to be included alongside the tags to 
 
21  Rychlicki 2008 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 393. 
22  Henley  
https://www.theguardian.com/culture/shortcuts/2014/mar/04/graffiti-leave-mark-on-ancient-
monuments (Date of use: 2 November 2016), Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 636; 
Gleaton Power to the People 6-8 and Jim http://www.historicmysteries.com/ancient-graffiti/ 
(Date of use: 18 October 2016). See also Peden Pharaonic Egypt and Howarth Graffiti 551 – 
555. For more on the history of graffiti see Reisner Graffiti. 
23  Lewisohn Street Art 26; Blume Graffiti 138. 
24  Howarth Graffiti 550, 553 
25  Howarth Graffiti 553, Ferrel Crimes of Style 7. Tagging is the writing of the graffiti writer’s name, 
or initials or pseudonym (and can include other details such as the street number of their 
residence). Tapz is an example of a well-known South African tagger who writes the tag Tapz 
in many areas of South Africa. Further, this phenomenon was not exclusive to New York and 
occurred in many US cities and other countries, New York has been used as an illustrative 
example. 
26  Howarth Graffiti 553 – 554, Ferrel Crimes of Style 7-8 
27  Lewisohn Street Art 30-35. In general, see Cooper and Chalfant Subway Art and Chalfont and 
Prigoff Spraycan Art 7-12.  
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enhance them and, again, to distinguish artists from other train car taggers.28 Then 
elaborate, designed images began to appear.29 Eventually, some artists succeeded 
in painting entire train cars.  
The art world began to take notice of the developing art form, and graffiti artists 
began to be represented by art dealers and galleries. For instance, in 1979 an art 
dealer Claudio Bruni exhibited the works of graffiti artists Lee Quinones and Fab 5 
Freddy at the Galleria La Medusa in Rome.30 In the early 1980s, a Dutch art dealer 
Yoki Kornblit hosted an exhibition of graffiti artwork in Rotterdam. The exhibition 
included works by Dondi, Rammellzee and Futura2000 to name a few.31 
By the early 2000s, stencil art became the predominant form of graffiti and this 
advanced to include a greater diversity of practices and images. With this growth 
and development, and the experimental attitude of artists, graffiti now includes a 
vast array of media, including street sculpture, yarn-bombing, cross-stitch street art, 
digital displays, plant displays, masking tape street art, sand (or beach) and snow 
art, balloon street art, Lego street art and installation art.32 
Emerging from this period (circa 1970 to current) some graffiti artists, such as Jean-
Michel Basquiat, Keith Haring, Banksy, Shepard Fairey, David Choe and Mr 
Brainwash, began to commercialise their work; indeed, David Choe ranks amongst 
the world’s most successful (and wealthiest) artists.33 The popularity of graffiti has 
 
28  Howarth Graffiti 554, Ferrel Crimes of Style 7. Indeed, tagging is recognised as an art form in 
its own rights, similar to calligraphy. Further, some street artists specialise in typography. See 
Lewisohn Street Art 19 – 21, 48- 49, 137 and Peiter Guerrilla Art 50 -55. 
29  Howarth Graffiti 554 – 555, Ferrel Crimes of Style 8. 
30  Francis Re-facing Societies 2 and Fab 5 Freddy http://fab5freddy.com/back-makin-art/ (Date of 
use: 19 May 2018).  
31  Hunt Popular Culture 24. 
32  Young Street Art 4, Lina D http://www.boredpanda.com/street-art-interacts-with-surroundings/ 
(Date of use: 8 November 2016), Delana http://weburbanist.com/2009/11/05/off-the-wall-graffiti-
11-artists-making-odd-marks/ (Date of use: 8 November 2016), Gould-Bourne 
http://www.boredpanda.com/cross-stitch-street-art-in-spain-by-raquel-rodrigo/ (Date of use: 8 
November 2016). For more on this part of the history of street art see Bates Bombing, Tagging, 
Writing 23 – 53. 
33  Widewalls http://www.widewalls.ch/graffiti-history-10-important-moments/shepard-fairey-obey/ 
(Date of use: 2 November 2016); Widewalls http://www.widewalls.ch/richest-artists-in-the-
world/david-choe/ (Date of use: 2 November 2016). See also Howarth Graffiti 555. Street artists 
are regularly commissioned to create ‘legal’ street art, wherein they are provided with a privately 
owned or state owned, space on which to paint and are remunerated for this. To distinguish this 
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caught the attention of mainstream media (with graffiti becoming a topic for in-depth 
articles in various publications, documentary films, music videos and 
photojournalism) and become a field for academic research.34 Even advertising 
agencies have begun to use graffiti and urban art as an inventive method to promote 
their clients; companies such as Nike have run graffiti style campaigns.35 
These developments have therefore led to the consideration of certain graffiti as a 
formal form of art in that, it has recognisable forms and conventions.36 Indeed, some 
graffiti has many similarities with what is termed, ‘high art’, in that, it has a strong 
and identifiable aesthetic concept. As Mann notes, 
‘As a medium that extends itself to almost every corner of a city for all 
to see, graffiti has always been (and probably still is) one of the true 
forms of public art in the country. It is a golden art form that as a result 
of the aforementioned public acceptance can now exist in gallery 
spaces as well as lower-income areas, for all to see and appreciate. 
As Cale, Damn Vandal and Bias collectively explain and agree upon, 
graffiti has the power to change how people view and interact with 
art’.37 
1.3 Distinguishing street art from graffiti 
Despite its long, rich, and vibrant history, graffiti is commonly understood to be anti-
social behaviour and/or a crime.38 Graffiti is treated as a form of vandalism and a 
 
art from street art (which is not commissioned) it will be referred to as urban art. However, as 
urban art results from a commission it falls within the law of contract and is not the focus of this 
study. As an example of how commercial some street artists are, see Sernoffsky 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Banksy-s-S-F-artwork-draws-a-six-figure-fervor-
5568831.php (Date of use: 18 May 2018). 
34  Ferrel Crimes of Style 8-11, Young Street Art 5, McAuliffe and Iveson 2011 Geography 
Compass 134 – 136. 
35  Young Street Art 5, McAuliffe and Iveson 2011 Geography Compass 134. For more on the 
commercialization of graffiti see Lombard 2013 Visual Communication Quarterly 91. 
36  Cooper and Chalfant Subway Art 17. 
37  Mann http://10and5.com/2016/02/25/from-tags-to-murals-south-african-graffitis-move-into-the-
accepted-public-eye/ (Date of use: 19 September 2016). 
38  See for instance Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 656-670. 
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sign of urban decay.39 Graffiti is considered to be the illegal positioning of art on 
immovable or movable property; it is ‘any form of unofficial, unsanctioned application 
of a medium onto a surface’.40 Indeed, in most cities throughout the world, graffiti is 
determined to be a criminal act and the artists as criminals.41  
The South African approach to graffiti is in line with this international trend. In South 
Africa, graffiti is criminalised in terms of the common law crime of malicious damage 
to property, the General Law Further Amendment Act 93 of 1962 (GLFA), and by 
various municipal by-laws.42 In terms of these standards, graffiti is understood to be 
the defacement or disfiguration of movable or immovable property by, ‘placing any 
placard, poster, writing, word, letter, sign, symbol, drawing or other mark on any 
property, whether movable or immovable, of any other person or of the State, and 
thereby defaces or disfigures such property.’43 
However, this is a limited perspective of graffiti since it fails to consider graffiti as a 
form of art. The term street art is applied to this identifiable art form in order to 
distinguish the ‘art’, from the graffiti, the ‘art’, from the vandalism.44  
The evolution of graffiti to street art,  
 
39  Herron http://www.herron.iupui.edu/blog/06042012/street-art-vs-graffiti (Date of use: 28 August 
2015). 
40  Lewisohn Street Art 15. 
41  General Law Further Amendment Act 93 of 1962 (hereinafter referred to as the GLFA). McAuliffe 
and Iveson 2011 Geography Compass 128. A distinction is made between street artists and 
graffiti writers, this distinction will be highlighted further in the discussion on the difference 
between graffiti and street art. Suffice, to say, at this point, that some graffiti writers do not wish 
to be perceived as ‘artists’ and some street artists do not want to denigrate their work to graffiti. 
Lewisohn Street Art 18. 
42  GLFA s44(1). For examples of municipal by-laws regulating graffiti see City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality Public Open Spaces By-laws 831 of 2004 s17(1)(a) (hereinafter 
referred to as the JHB Graffiti By-law) and City of Cape Town: Graffiti By-law 2010 s1, s3(1) and 
s11 (hereinafter referred to as the CPT Graffiti By-law). 
43  GLFA s44(1). 
44  Austin 2010 City 35; DeNotto 2014 College and Research Libraries News 208 – 209. See also 
Lewisohn Street Art 15 and Schrift and Fabre Design Team http://schriftfarbe.com/the-
difference-between-street-art-and-graffiti (Date of use: 25 August 2015). The term, ‘street art’, 
is not universally used, with some authors still using the term graffiti. In this study, these two 
terms are used to distinguish between graffiti that can be considered to be art and graffiti that 
does not hold the artistic value (as street art shares with ‘traditional’ art) and therefore remains 
considered as a public nuisance.  
9 
 
 
‘has produced a culturally rich visual history that links artists, city spaces, 
urban audiences and media technologies across the globe. The art form’s 
collectively sustained duration, its historically complex social and 
institutional development and its aesthetic sophistication [which] place it 
among the longest-running, global visual culture movements originating 
within the 20th century, and perhaps the most important of the last 
decades…’45  
The significant distinction between street art and graffiti is the intention of the 
artwork.46 Graffiti does not seek to speak to a public audience, rather, it speaks to 
the artist and/or to other graffiti writers. The graffiti writer is not concerned with 
having a positive public reputation, they seek to destroy rather than create; to make 
a mess rather than to improve.47 Graffiti has no justification other than its 
existence.48 The aesthetic is not necessarily identifiable, nor is it integral to the work. 
This, ‘form of unofficial, unsanctioned application of a medium onto a surface’ is still 
considered to be a public nuisance and/or vandalism.49  
In contrast, street art is considered to be the higher art form, wherein the purpose 
of the artwork is not destruction (as may be the case with graffiti) but rather to invoke 
an emotional response, to create a conversation and to beautify the urban 
environment.50 Often, street art will relate to external rules of aestheticisation.51 
Indeed, the semantic content of street art, as opposed to graffiti can be more 
important than the presented visual.52  
 
45  Austin 2010 City 35. 
46  Schrift and Farbe http://schriftfarbe.com/the-difference-between-street-art-and-graffiti (Date of 
use: 28 August 2015). 
47  Lewisohn Street Art 18 – 19. These are, obviously generalisations as the two genres have the 
same origin and often the two genres can be found in the same piece. However, as Lewisohn 
suggests, ‘in strict academic terms, it is necessary to differentiate between them …’  
48  Lewisohn Street Art 18. 
49  Lewisohn Street Art 15. 
50  DeNotto 2014 College and Research Libraries News 208. 
51  Lewisohn Street Art 18. 
52  Austin 2010 City 35. 
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Gómez suggests that distinguishing between graffiti and street art depends upon 
the motivation underlying each piece.53 Many different motivations for graffiti exist, 
such as marking territory, gaining fame/recognition/notoriety, advertisement of 
skills, political commentary, self-expression and to convey a message amongst 
many other motivations.54 It is rare for graffiti merely to be motivated by its illegality.55 
 ‘[Street] artists often use their medium to express their feelings about 
society and/or to enhance an otherwise bleak urban landscape. 
Political messages are also sometimes conveyed.’56  
Street artists may even perceive themselves as a public benefactor; turning the dull, 
bland walls of a city into art.57 After all, 
 ‘…one person’s enjoyment of graffiti does not “use it up” for others; 
inspiration from graffiti is infinite and non-segmentable. An endless 
number of people can see graffiti in one location without increasing its 
cost of production. As well, one can argue that graffiti art is non-
excludable. By virtue of its creation and display in public spaces, no 
one can be excluded from seeing, enjoying or benefitting from it. 
Unless a wall is built to hide it, or the image is erased, a graffiti image 
painted on a wall is out there for everyone to view. Graffiti thus fits the 
definition of a public good.’58 
Street art has been compared to pop art, conceptual art, New Realism and as 
generally following the tradition of all modern abstract painting.59 Indeed, street art 
is beginning to be seen by the art world and the public as a tolerable and effective 
 
53  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 633. 
54  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 644 – 650. 
55  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 697. For more on the motivation of graffiti writers see 
Halsey and Young 2006 Theoretical Criminology 279 – 289. 
56  Hype Magazine http://www.hypemagazine.co.za/2012/07/graffiti-art-or-vandalism/ (Date of use: 
19 September 2016). 
57  Buckley Handwriting 139. 
58  Rizk 2015 The African Journal of Information and Communication 50. 
59  Howarth Graffiti 555 – 556. It has also been considered to be a development from the sixteenth-
century Italian painters (such as Caravaggio) who rebelled against the confines and limitations 
of traditional canvas painting. 
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manner in which to highlight social issues. It is also being seen as a form of self-
expression; as well as a form of public art (considering the artwork to be an 
improvement to property and the urban environment rather than vandalism).60 It is 
a form of urban re-facing rather than defacement (which is identified with graffiti).61 
Thus, street art tends to be concerned with the audience and not with the artist. 
Further, the public’s positive reaction to some street art can call into question the 
criminalisation of certain pieces.62 ‘The boundaries of public are becoming more 
blurred, and different types of art are commissioned for public consumption’.63 In 
this regard, the location, content and style of a piece can change the public’s attitude 
towards the criminalisation of street art.64  
With this identification as a unique art form and with acceptance into the art world, 
street artists are currently being recognised alongside well-known ‘traditional’ 
artists.65 As previously stated, some street artists rank amongst the world’s 
wealthiest and most respected artists.66 For instance, many street artists’ work has 
been exhibited by prominent galleries worldwide, and both the legal (whether urban 
art or ‘traditional’ artworks) and illegal artwork of street artists have fetched high 
sums at auction.67 This recognition and the acceptance by the art world has resulted 
in certain works of street art acquiring significant artistic and financial value. Further, 
 
60  Wilson and Healy Graffiti and Vandalism 33. 
61  Francis Refacing Societies 1. 
62  Halsey and Young 2002 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 168. 
63  Waddacor as quoted in Mann http://10and5.com/2016/02/25/from-tags-to-murals-south-african-
graffitis-move-into-the-accepted-public-eye/ (Date of use: 19 September 2016). 
64  Halsey and Young 2002 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 169. 
65  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 655 and the sources quoted therein. See also Lachmann 
1988 American Journal of Sociology 245 – 248. 
66  DiVirgilio http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/world/the-worlds-five-richest-artists/ (Date of use: 2 
November 2016). 
67  Lerman 2012 -2013 NYU J Intell Prop & Ent L 300, Peiter Guerrilla Art 4 – 7 and Howarth Graffiti 
551, 555. Further, see Rahm  
  http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellerahm/2013/10/22/banksy-the-20-million-graffiti-artist-who-
doesnt-want-his-art-to-be-worth-anything/ (Date of use: 4 July 2014), Julien’s Auctions 
  http://www.juliensauctions.com/press/2014/street-art-banksy-addl.html (Date of use: 4 July 
2018) and Artnet Auctions 2014 http://www.artnet.com/auctions/urban-art/ (Date of use: 4 July 
2014). 
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some street artworks are also considered to have cultural value to the communities 
and countries in which they are situated.68  
There is no doubt that some street artists have gripped the public’s attention and 
that certain of their legal and illegal artworks are considered to have artistic value, 
financial value and cultural value.69 The street artist Shepard Fairey’s work was used 
in Hope posters for the former President of the USA, Barack Obama’s presidential 
campaign.70 Moreover, apart from the artistic and cultural significance of his pieces, 
Shepard Fairey’s artwork regularly sells for tens of thousands of dollars. For 
example, a painting titled War is Over sold for $71 700.71 Another example of the 
acceptance of a street artist occurred when the former UK Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, gifted Barack Obama an artwork by the street artist Eine upon a visit to 
the White House; the artwork was considered to be an example of UK art and culture 
and thus, an appropriate gift from the Prime Minister.72 Further, many celebrities 
invest in street art, for instance, Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt bought several artworks 
by Banksy, to the value of £1 million.73 Further, the concept of street art has also 
appeared in an episode of the cartoon series The Simpsons, wherein it was 
 
68  Lewisohn Street Art 9. For an example of a street artwork that is considered to have cultural 
value see Banksy’s Spy Booth. BBC “Cheltenham Banksy artwork will stay in town” 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-gloucestershire-31100915 (Date of use: 14 June 2019). 
This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
69  Bengsten 2013 Journal of Art History 63 – 80. In general, see Lewisohn Street Art and Peiter 
Guerrilla Art. For examples of international street artists whose artworks (both legal and illegal) 
are highly desirable and valuable see the works of Banksy, Nick Walker, Shepard Fairey and 
Invader to name a few. Bamberger http://www.artbusiness.com/osoqfairbank.html (Date of use: 
11 February 2015); Mark 
http://www.ukstreetart.co.uk/banksys-rival-nick-walker-sells-750000-pounds-of-street-art/ 
(Date of use: 8 July 2014); Street Art Bio http://www.streetartbio.com/#!shepard-fairey/cd7u 
(Date of use: 8 July 2014); Invader http://www.space-invaders.com/about/ (Date of use: 8 July 
2014). 
70  Mettler 2012-2013 Mich L Rev 253.  
71  Widewalls http://www.widewalls.ch/shepard-fairey-art-auctions/ (Date of use: 7 November 
2016). 
72  BBC News http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-10710074 (Date of use: 28 September 2016). 
73  MailOnline http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-487230/Brangelina-spend-1-million-
Banksy-work-contemporary-art-auction-London.html (Date of use: 7 November 2016). This 
celebrity duo have collected numerous pieces of street art, see for instance Independent 
https://www.independent.ie/woman/celeb-news/art-lover-brad-pitt-buys-graffiti-pics-of-amy-
winehouse-and-prince-william-26867656.html (Date of use: 1 January 2019). 
13 
 
 
depicted, ‘[u]rban vandalism is now the hottest art form there is.’74 Street art is now 
part of pop-culture.  
The popularity of street art has made it a desirable acquisition for art collectors. 
There are many and varied reasons as to why people invest in and collect this form 
of art.75 For instance, some collectors acquire street art as a blue-chip investment.76 
Based on its popularity, there is potential for selected street artists’ works to increase 
in value to the tens of millions of dollars.77 Consequently, for art experts, there may 
be a considerable amount of money to be made from investing in street art which 
makes it an attractive acquisition for blue-chip investors. In addition, other collectors 
may acquire street art because of their relationship with the individual artist, or 
because street art represents their personal brand or for aesthetic reasons.78 For 
example, Hong Kong entrepreneur Kevin Poon began collecting street art in 2005 
with the acquisition of a piece by New York street artist Kaws (appreciating the 
aesthetic quality of the piece).79 The American financier Marc Bell collects works by 
the street artist Monopoly.80 Likewise, American art collector and Andy Warhol 
“Superstar” Jane Holzer’s collection includes works by Keith Haring and Jean-
 
74  Almendrala  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/05/shepard-fairey-on-the-simpsons_n_1321383.html 
(Date of use: 15 December 2015). 
75  For a discussion of the reasons and motivations behind street art collectors see Jacobson The 
Passionate Economy 20-41. 
76  A blue-chip art collector is one who collects the art for the potential of the resale value. The 
  artwork is not acquired for the collector’s aesthetic enjoyment, or because it is an important 
artwork in terms of an institution, artist or history (for examples) but because it is a financial 
investment. IdeelArt https://www.ideelart.com/magazine/what-is-a-blue-chip-artist- (Date of 
use: 31 December 2018). See also Abrams  
https://www.artspace.com/magazine/art_101/close_look/how-does-banksy-make-money-or-a-
lesson-in-art-market-economics-55352 (Date of use: 31 December 2018). 
77  Sullivan https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/your-money/collecting-street-art-have-room-on-
your-wall-for-a-wall.html (Date of use: 31 December 2018). 
78  Sullivan https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/your-money/collecting-street-art-have-room-on-
your-wall-for-a-wall.html (Date of use: 31 December 2018). 
79  Raitt http://www.larryslist.com/artmarket/the-talks/larrys-list-kevin-poon-from-street-art-to-
contemporary-art/ (Date of use: 31 December 2018); Twigg and Mirandilla 
https://hk.asiatatler.com/life/art-talk-the-young-collectors-kevin-poon (Date of use: 31 
December 2018), Twigg and Mirandilla https://hk.asiatatler.com/life/art-talk-the-young-
collectors-kevin-poon (Date of use: 31 December 2018). 
80  Mun-Delsalle https://www.forbes.com/sites/yjeanmundelsalle/2015/03/13/alec-monopolys-
graffiti-celebrity-portraits-and-monopoly-man-are-a-hit-with-the-rich-and-
famous/#7118e9ac1631 (Date of use: 1 January 2019). 
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Michele Basquiat.81 Plus, as noted above, street artists are popular amongst 
celebrity collectors such as Brad Pitt, Angelina Jolie, Russell Simons, Christina 
Aguilera, Swizz Beatz and Jay-Z, to name a few.82 In addition, some collectors are 
directly involved in the art industry, such as Todd Kramer who is a partner at an art 
gallery and began collecting Banksy works in 2001.83 Further, some museums, such 
as the Urban Nation museum in Berlin Germany, have opened for the purpose of 
collecting street artworks.84 Due to the rise in popularity for collecting street artwork, 
Banksy began an authentication site for his artworks. This site enables collectors to 
ensure they are acquiring original Banksy works.85 
The trend, of recognising, valuing and collecting street art alongside traditional art, 
has also evolved in South Africa and a few South African street artists are garnering 
international recognition.86 Faith47’s works are artistically and financially valuable 
and more importantly, several pieces are significant to South Africa’s cultural 
heritage. Faith47 is an internationally respected artist; her legal artworks (the 
majority of the work she does now is legal and commissioned) are highly valuable, 
 
81  Viladas https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/24/style/tmagazine/24holzer1.html (Date of use: 1 
January 2019), Complex https://www.complex.com/style/2011/09/25-celebrities-with-baller-art-
collections/6 (Date of use: 1 January 2017).  For a discussion on the concept of, and the 
models/actresses that are deemed, Warhol “Superstars” see Gilbertson 2001 Art Journal 24. 
82  Complex https://www.complex.com/style/2011/09/25-celebrities-with-baller-art-collections/6 
(Date of use: 1 January 2017).   
83  Sullivan https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/your-money/collecting-street-art-have-room-on-
your-wall-for-a-wall.html (Date of use: 31 December 2018). 
84  Ellis-Petersen https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2017/sep/20/street-art-goes-home-
museum-of-graffiti-opens-in-berlin-urban-nation (Date of use: 31 December 2018). 
85  Pest Control https://www.pestcontroloffice.com/whatispco.html (Date of use: 31 December 
2018). Banksy also uses this service to try to keep his illegal artworks from being removed from 
public spaces by unscrupulous collectors. He does this by not authenticating those artworks so 
that should the collector try to sell the artwork the provenance of the artwork will be uncertain. 
See also Myartbroker https://www.myartbroker.com/artist/banksy/pest-control-verify-banksy-
prints/ (Date of use: 31 December 2018). 
86  Top South African street (and graffiti) artists include Rasty, Falko, Mak1one, Faith47, and Mars 
amongst others. See in general Waddacor Graffiti South Africa. As an example, see the work of 
Faith47 who has participated in many international exhibitions and whose legal artwork is sold 
by respected South African and international galleries. Faith47 https://faith47.com/ (Date of use: 
4 July 2018) and Nurse http://davidkrutprojects.com/exhibitions/2012-11-2_faith-47_proj-js 
(Date of use: 11 February 2015). Falko has also participated in many international exhibitions 
and has received commissions from several name brand companies. See his Facebook page 
for a summary of exhibitions, commissions and awards; Falko One 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Falko-one/161187987282182?sk=info&tab=page_info (Date 
of use: 18 June 2015). 
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and she has been commissioned to produce several urban art murals and is paid 
well for such artworks.87  
South African street artists are in demand and can be very successful in the art 
world.88 Thus, it is not a leap to suggest that these artists’ illegal artwork, their street 
art, also has artistic and financial value, and further, that there are examples of street 
art that hold cultural significance to South African communities and the country. 
Consequently, the protection and preservation of these culturally significant 
artworks is worth investigating.  
1.4 Problem statement: The loss of street art 
Despite its worldwide recognition, the understanding of street art as a crime has 
been maintained. The aesthetic value and the intention of the work remains ignored, 
as is the artistic, financial, and cultural value.89 As Austin states,  
‘Graffiti artists painting and making work in the street and/or on trains 
have been engaged in law breaking violations of property rather than 
singular creation of aesthetic commodities and objects of ownership.’90 
This polemical approach to street art has resulted in the damage and/or destruction 
of significant artworks. The nature of street art is precarious; street art is at risk of 
damage and/or destruction from other artists, vandals, the public, and, local 
authorities because of the failure of the law to adapt to the evolution of graffiti to 
street art. Street art can be damaged by being painted on, and by parts of the work 
being removed (especially where the street art is a sculpture, installation art, or 
mosaic). Street art may also be removed entirely, this occurs where the art is kept 
intact but is removed from its original position and often the possessor or owner of 
 
87  Francis Re-facing Societies 8. See this source in general for more on Faith47 as an artist and 
the impact of her work. For examples of the financial value of Faith47’s works see Nelly Duff 
https://www.nellyduff.com/artists/faith47 (Date of use: 28 December 2018). 
88  For more information on the South African street art scene in general and for examples of South  
   African street artists and their artworks see Graffiti South Africa 
http://www.graffitisouthafrica.com/ (Date of use: 4 July 2014). 
89  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 650. 
90  Austin 2010 City 41. 
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the property on which the art is located removes the artwork with the intention of 
selling the artwork,  
‘[t]here is something of the Wild West about ownership of street art. 
The only certainty is that it is not likely to remain in the street for very 
long. It has simply become too valuable.’91 
Further, street art may also be scrubbed by being sandblasted or chemically 
removed. Scrubbing off artwork may be done by local authorities or private property 
owners. Finally, pieces may be destroyed by the destruction of the surface on which 
they are painted.92  
The failure to recognise the artistic value of street art and to seek its protection and 
preservation has resulted in many countries losing valuable artworks by renowned 
street artists. This failure has also resulted in the loss of well-loved public art and, in 
some circumstances, arguably, a cultural heritage resource. Many of Banksy’s other 
street artworks have been damaged, removed or destroyed. As a well-respected 
and prevalent street artist, Banksy’s artworks have regularly been the object of 
damage and destruction and the target of scrubbing by local authorities.93 Despite 
his popularity, his artwork is still considered to be vandalism and thus, most often, 
not protected and preserved.94 For example, in Melbourne, Australia, an artwork, 
titled Little Diver (circa 2003), was destroyed when paint was poured over the image 
 
91  Aspden as quoted in Williams https://itsartlaw.com/2013/03/25/part-i-who-owns-street-art/ 
(Date of use: 23 January 2017). 
92  These threats are similar to, if not the same as, the threats faced by cultural heritage objects. 
Roodt notes that cultural heritage objects face numerous threats: physical threats (which include 
war and illicit excavations), disintegrative threats (which include environmental threats and 
threats posed by the commodification of culture), the enormous demand for heritage objects, 
and threats posed by progress and globalisation. See Roodt Cultural Heritage xxiv. Interestingly, 
she later notes at xxix that the world market for stolen art is one of the largest areas of 
international crime, only the arms and drug-trafficking markets are larger. See also Palmer 
Current Legal Problems 215 – 254. 
93  For a discussion of Banksy’s prominence in the street art world see Chao Getting up 24 – 35. 
94  For a successful example of Banksy’s street art being given legal protection see Art Law and 
More https://artlawandmore.com/2015/02/22/banksy-granted-legal-protection/ (Date of use: 8 
November 2016). A few others have also been considered for Heritage Protection, for instance 
see Brown http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-06-23/melbourne-graffiti-considered-for-
heritage/2481118 (Date of use: 8 November 2016). Further, whilst Banksy an anonymous artist 
it is widely presumed that he is male therefore the male pronouns are used to refer to him herein. 
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despite the attempt by the private property owner to protect the work by covering 
the piece with Plexiglas. Similarly, Banksy artworks on walls in Palestine, the UK, 
New Orleans and Los Angeles have been removed (intact) by galleries, collectors, 
and private property owners, and sold for sums ranging from $50 000 to $1 million.95 
As another example of this type of risk; the Banksy artwork, known as Slave Labour 
(circa 2012), which was situated on the wall of a building in Wood Green, England 
was (at first) damaged by a member of the public and then removed intact from the 
wall of the building. The piece eventually went up for sale at auction and was sold 
for £750 000; intended to become part of someone’s private collection and for the 
owner of the Wood Green building to profit from the artwork.96 The removal of the 
work occurred despite the public’s appreciation of the work, as well as the cultural 
significance of the piece and the political statement it made considering its creation 
before the Queen of England’s Diamond Jubilee and the London Olympics. The 
removal of the work was described as the ruin of a national treasure.97 Therefore, a 
councillor for Wood Green, upset by the removal of the work from the public sphere, 
has campaigned to have the work restored.98 
It should also be noted that the lack of recognition and protection of these types of 
artworks allows acquisitors to export the artworks without complying with any of the 
national or international laws that limit (or in some cases prohibit) the international 
trade in cultural heritage objects.99 For instance, the Banksy artwork Kissing 
Coppers (circa 2005) that was displayed on a wall in Brighton, England for seven 
years was removed (to the chagrin of many Brightonians) and sent to the Keszler 
 
95  Martin http://www.forbes.com/sites/guymartin/2015/12/30/banking-on-banksy-how-collectors-
can-and-cant-monetize-500000-works-of-art/#553687ec4a79 (Date of use: 7 November 2016). 
Many of these removed pieces had significant meaning because of where they were located i.e. 
they were site specific artworks. 
96  Hansen 2016 Crime Media Culture 292. 
97  Hansen 2016 Crime Media Culture 302. 
98  Young Street Art 147 – 150; Hansen 2016 Crime Media Culture 289 – 293. Hansen also 
discusses another of Banky’s pieces known as No Ball Games herein. This is not the only 
example of a community working together to save a Banksy artwork for public appreciation. See 
Sernoffsky https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/Banksy-s-S-F-artwork-draws-a-six-figure-
fervor-5568831.php?cmpid=twitter-premium&t=c1f98bd3ff793836fd#/4 (Date of use: 18 May 
2018). 
99  For a discussion on the reasons for limitation of international art trading see Bator 1982 Stan L 
Rev 294-310. See in general Merryman 1998 NYU J Intl L & Pol 1. 
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Art Gallery in New York which subsequently sold the piece.100 Although this work 
was arguably an object of English cultural heritage, the lack of recognition of Kissing 
Coppers enabled the removal and export of the artwork.101 
The risks that Banksy’s artworks face is no different for other street art, or other 
street artists; they are just better known because of Banksy’s fame. In South Africa, 
street art is also in a precarious position: The City of Cape Town has strict by-laws, 
prohibit graffiti. These by-laws allow for the prosecution of graffiti writers and provide 
a method of compensation for the possessor or owner of the property on which the 
street art is located for the cost of repair. According to the City of Cape Town: Graffiti 
By-law 2010 any person who fails to comply with the by-law is guilty of an offence, 
and, if convicted, shall be liable for a fine of up to R15 000 or 3-months imprisonment 
(for a first offence). The transgressor also has to reimburse the City or the private 
owner of the damaged property for the costs of removing the graffiti.102  
In 2016, Johannesburg mayor Herman Mashaba, took a firm stance on graffiti by 
developing stricter by-laws in an effort to create a more investor-friendly city 
(inspired by Cape Town’s position).103 According to the City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality Public Open Spaces By-laws 831 of 2004, a convicted 
artist may be liable for an unspecified fine or a six-month prison term.104 Mashaba 
intended to make these punishments more severe and therefore, deter graffiti 
writers and street artists from ‘defacing the city’. This new approach to graffiti in 
Johannesburg has already resulted in the Johannesburg Roads Agency removing 
various graffiti works from the side of Johannesburg roads. None of the works 
removed were documented, and there were no attempts to preserve any of the 
 
100  Topping https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2011/apr/21/banksy-kissing-copppers-
sold-america (Date of use: 1 January 2019). 
101  The export of cultural objects from the United Kingdom is controlled by the Export of Objects of 
Cultural Interest (Control) Order 2003, made under the Export Control Act 2002 s 9(6). See also 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport Export Controls.  
102  CPT Graffiti By-law s11. 
103  Sosibo http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-01-00-graffiti-and-the-legal-bid-to-erase-public-art-
histories (Date of use: 2 November 2016). How removing and preventing graffiti creates a more 
investor-friendly city is not discussed. 
104  JHB Graffiti By-law s27(1)(a). 
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work.105 If this approach is maintained and stricter by-laws are enacted, then 
Johannesburg may lose important artworks. An example of artwork that is at risk in 
Braamfontein is the work of the American artist Shepard Fairey (the same artist who 
designed Barak Obama’s presidential campaign poster). The mural (circa 2014) 
depicts an image of former president Nelson Mandela with the slogan, ‘[t]he purple 
shall govern’ and was painted in commemoration of the anniversary of the 1989 
anti-Apartheid Purple Rain protests.106 Though the work is covered in a varnish to 
try to protect it, it remains at risk of damage, removal or scrubbing because it is not 
recognised as a cultural heritage resource.  
 
Figure 2: Shepard Fairey’s The Purple Shall Govern 
 
Another example of Faith47’s work, The People Shall Govern (circa 2010) (created 
as part of her Freedom Charter Project (circa 2010)) still stands, undamaged but 
 
105  Whittles http://mg.co.za/article/2016-10-27-00-writings-on-the-wall-for-joburgs-graffiti-artists 
(Date of use: 2 November 2016); Sosibo http://mg.co.za/article/2016-11-01-00-graffiti-and-the-
legal-bid-to-erase-public-art-histories (Date of use: 2 November 2016). Albeit that it is not known 
whether these could have been considered as street art or were merely a public nuisance. 
106  Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nelson_Mandela_Mural_by_Shepard_Fairey (Date of 
use: 3 November 2016) (hereinafter referred to as The Purple Shall Govern). This artwork is 
located on the building 155 Smit Street, in the Johannesburg CBD.  
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unprotected, in Jeppestown, Johannesburg. The Freedom Charter artwork in the 
same project (painted at Frere street in Observatory, Cape Town) which was an 
ornate replica of the actual Freedom Charter, has been painted over and is now a 
plain white wall. How long the rest of the existent works in the project will remain 
undamaged is not certain if they continue to be considered as the products of crime 
and, thus, remain unprotected by the law. In addition, the lack of recognition of street 
art ensures that the laws that limit and prevent (in special cases) the export of South 
Africa’s cultural heritage objects cannot be applied to this form of art.107  
 
Figure 3: Faith47’s The People Shall Govern 
Before the enactment of the abovementioned by-laws, South Africa had already lost 
many street artworks because of the failure to recognise them as art. This is 
evidenced by an unknowable number of graffiti resistance artworks, protesting the 
Apartheid regime, which no longer exist.108 The loss of these artworks is a pity since 
resistance art (and graffiti as an aspect of this category of art) is an important part 
of South Africa’s cultural heritage.  
 
107  The export of cultural heritage objects is regulated in terms of The National Heritage Resources  
Act 25 of 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the NHRA) s32(1) and (19)-(32). 
108  NLA Designs and Visual Art https://nladesignvisual.wordpress.com/2013/04/06/resistance-or-
protest-art-in-south-africa-background/ (Date of use: 2 November 2016). For more on protest 
art see Clark Protest Art and Contemporary African Art https://www.contemporary-african-
art.com/resistance-art.html (Date of use: 16 May 2018). 
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Graffiti played a significant role (albeit a limited one) in the anti-Apartheid 
movement.109 Due to the banning of public protest during the 1985-1986 State of 
Emergency, graffiti became a method in which the Apartheid government could still 
be challenged; it became a tool by which anti-Apartheid protestors could still voice 
their rebellious opinions of the system.110 Graffiti also played a role in the 
communication between the various liberation movements by providing them with a 
means of leaving messages for one another.111 Graffiti was also an emotional tool 
in which communities could respond to the oppression of the Apartheid state. An 
example of such, was painted on a wall in a Cape Town slum by Falko, Wealz and 
Faith47 in response to the demolishment of interracial communities as required by 
the Group Areas Act.112 Over and above this there was also a poster protest 
movement which entailed the posting of illegal anti-Apartheid posters in townships 
where the majority of South Africans could access them.113 This movement 
continues in South Africa, specifically by the Burning Museum collective which uses 
the art form to highlight current social issues by pasting posters onto the walls of 
public buildings, galleries and museums.114 Sadly, most of this resistance art is lost 
to history despite its cultural and historical significance to South Africa.115 
Admittedly, a significant amount of this graffiti resistance art would have been 
destroyed by the Apartheid government themselves because the political graffiti 
contradicted Apartheid law and policies, hence a crime. However, even post-1994, 
 
109  Kurtz https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/kurtz_south_africa.pdf 
(Date of use: 7 March 2020) 5. 
110  See Nippard https://www.dw.com/en/south-african-street-artists-paint-for-the-people/a-
14902960 (Date of use: 2 November 2016) for a discussion of the influence of anti-Apartheid 
graffiti and its influence on Faith47. 
111  NLA Designs and Visual Art https://nladesignvisual.wordpress.com/2013/04/06/resistance-or-
protest-art-in-south-africa-background/ (Date of use: 2 November 2016). For more on the South 
African resistance art movement see Williamson Resistance Art. 
112  Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Group Areas Act). The story of this 
artwork was included in the graffiti documentary Bomb It. See Bomb It http://www.bombit-
themovie.com/ (Date of use: 24 January 2017). 
113  Francis Re-facing Societies 6-8. 
114  Hewson https://www.contemporaryand.com/magazines/protest-art-in-south-africa-and-beyond-
2/ (Date of use:16 May 2018). See also Burning Museum 
https://burningmuseum.wordpress.com/ (Date of use:16 May 2018). 
115  Graffiti can be viewed as an integral aspect of a resistance movement, this is apparent in many 
countries which have or are experiencing some form of political revolution such as Egypt and 
Palestine. See for instance Owens Egyptian Graffiti and Street Art chapter 13. 
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more artwork has been lost because this form of resistance art is still considered to 
be to graffiti.116 An example of such resistance art used to exist in Observatory, 
Cape Town. The work, painted by an anonymous artist, read Free Mandela (circa 
unknown, presumed to have been painted during Nelson Mandela’s imprisonment 
1963-1990).117 Unfortunately, this example of graffiti resistance art was painted over 
by the City of Cape Town due to the CPT Graffiti By-Law that does not differentiate 
between graffiti and street art and thus, considers this form of resistance art to be a 
public nuisance. Local artists, upset by the loss of this piece, petitioned the 
municipality (unsuccessfully) to repaint the slogan because of the meaning and 
impact the painting had on that community and South African heritage, albeit that 
the ‘original’ work had already been destroyed.118 This street artwork is just one 
example of protest art that has been scrubbed because of the criminalisation of 
graffiti and the failure of the law to accommodate street art.119 Very little of this 
specific form of resistance art was, and is, documented, therefore it is impossible to 
know what has been lost. Almost none has been preserved for future generations 
and what graffiti resistance art remains is under threat of damage or destruction 
because the law treats it as a public nuisance.120 
The failure to view these street artworks as art, to take into consideration that graffiti 
may not always be a public nuisance but that some graffiti may be art, has resulted 
in the loss of important pieces of South African heritage. If this position does not 
change it could result in the loss of more artworks. Consequently, understanding 
street art in terms of crime alone is an over-simplification of the art form and the 
various meanings and styles that it can take. This understanding fails to view street 
 
116  For more on resistance art see Williamson Resistance Art, in particular, her focus on graffiti as 
resistance art at 83 – 98. 
117  Mackay 
http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/jspui/bitstream/10539/19894/3/T%20Mackay_Research%20Repor
t_Reading%20Rebellion_Oct2015.3.pdf (Date of use: 16 April 2019) 18. 
118  Mposo http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/bring-back-free-mandela-graffiti-
1563507 (Date of use: 3 November 2016). 
119  Most graffiti resistance art may not meet the aesthetic standards of traditional art, however, as 
already stated, one of the differences between street art and graffiti is the motivation behind the 
piece. The motivation underlying resistance art has cultural significance (as opposed to 
vandalism) and thus can be considered as street art. 
120  What has been preserved is mostly in photographic records such as Williamson Resistance Art; 
the physical artwork has not been preserved. 
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art as a heterogeneous and complex phenomenon.121 Bates notes that street art 
can have historical resonance in that it can be social commentary and it can also 
provide evidence of the events of a certain time period.122 Viewing this form of art 
as cultural heritage is a method of,  
‘sustaining a legacy left not by traditional archival resources, but by 
marks made on a wall – which still provide insight into the past. The 
only difference is the physical artefact that is preserved; rather than 
books or architectural drawings, it is paint on a vertical surface.’123 
It seems naïve and outdated to continue to view street art as a public nuisance. 
Instead, the law needs to develop as the art worlds and the public’s perception of 
street art has.  
1.5 The purpose of the study 
The purpose of the study is to determine who the owner of South African street art 
should be: either street art should belong to the owner of the property upon which 
the artwork is located, the street artist or, where the street art is culturally significant, 
the South African public (represented by the state and/or the relevant heritage 
authority).124  Consequently, the purpose of the study has two main paths. One, to 
determine who the owner of street art is in terms of the current SA property law 
regarding original acquisition of ownership; either the person who owns the property 
on which the street art is painted or the street artist. Two, to determine whether the 
answer provided to question one is acceptable for street art that is culturally 
significant. In other words, can the owner of the street art (as determined by property 
law) that is culturally significant ensure the protection and preservation of cultural 
heritage resources.  
 
121  Halsey and Young 2002 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 165. 
122  Bates Bombing, Tagging, Writing 87. 
123  Bates Bombing, Tagging, Writing 88. 
124  These are original owners, not owners who may acquire ownership through derivative 
acquisition. See the limitation at 1.5.1 a). 
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The first aspect of the study requires analysing the ownership of street art from the 
perspective of South African property law.  A significant portion of street art is 
created on the immovable or movable property belonging to someone other than 
the artist. South African property law determines ownership of artwork through the 
common law of accessio and in certain circumstances the artist may become the 
owner of the artwork (and the property on which the art is located) as opposed to 
the owner of the surface on which it is painted.125 Such enquiry will evaluate whether 
street art belongs to the owner of the property upon which it is located or to the street 
artist.   
Then, as highlighted in the Spy Booth and Mobile Lovers cases, the public has an 
interest in preserving, protecting and accessing culturally significant street art. 
Consequently, South Africa’s cultural heritage legislation needs to be examined to 
determine whether the limitations placed on private ownership of cultural heritage 
resources can ensure the protection, preservation and accessibility of culturally 
significant street art.126 Should private ownership of culturally significant street art 
not ensure the protection, preservation and accessibility of such then the state may 
need to assume ownership. It may be preferable for the state to assume ownership 
of some culturally significant street art to fulfil its responsibility regarding South 
Africa’s cultural heritage resources as the custodian of South Africa’s cultural 
heritage.  
This requires examining the limitations placed on private ownership by South 
Africa’s cultural heritage legislation. These limitations could be a deprivation of an 
owner’s property right.127 However, in the instances where private ownership is not 
guaranteed the protection and preservation of the resource then the expropriation 
of this form of property needs to be explored. 
In view of this, should the ownership of South African street art ever be called into 
question (which, with the international acclaim of South African street artists is 
 
125  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 115-116. 
126  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 705–706. 
127  The Constitution s25(1). 
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becoming a possibility) this study will be informative as to how ownership may be 
determined. The study also offers guidance to the state (represented by the 
Department of Arts and Culture (DAC), the South African Heritage Resource 
Agency, and the National Arts Council) as to whether they should take an interest 
in the protection and preservation of street art as cultural heritage resources. And, 
if they do, whether this should be achieved through the deprivation of property or 
the expropriation of property.  
1.6 The scope of the study 
Admittedly, as already discussed, not all graffiti can or should be viewed as street 
art.128 A distinction between graffiti which qualifies as street art and graffiti which is 
a public nuisance needs to be made.129 As Gomez argues ‘[v]andalism is a crime; 
graffiti can be art’.130 Only some examples of South African street art may be 
culturally significant and should not be viewed as a public nuisance. Instead, the 
value of these selected artworks as cultural heritage resources should be 
recognised, and should be protected and preserved as such. 
A determination will have to be made as to which examples of street art have cultural 
heritage significance and are thus worthy of the protection provided by the status as 
a cultural heritage resource. After all, the laws regarding cultural heritage protection 
can only be enforced once the res131 is recognised as a cultural heritage resource.132 
Therefore, ‘[a] key question here would be: at what point does graffiti pass from 
being a contemporary blight on the landscape to a valued “historical indicator” of 
socio[-]political events and issues?’133  
 
128  See part 1.3. 
129  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 633. 
130  Gómez 1992-1993 U Mich JL Reform 697. 
131  Res is the accepted Latin term used in property law. It is uses to mean ‘thing’, which in turn 
means, ‘a specific category of property, which is defined with reference to its characteristics: a 
corporeal object outside the human body, and an independent entity capable of being subjected 
to legal sovereignty by a legal subject for whom it has use and value’. Van der Walt and Pienaar 
Law of Property 9 (see 17-18 for the classification of things). 
132  Roodt Cultural Heritage xxxi. The granting of cultural heritage status is governed by the NHRA 
to be discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
133  Halsey and Young 2002 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 167.  
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Albeit, deciding which South African works are merely graffiti, which are street art, 
and which examples of street art carry cultural heritage significance is not necessary 
to do in this study; the decision whether an artwork qualifies as a cultural heritage 
resource will be the responsibility of the South African Heritage Resources 
Agency.134 This study only suggests that there is street art that could warrant this 
status and should be considered for such. Works such as Shepard Fairey’s The 
Purple Shall Govern and the remaining artworks in Faith47’s Freedom Charter 
Project are examples of street art that could be considered for cultural heritage 
resource status.  
The motivation, aesthetic, artistic, and potential financial value of the street artwork 
would be persuasive factors.135 Of course, the cultural value the street art has to the 
community in which it is located, and/or to South Africa, may also affect the outcome 
of a heritage status application. In this light, it is unlikely that examples of graffiti 
would warrant the protection provided to cultural heritage resources; as previously 
discussed, the different motivations for graffiti and street art would probably preclude 
graffiti from having cultural significance.136 As it is street art which is considered to 
be an identifiable art form, the artistic value of street art is probably higher than 
graffiti; and, as the intention is often essential to the artwork, street art is more likely 
to have cultural significance. Therefore, it is more conceivable that street art be 
considered for cultural heritage resource status. 
The South African Heritage Resources Agency has an online application process 
for the nomination of heritage sites and objects.137 The nomination process requires 
the applicant to provide a reason for the nomination and motivate for the significance 
of the piece, amongst other necessary information. Importantly, the process also 
requires the inclusion of consent forms from relevant parties in the application (if 
applicable) such as the consent of the owner of the property on which the street art 
 
134  SAHRA http://www.sahra.org.za/sahris/about/about-sahra (Date of use: 15 December 2015). 
135  The market value of an item may provide some insight into the intrinsic value of the item. Cornu 
2006 Art Antiquity and Law 162. 
136  See the discussion in 1.2. 
137 SAHRA 
http://www.sahra.org.za/sahris/sites/default/files/website/articledocs/Site%20and%20object%2
0nomination%20process.pdf (Date of use: 19 June 2018). 
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is located. However, this consent can only be provided for street art if there is an 
identifiable owner. The owner of street art may not be the person in possession of 
the res on which the art is located. 138 
For these reasons, an application for cultural heritage status is unlikely to be 
successful (in the case of street art) if consent from the property owner is not 
included. Accordingly, determining who the owner of a street artwork is will be 
necessary, before an application for cultural heritage status can be made. 
Further, considering that South African street artists’ work is gaining international 
recognition and that their legal artworks sell for substantial amounts, it is worth 
investigating who owns street art in South Africa because acquiring ownership of 
such an artwork could result in the acquisition of a valuable asset. In addition, Roodt 
notes that ‘different conceptualizations of property rights and ownership … may 
present difficulties’, in the protection of cultural heritage objects.139 
Consequently, this study begins by examining the South African legal position on 
the original modes of acquisition of ownership of art through accessio in so far as it 
applies to the creation of street art. Accessio is the “accepted” original mode of 
acquisition of ownership used for artworks in South African law.140 However, two 
other modes of original acquisition of ownership are also relevant. Specificatio will 
also be studied as a potentially better method for acquisition of ownership of 
artworks.141 Moreover, the acquisition of res nullius will be explored, because street 
art may be considered abandoned once the artist has completed the work.142  
Further, because ownership of street art may be acquired by the street artist who 
acted illegally or by an intervening party, the question of what is just arises. Thus, it 
will be determined whether the original owner of the res on which the street art is 
located can claim compensation for the loss of his property (and the legal action 
 
138  Van der Luit-Drummond http://jvdld.com/2013/02/24/who-really-owns-public-art/ (Date of use: 
16 February 2015). 
139  Roodt Cultural Heritage xxii. 
140  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 115-116. 
141  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 124. 
142  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 113. 
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they could use to do so) or whether any criminal law rules could prevent ownership 
from transferring. Thus, this study considers the potential owners of street art (the 
original owner of the res on which the art is located,143 the artist,144 or a possible 
intervening party who acquires ownership of a res nullius) and ascertains who has 
the best claim to these potentially valuable artworks.145  
The common law regarding original acquisition of ownership in the case of accessio, 
specificatio, and res nullius comes from Roman law. These laws were not developed 
for the legal demands of contemporary South African society, yet they are still 
applicable. The rise in the popularity of street art provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the continued appropriateness of these laws and to explore the potential 
development of these laws.146 
Determining the ownership question resolves who has rights and duties over the 
property and may provide guidance as to who is responsible for the protection and 
preservation of street art. Ownership may be limited and are already limited for 
various reasons. One of the ways in which ownership can be limited is if the 
limitation is in the public interest.147 In fact, ownership is already limited in the public 
interest by the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas principle, in the interests of the 
community (such as nature conservation)148 in the interests of those disadvantaged 
by South Africa’s colonial and Apartheid history,149 in the interests of human 
dignity,150 and for economic, social and political reasons.151 In fact it is possible that 
ownership of street art could be limited to an extent that it requires the owners to 
protect and preserve street art which has cultural heritage value because the 
 
143  Barnett 2013 Chi-Kent J Intell Prop 208 – 210; Karmel 2011-2012 Columbia Journal of Law and 
Social Problems 353-356.  
144  Barnett 2013 Chi-Kent J Intell Prop 205 – 208; Howell 
  https://wjlta.wordpress.com/2011/05/12/selling-the-writing-on-the-wall-does-copyright-protect-
the-work-of-graffiti-artists/ (Date of use: 4 July 2014). 
145  Van der Walt and Pienaar Property 113 -114. 
146  Hutchinson and Duncan 2012 Deakin Law Review 101. Van Warmelo The Vicissitudes of 
Roman-Dutch Law 2. 
147  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 50. 
148  Corium (Pty) Ltd v Myburgh Park Langebaan (Pty) Ltd 1993 (C). 
149  Diepsloot Residents’ and Landowners Association v Administrator Transvaal 1994 (A). 
150  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (CC). 
151  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 50-53. 
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protection and preservation of South Africa’s cultural heritage resources is in the 
public interest. 
Thus, once the study of accessio and specificatio has resolved whether the owner 
of the illegal street art is the artist or the owner of the property on which the artwork 
is located the study explores whether this determination is appropriate to ensure the 
protection and preservation of culturally significant street art. Should privately owned 
street art be identified as a cultural heritage resource would such identification 
ensure the protection and preservation of the resource. Consequently, this part of 
the study begins with an exploration of the SA law regarding cultural heritage. The 
chapter seeks to determine why cultural heritage is important, what types of res are 
considered for cultural heritage status and whether this could include street art. 
Further, how cultural heritage status is acquired and what protection this may offer 
for specific examples of street art that could be considered for the status. This aspect 
of the study also highlights issues with the current legislation regarding cultural 
heritage resources.152 
Identifying examples of street art as cultural heritage resources has the protentional 
to limit an owner’s property rights. However, the limitation may not guarantee the 
protection and preservation of the property (and it may place too heavy a burden on 
private property owners); the duty to protect and preserve street art may be an 
unjustifiable limitation on property rights. The limitation of this form of property may 
not ensure the purpose of the deprivation. 
In light of these concerns and with regard to the state’s responsibility to conserve 
and manage South Africa’s cultural heritage resources, it is suggested that the state 
could assume the burden to protect and preserve street art which has cultural 
heritage significance.153 Indeed, it may be preferable for these at risk heritage 
resources to be possessed or owned by the state and for the responsibility for the 
preservation and protection of these resources to be taken on by the state.  
 
152  Identified during the analysis of the NHRA. 
153  NHRA, Preamble. 
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This aspect of the study entails an examination of the South African law regarding 
expropriation; to understand what type of property and under which circumstances 
private property can be expropriated, by the state, in the public interest to conserve 
South African cultural heritage resources.154 By default this requires an examination 
of the deprivation of property, because the expropriation of property can be viewed 
as a form of deprivation.155 
Finally, the study concludes with a summary; a statement on who the owner of a 
South African street art is and the legal tools that exist to ensure that street art which 
has cultural heritage value may be protected and preserved for future generations. 
1.6.1 Limitations on the scope of the study 
The academic study of graffiti and/or street art is relatively new. Consequently, there 
are many aspects of these art forms and how these art forms function in a legal 
system that need to be examined. To limit the scope of the study and to highlight 
issues that may be raised in the study which are not explored, it is necessary to 
include several limitations: 
a) This study examines the original modes of acquisition of accessio, 
specificatio, the acquisition of res nullius and expropriation. No other original modes 
of acquisition are considered; nor will any derivative modes of acquisition be 
considered. 
b) In relation to a) it is noted that the study is only concerned with ownership of 
street art, no other art forms are considered. However, as the discussion of accessio 
and specificatio concerns the ownership of tabula picta, by default this discussion 
applies to other forms of painting. 
c) Importantly, in limiting the study to street art, the study assumes that rock art 
is not a form of graffiti. Defining graffiti to the exclusion of rock art is in no way 
 
154  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Constitution) s25(2). Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Expropriation 
Act). 
155  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 349. 
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definitive, however in this study rock art is not explored within the definition of graffiti. 
This limitation is justified because most rock art had or has, ‘something to do with 
ritual, and, therefore, was in part a community-sanctioned pastime’.156 Thus, the 
permitted nature of rock art distinguishes it from the illegal nature of graffiti. Regard 
must also be given to the traditional concept of wall painting or decoration that is 
native to many South African cultures.157 However, artists in this style usually paint 
on their own property or the property of others with permission to do so. Thus, this 
does not have an illegal nature and is not included in this research. 
d) It is noted that street art can be both tangible and intangible cultural heritage, 
that is, street art can be viewed as both a product of culture and cultural practice.158 
The purpose of this study, the protection and preservation of street art as cultural 
heritage resources, may interfere with the intangible practice of street art. The 
protection and preservation of selected street artworks may change the ephemeral 
nature of those artworks. As Turner notes,  
‘…[t]he problem of preservation asks, what is risked or lost in the 
attempt to preserve? It is often remarked that the attempt to preserve 
culture risk fossilizing it … much of the value of Culture lies in it being 
a vibrant part of lived experience …’159 
The heritagisation of street art raises the question of authenticity. It may be 
suggested that the ephemeral nature of street art is integral to the art form. Thus, 
pursuing heritage status for street artworks may interfere with the intangible cultural 
practice and may go against the purpose of legislative protection for culture and 
cultural heritage. In other words, protecting and preserving street artworks as 
cultural heritage resources may interfere with street art culture. Instead of preserving 
 
156  Lewisohn Street Art 26. 
157  Frescura Culture in the New South Africa 65-90. 
158  For a discussion of graffiti as intangible cultural heritage see Merrill 2015 International Journal 
of Heritage Studies 380-382. 
159  Turner 2006 International Journal of Cultural Property 354-355. 
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aspects of that culture, preserving street art may change or disrupt the culture.160 
This is a significant issue which warrants its own, dedicated study as such, this issue 
is not explored in this thesis.161 
e) Building on from the above limitation, due to the foundation of this study being 
based in property law (specifically ownership of physical or corporeal property), the 
focus is on cultural heritage sites and cultural heritage objects (tangible cultural 
heritage) and the legislation concerning the promotion and protection of such.162 To 
this end, the field of intellectual property law is not examined. Reference may be 
made to intellectual property, but such area of law does not form the basis for this 
study.163 Instead, the focus of the study is on the real right in the tangible or 
corporeal thing (artwork) analysing the original modes of acquisition of ownership in 
property law and the protection of street art as cultural heritage sites and objects.164 
Afterall, ‘[i]ntellectual property rights do not protect the rights of ownership in the 
physical object in which the intellectual property is embodied’.165 The copyright of 
the artist is distinguished from the rights of ownership in the res.166 Thus, this study 
only concerns the real rights in the tangible or corporal property upon which the 
street art is located. The conclusions reached regarding ownership of the res do not 
 
160  See Merrill 2015 Internal Journal of Heritage Studies 380 – 385 and the sources therein for a 
discussion on authenticity. See also Mulcahy and Flessas 2016 Law, Culture and the 
Humanities 13–14. 
161  Bates suggests that the ephemeral nature need not exclude graffiti from heritage recognition, 
noting that there are other art forms such as theatre that are ephemeral but still considered to 
be part of a country’s heritage. Bates Bombing, tagging, writing 80-82. 
162  Mulcahy and Flessas 2016 Law, Culture and the Humanities 9. 
163  It is debatable whether a graffiti artist can have the copyright to their illegal artworks as copyright 
does not arise for works that are contra bonos mores. Goeie Hoop Uitgewers (Edms) Bpk v 
Central News Agency 1953 (2) SA 843 (W), Ramsden Intellectual Property Law 224. Graffiti is 
contra bonos mores (it is a crime) and this may mean that a graffiti artist would not be able to 
enforce copyright. For more on this field of study see Iljadica Copyright Beyond Law, Schwender 
2007 – 2008 J Copyright Soc’y USA 257, Rizk 2015 The African Journal of Information and 
Communication 45, Lerman 2012 – 2013 NYU J Intel Prop & Ent L 295, Roundtree 2012-2013 
Cardozo Arts and Ent L J 959 and Howell  
https://wjlta.wordpress.com/2011/05/12/selling-the-writing-on-the-wall-does-copyright-protect-
the-work-of-graffiti-artists/ (Date of use: 4 July 2014). For an interesting example of the conflict 
regarding ownership of art and the intellectual property of the artist see The Telegraph 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/10963754/Spot-of-bother-over-Damien-Hirst-wall-art-
painting.html (Date of use: 6 April 2018). 
164  See Ramsden Intellectual Property Law 1-2 for a discussion on the difference between real 
rights and intellectual property rights. See also Adams and Adams Practitioner’s Guide 1-3. 
165  Ramsden Intellectual Property Law 2. 
166  Ramsden Intellectual Property Law 55. 
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affect the intellectual property rights of the artist. The exploration of the effect of 
intellectual property law on the ownership of street art in South Africa warrants a 
study on its own. Consequently, it exceeds the scope of this study. 
f) Upon deciding who has acquired ownership of the street artwork further 
questions arise, such as whether the owner will be profiting from the proceeds of a 
crime should they sell such artwork. Whether any third parties involved in the sale 
of street art (such as an auction house or art gallery) could also be viewed as 
profiting from the proceeds of a crime.167 Further, would cultural heritage law 
outweigh the criminal law in such cases? If the street art is evidence of a crime or 
the proceeds of a crime can it be considered for heritage protection? 
Despite the importance and value of these questions, they warrant their own 
investigations. The criminal law aspect of the study will thus be limited to the illegal 
nature of graffiti.168 
In keeping with this limitation, the study is not a comprehensive survey of the various 
municipal by-laws criminalising graffiti in South Africa. Instead, two by-laws have 
been selected as examples, namely; the CPT Graffiti By-law and the JHB Graffiti 
By-law. The City of Cape Town: Graffiti By-law 2010 is selected as it is the most 
severe by-law concerning graffiti in the country. The City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality Public Open Spaces By-laws 831 of 2004 chosen for a 
few reasons: Johannesburg is the economic hub of South Africa, it has the highest 
 
167  See s 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (hereinafter referred 
to as the POCA. As well as the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to 
Proceeds of Crime Act). Companies such as the Sincura Group have specialised in removing 
street art and preserving it on behalf of a private property owner and consequently profits from 
the removal and preservation of such art. See Sincura Group http://www.thesincuragroup.com/ 
(Date of use: 9 November 2016). And the project run by the Sincura Group which considers the 
moral and legal issues surrounding the sale of street art, Sincura Arts Ltd “The controversial 
Banksy Book” http://banksybook.com/ (Date of use: 14 June 2019). For more on the process to 
safely remove street artworks from the buildings to which they are attached see Smallman 
https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/features/how-do-you-remove-a-banksy-
mural-9142482.html (Date of use: 6 April 2018) and Tsang https://www.domain.com.au/news/a-
hidden-banksy-artwork-removed-and-restored-to-be-displayed-by-a-london-developer-
20170823-gy2u8y/ (Date of use: 2 August 2018). 
168  For more on the criminalisation of street art in South Africa see Smith 2014 SACJ 181. 
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population (and highest population density) and, like Cape Town before the CPT 
Graffiti By-law, has a burgeoning street art movement. 
In addition, the study touches on various statutes concerning culture / cultural 
heritage and cultural heritage resources. It is not an exhaustive study of each 
relevant statute; it only examines the legislation and aspects of that legislation 
regarding the protection and preservation of street art as a cultural heritage 
resource. Further, the study is limited predominantly, to national legislation. The 
provincial, and/or local structure developed to support this framework is not 
discussed unless relevant for exemplary use.  
g) In terms of the South African common law, graffiti falls under the crime of 
malicious damage to property. However, some South African by-laws include graffiti 
within the category of public nuisance. Further, in some instances (especially in 
foreign jurisdictions) graffiti is defined as vandalism. The terms: malicious damage 
to property, public nuisance and vandalism are used interchangeably throughout the 
study, merely to avoid repetition. However, it is noted that in South Africa, legally, 
graffiti falls under the rules concerning malicious damage to property.169 
h) As there are no South African street artworks which are recognised as 
cultural heritage resources reliance is made to various foreign examples of street 
art (and/or street artists) that are or were considered culturally significant. 
Significantly, the artworks of the UK artist Banksy will be predominant.170 Banksy is 
a prolific artist, his artwork is popular worldwide, and he is commercially successful. 
Some of his street artworks have acquired heritage status. However, this study is 
not a comparative study with the English approach to protecting and preserving 
Banksy’s artwork.171 Rather, his examples are instructive as potential scenarios for 
South Africa street art.  
 
169  Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 849-852. See also R v Bowden 1957 (3) SA 148 (T). 
170  Banksy www.banksy.co.uk (Date of use: 20 December 2018). See also Banksy Wall and Piece 
and Ellsworth-Jones Banksy. 
171  See for example Hackney Council Graffiti Policy 2013 available at  
https://www.hackney.gov.uk/graffiti (Date of use: 23 January 2017). 
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However, to justify the argument for protection and preservation of street art and the 
potential cultural heritage status of certain street artworks, the English experience 
is informative. England is home to some of the most famous street art and artists. 
England has also experienced cases of street art being sold by the possessors or 
owners of property on which the art is located, as well as having examples of street 
art considered for heritage status. The English law and experience may offer 
feasible lessons as to how to proceed with assigning ownership of street art and for 
the protection and preservation of street art because they form part of cultural 
heritage.172 
Further, as this study deals with a problem that is currently hypothetical (it has not 
been tested in South African courts) reference will be made to various foreign case 
law, artists (including graffiti artists) and useful foreign legislation to justify certain 
aspects of the study. Indeed, as very few foreign jurisdictions have had to grapple 
with questions regarding the ownership of street art or the heritagisation of street 
art, it is necessary to rely on these various examples (and jurisprudence) where 
relevant, in order to justify the arguments contained in some parts of this study.  
This study is also not a comparative study of any other foreign jurisdiction whose 
examples have been relied upon.173 The examples are merely instructive for the 
development of the law and the approach of heritage bodies to South African street 
art. 
i) This is also not a study of the international law concerning cultural heritage. 
There is a vast body of international law concerning cultural heritage and many 
international organisations which are focused on cultural heritage. Indeed, South 
Africa is represented in many of these organisations and is a signatory to many of 
 
172  The influence of the English Waverley Criteria on the development of the NHRA should also be 
recognised. See Maurice and Turner 1992 IJCP 276-283 for more on the Waverley Committee 
of 1952. See also Roodt Cultural Heritage 20. 
173  For a comparative study on the legal aspects of the protection of cultural heritage see Roodt 
Cultural Heritage. See also O’Keefe and Prott Cultural Heritage Conventions for a discussion of 
the international conventions and instruments surrounding cultural heritage. 
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the international documents.174 For instance, in 1946 South Africa was one of 20 
member states that first signed and ratified the Constitution of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.175 South Africa was also among 
the state parties to sign and ratify the Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.176 South Africa is one of the state parties to 
the Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.177 South 
Africa is also a member of the International Council on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS), the International Council of Museums (ICOM), the International Centre 
for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), 
amongst others.178 There is much jurisprudence concerning this international law 
and consequently this study does not discuss the international law or the various 
organisations which support it. 
j) The study is not a historical study of South Africa’s fight against Apartheid 
and the struggle for self-determination. The term self-determination as used herein 
encompasses, ‘the possibility to live under those political, social and cultural 
conditions that correspond best with [South Africa’s] characteristic singularity, and 
above all to protect and develop its own identity’.179 
k) Various examples of South African street art are used throughout this study. 
Whether, these pieces of art have artistic, financial, and cultural value and could be 
considered for heritage status (and potentially be included within the national estate) 
remains to be decided by the South African Heritage Resources Agency. The study 
cannot definitively conclude that these chosen examples hold cultural significance 
and qualify for cultural heritage resource status. The study uses these examples to 
 
174  For more on this topic see Forrest International Law, Roodt Cultural Heritage, O’Keefe and Prott 
Cultural Heritage Conventions, Kotze and Jansen Van Rensburg 2003 QUTLJJ 125. 
175  UNESCO http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb73094.html (Date of use: 27 October 2017). 
176  UNESCO http://www.refworld.org/docid/40422c914.html (Date of use: 27 October 2017). 
177  UNIDROIT https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention (Date of 
use: 2 January 2019). 
178  ICOMOS https://www.icomos.org/en/about-icomos/mission-and-vision/mission-and-vision 
(Date of use: 20 December 2018); ICOM https://icom.museum/en/about-us/ (Date of use: 20 
December 2018); ICCROM https://www.iccrom.org/about/overview/what-iccrom (Date of use: 
20 December 2018). 
179  Murswiek Secession 38. 
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highlight examples of street art which may warrant protection and preservation and 
could be considered for cultural heritage resource status. 
l) The budget provided to the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) (and 
subsequently to institutions such as the South African Heritage Resources Agency 
and the National Arts Council) are not discussed in any detail. The intention of this 
study is to investigate the theoretical and legislative foundations for the protection 
and conservation of street art, not the practicability of such.180 
m) The new Expropriation Bill is set to be enacted.181 The intention of the new 
Expropriation Bill is to speed up, increase and better achieve the nation’s 
commitment to land reform, with a focus on expropriation without compensation. 
The Expropriation Bill was intended to be promulgated in 2013, then in 2015, and 
again in 2016. However, the Bill still has Constitutional infringements that need to 
be resolved before enactment.182 The need to better ensure land reform may also 
result in changes to section 25 of the Constitution.183 Indeed, the National Assembly 
has agreed to amend s25 in order to make expropriation of land without 
compensation more explicit.184 This has resulted in the Constitution Eighteenth 
Amendment Bill.185 Both Bills are yet to be passed and it is unclear as to whether 
s25 will be amended and, if it is, when such amendment may occur. Consequently, 
 
180  For a short discussion on the capacity of states to protect their cultural heritage see Chirikure 
2013 South African Journal of Science 17. 
181  Expropriation Bill B4 2015 as introduced in the National Assembly (proposed section 76) 
(hereinafter referred to as the Expropriation Bill. A previous Bill was submitted in GN 440 
Government Gazette 30963 of 11 April 2008 however, this Bill was withdrawn. 
182  South African Institute of Race Relations http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/submissions-
on-proposed-legislation/irr-full-submission-on-the-expropriation-bill-2013-6-may-2015 (Date of 
use: 7 December 2015). 
183  The Constitution, 1996 s25 (hereinafter referred to as s25). 
184  Parliament of the Republic of South Africa  
https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-approves-process-amend-
section-25-constitution (Date of use 11 April 2019). 
185  Constitution Eighteenth Amendment Bill (draft) available at 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/CommitteeNotices/2019/december/06-12-
2019/Draft_advertised.pdf (Date of use: 25 March 2020) 
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the deprivation and expropriation section is based on the current law, specifically, 
the Constitution and the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.186  
n) In light of the above limitation, the study highlights the current method used 
by the state for calculating compensation for the expropriation of property.187 
However, as this method is likely to change (it may become possible to expropriate 
cultural heritage sites without having to pay compensation) this aspect of the study 
is not comprehensively dealt with. 
o) The terms ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ are used regularly in the study. These 
terms are intended to hold their ordinary meanings, protect means to, ‘keep safe’ 
and preserve means to, ‘maintain in its original or existing state’. 
1.7 Research Methodology 
Legal research is traditionally doctrinal, ‘[r]esearch which provides a systematic 
exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyses the 
relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, predicts future 
developments’.188 In line with this tradition this study relies on the authoritative 
sources of the common law, legislation and case law as well as relevant books, 
journal articles, and internet sources. These texts are reviewed, analysed and 
interpreted to understand how the law of property and the legislation concerning 
cultural heritage can be developed to account for changes and developments in 
South African society (in this case the recognition of the cultural significance of 
street art). The study goes further than doctrinal analysis in that, it is reform-
orientated - it, ‘intensively evaluates the adequacy of existing rules and … 
recommends changes to any rules found wanting’.189  
 
186  For an example of the debate surrounding the amendment of s25 see Musker 
https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-08-02-the-real-problem-with-amending-the-
constitution/ (Date of use: 20 December 2018). 
187  Department of Land Affairs Policies and Procedures at 1.7.1.1.1. 
188  Hutchinson and Duncan 2012 Deakin Law Review 85 and 101. For more on legal research 
methodology see Kroeze 2013 PER 36. 
189  Hutchinson and Duncan 2012 Deakin Law Review 101. See also Coleshaw 
  https://uweascllmsupport.wordpress.com/2017/01/18/research-methods-doctrinal-
methodology/ (Date of use: 9 April 2019). 
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The research focuses predominately on two legal disciplines, namely property law 
and cultural heritage law. However, constitutional law, delict and unjustified 
enrichment are also considered. 
1.8 Structure of chapters 
The structure of the chapters follows the format followed in the Problem Statement 
(part 1.4). The study begins with this Introduction chapter. The second chapter 
concerns the original acquisition of ownership. The chapter explores the original 
acquisition of street art through accessio and specificatio and the acquisition of 
street art as a res nullius. This chapter also includes a part on claims for 
compensation following the loss of ownership, and questions whether the criminal 
law could prevent ownership from transferring. The third chapter covers cultural 
heritage resources, namely: the South African legislation on cultural heritage and 
the bodies tasked with the conservation of South Africa’s cultural heritage. As well 
as the types of property considered for cultural heritage resource status, the process 
for obtaining cultural heritage resource status, an evaluation of specific examples of 
South African street art and whether such examples warrant the status of cultural 
heritage sites or objects and the protection that comes with such status. The fourth 
chapter considers the limitation of ownership of street art in the public interest 
(because protecting street art which warrants or has cultural heritage resource 
status is in the public interest) and whether such a limitation is justifiable. This 
includes the limitation of ownership through the deprivation or expropriation because 
such limitation is in the public interest and whether doing so will be justifiable. 
The final chapter consists of a summary of what has been presented and a 
recommendation in respect of whether the protection and preservation of South 
African street art (which has cultural significance) may be achieved through already 
existing or amended legislation. 
1.9 The referencing style and the use of old authorities 
The referencing style of the School of Law at the University of South Africa is 
followed throughout this thesis. 
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As the author’s first language is English most of the research consists of English 
sources. A few Afrikaans sources have been used as the author is fluent in the 
language. However, due to the language barrier, the old authorities which have been 
consulted were the English translations of the original source. For ease of reference, 
these sources are referred to by the name of the original author as well as the author 
of the translated work. 
Cross-references will refer to part of the study instead of section of the study so as 
not to confuse cross-references with sections of legislation. 
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CHAPTER 2 ORIGINAL ACQUISITION OF ART THROUGH ACCESSIO  
2.1 Introduction 
Street art is created when an artist paints upon the surface of immovable or movable 
property belonging to someone other than themselves and without the permission 
of the owner of the surface. As discussed in the previous chapter there are examples 
of street art that are considered by the art world to hold artistic and financial value. 
Moreover, there are some South African artists whose legal artworks hold artistic 
value and financial value (and are respected as artists both nationally and 
internationally) who are also becoming known for their street art. Thus, as these 
artists legal artworks hold artistic and financial value acquiring ownership of their 
street artworks could be a benefit in that they could acquire art which is artistically 
valuable, but also, importantly, art which will increase their patrimonial wealth. 
Consequently, investigating ownership of South African street artworks may assist 
in future cases, where conflict regarding ownership of such art arises. Afterall, as 
Van der Walt says,  
‘[w]e should be balancing on the very edge of the legal order … 
exploring the limits and boundaries of our subject and the extremities 
of its social function, looking for new answers and new solutions in 
order to solve new problems.’1 
The South African common law ascribes the original acquisition of ownership of new 
artworks through accessio (original acquisition of ownership).2 However, some of 
the historical sources of South African law (some sources of Roman law and 
Roman-Dutch law) are less certain as to whether the original acquisition of 
ownership of artwork should be through accessio; instead, both accessio and 
specificatio have been suggested by jurists, as the mode of original acquisition.3  
 
1  Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 47-48. 
2  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
3   Most of the writers referred to in this chapter recommend that ownership of art be derived 
through accessio. However, in his Inleidinge Grotius suggested that ownership of art should be 
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This chapter concerns the current South African law on accessio, the remedies for 
compensation following accessio and whether the current legal approach in South 
Africa is the appropriate method for the acquisition of ownership of street art. 
Further, this chapter reflects on whether the option presented by the Roman-Dutch 
jurist Grotius (that paintings should be not be acquired through accessio but rather 
through specificatio) would be a more appropriate legal approach to the growing 
street art phenomenon. 
2.2 Accession 
Accessio is the original mode of acquisition of ownership through which the 
ownership of things which are joined together, such that they cannot be easily 
separated, is decided. Thus, accessio occurs when two or more independent 
articles are joined into one thing, such that they are identified by one of the original 
articles.4 
The current rules for accession developed from South Africa’s oldest legal influence; 
namely Roman law.5 Although accessio was not included in the Twelve Tables (one 
of the earliest sources of Roman law), by the time of Justinian’s codification of 
Roman civil law in the Corpus Iuris Civilis it was an accepted part of Roman law.6 In 
the Corpus are included writings of Gaius on accessio (in the Digesta and the 
Institutiones which were both in force from 533 CE).7 
 
acquired through specificatio rather than through accessio. Grotius Inleidinge 2.8.3 (Herbert 
Dutch Jurisprudence 2.8.3).  
4  Arnold 1922 Columbia Law Review 103. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert recognise that 
accession can also include the acquisition of ownership of the increase of a thing even though 
no joining has taken place, such as the offspring of animals and fruits. However, this aspect of 
accessio is not the focus of this study. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman 199. 
5  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 5. 
6  Lewis and Reinhold (eds) Roman Civilization 111–112. 
7  Justinian Digesta D41.1 (Watson The Digest of Justinian D41.1). Gaius Institutiones 1.2.78 (De 
Zulueta The Institutes 1.2.78). 
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Further, accessio was also included in many medieval law writings8 and became 
part of the Roman-Dutch law.9 Consequently, accessio became part of South 
African law with the reception of Roman-Dutch law in the Cape and is still recognised 
as one of the original modes of acquisition of ownership.10 The operation of accessio 
in South African law is still, essentially, as it was described in the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis.11 
The following passage from Van der Walt and Pienaar clarifies the position on the 
acquisition of ownership of property through accession in current South African 
(common) law: 
‘Accession takes place when two corporeal things or parts of things 
(usually a principal and an accessory thing) are combined either through 
human activities or natural processes in such a way that the one thing or 
part of a thing loses its physical or economic independence and becomes 
a component of another thing. The thing which remains essentially 
independent is called the principal thing, while the thing which is merged 
or combined in such a way that it loses its independence, is called the 
accessory thing. The owner of the principal thing becomes the owner of 
the new thing by operation of law without him necessarily being aware of 
the accession.’12  
 
8  See the work of Madero Tabula Picta in this regard. 
9  Roman-Dutch jurist Voet described accessio as, ‘a method of acquiring ownership by which a 
thing becomes another’s because it accedes to a more principle thing of that other.’ Gane The 
Selective Voet 41.1.14. 
10  Thomas, Van der Merwe and Stoop Historical Foundations 7 – 8. The other legal systems which 
have affected South African law, namely English law and customary law have not affected 
accessio, thus they will not be discussed in this context. Thomas, Van der Merwe and Stoop 
Historical Foundations 179 – 182; Aldine Timber Co v Hlatswayo 1932 TPD 337. 
11  Justinian Digesta D41.1 (Watson The Digest of Justinian D41.1). 
12  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 115-116. For more on accession see du Plessis 
Borkowski 198 – 203 and Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt Property 101. Further, Lee suggests 
that accession applies when several things, belonging to many owners, are combined to into a 
single thing; and that the new thing is owned in common (in undivided shares proportional to 
the value of the things which make up the new thing). Unless one of things is merely an 
accessory thing, then it accedes to the principal thing which is then owned by the owner of the 
principle thing. Lee Property 14. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert (quoting Voet) describe 
accessio as, ‘a method of acquiring ownership by which a thing becomes another’s because it 
accedes to a more principal thing of another’. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and 
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Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert provide a somewhat more concise definition by 
stating that;  
‘Accession in the law of property literally means an increase of or addition to 
a thing. Usually, it is said to denote the joinder of two or more separate things 
in such a way that they henceforth form an entity.’13 
Therefore, accessio applies in circumstances where an immovable has been joined 
to another immovable (such as the gradual aggregation of earth on the bank of a 
river), where a movable is joined to an immovable (such as buildings to land) or the 
attachment of one movable to another movable (such as gemstones to precious 
metals in the creation of jewellery).14 
2.2.1 Ownership of the joined thing: 
According to Voet, ownership: 
‘is not adjudged on what is more or less valuable, but on what accedes, 
that is to say is added for the purpose of adorning the other thing. If 
this matter is not clear, the greater part attracts to itself the lesser, or 
the more valuable to the less valuable.’15 
The test to determine who owns the joined thing (created out of separately owned 
parts) is commonly referred to as the identity test, is predominantly answered by 
deciding which item loses its independence and has become part of the other thing 
(the principal thing). In other words, the owner of the principal thing (that which gives 
 
Schoeman 96 (as based on Voet 41.1.14). Further, in general definitions of accessio tend to 
exclude descriptions of the acquisition of offspring and fruits, even though these are also forms 
of accession. 
13  Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 199. Interestingly, Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert limit accessio to the determination of ownership of the increase of the 
joined thing not to ownership of the res. 
14  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 116-123. Accessio is not actually an original mode 
of acquisition of ownership, rather it is process through which the combination of two (or more) 
things ensures that the accessory thing ceases to exist independently, and the principle thing is 
increased; however, accessio is treated as a mode of original acquisition because accession 
occurs with or without the co-operation of the previous owner. Carey Miller The Acquisition and 
Protection of Ownership 12. See also Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt Property 101. 
15  Gane The Selective Voet 41.1.14. See also Lee Property 14. 
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the merged item its identity) becomes the owner of the joined thing. Should this 
factor not be determinate, other factors are then taken into consideration. These 
factors include, but are not limited to, which thing has greater mass, which thing has 
greater value and which thing serves simply as decoration.16 
The identity test plays out differently depending on the nature of the property 
combined; the answer is different for the accession of immovables to immovables, 
movables to immovables and movables to movables. However, as street art does 
not concern the accession of an immovable to another immovable this form of 
accessio will not be explored herein. The identity test is only applied to joining of 
painting (a movable) to immovable property and movable property.17  
2.2.2 The accession of movables to an immovable in the form 
of inaedificatio 
For the accession of a movable to an immovable in the form of inaedificatio (building) 
Van der Walt and Pienaar regard the immovable to be the principle thing.18 In terms 
of the identity test, it is the immovable (the building/land) which retains its 
independence and the movable/s (the building material etcetera) which lose its/their 
identity.19 Consequently, the owner of the immovable becomes the owner of the 
composite thing (and in certain circumstances, the owner of the immovable must 
compensate the owner of the movable).20 This is in line with the common law 
principle of superficies solo cedit which states that the owner of land is also the 
owner of everything which is permanently attached to the land.21 
 
16  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 116. See also Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 
Property 101. 
17  Maasdorp divides accession into the categories of natural accession (that which occurs through 
natural causes), artificial or industrial accession (which occurs through a person’s labour) and 
mixed accession (the gathering of fruits). Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes 35 and 41. See also 
Silberberg Property 200- 218.  
18  Along with inaedificatio the accession of movables to immovables also includes planting and 
sowing. However, this study is only concerned with inaedificatio; street art does not concern 
planting and sowing. Thus, planting and sowing will not be discussed herein. Knobel 2011 
THRHR 298. 
19  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 122. 
20  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 122. 
21  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 117. See also Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 
Property 105 and Silberberg Property 100. 
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As stated in the previous paragraph, it is the immovable which gives the joined thing 
its identity. In some cases of accession, it may not always be clear whether a 
movable has been permanently fixed to an immovable, and determining ownership 
can be difficult in such instances. In these cases, where the permanence of the 
attachment is in question, courts have paid regard to the nature and purpose of the 
attached thing,22 the manner and degree of attachment,23 and the intention of the 
annexor to determine whether the accessory is permanently attached to the 
immovable.24  
Where street art has been attached to an immovable it is apparent from the nature 
and purpose of the attachment, the manner and degree of attachment and the 
intention of the annexor that the street art is permanently attached to the 
immovable.25 Thus, the owner of the immovable becomes the owner of the 
composite thing (the immovable with the artwork). To further enforce this finding, 
when considering the other factors that are used to determine ownership, it is likely 
 
22  Standard –Vacuum Refining Co of SA v Durban City Council 1961 (2) SA 669 (A) (hereafter 
referred to as Standard Vacuum) and Mpisi v Trebble 1994 (2) SA 136 (AD). 
23  Standard Vacuum 677E-679E. 
24  There is some debate regarding the weight that must be given to the intention of the annexor 
when deciding whether the movable is permanently attached or not. Knobel 2011 THRHR 296–
304; Freedman 2000 SALJ 667–676. See also Theatre Investments v Butcher Brothers 1978 
(3) SA 682 (A), Melcorp SA v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Transvaal) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W), 
Sumatie (Edms) Bpk v Venter 1990 (1) SA 973 (TPD), Konstanz Properties (PTY) LTD v WM 
Spilhaus (WP) BPK 1996 (3) SA 273 (A), Senekal v Roodt 1983 (2) SA 602 (T); Lewis 1979 
SALJ 94. This issue and case law is also discussed in Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt 
Property 105-108 and Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 207-215. 
25  Recognition must be given to the transient nature of street art. Street artists act knowing that 
their work may be temporary; that their artwork may be painted over by the owner of the surface 
or by another artist. Thus, the intention of the artist and the permanent nature of the attachment 
could be questionable. It is suggested though, that this a concern for all artists not just street 
artists. Artists paint over their own works, or the works of others, art is painted over accidently, 
art is vandalised (which can occur in the production of new art), art is damaged in restoration 
processes, and some artists intend the deterioration and eventual destruction of their works. 
Further, this is an issue which affects all property covered by inaedificatio. For instance, in the 
case of Standard Vacuum 677E-679E oil tanks were considered to be attached to the land 
because they were too heavy to be moved (and because they were manufactured on the land). 
The fact that the oil tanks could have been destroyed or taken apart did not affect the decision 
that they were permanently attached. The ephemeral nature of all art should not affect the 
ownership of such and, thus, where street art is attached to an immovable it should be 
considered to be permanently attached. For examples of the ephemeral nature of art see Miklós 
http://io9.gizmodo.com/these-secret-artistic-masterpieces-were-hidden-beneath-1626834333 
(Date of use: 20 June 2016), Campbell-Dollaghan http://gizmodo.com/5-lost-images-found-
hidden-beneath-famous-paintings-1592796080 (Date of use: 20 June 2016), Entiknap Film 
Restoration 151 – 161 and Healy 2015 InterventionsJournal.  
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that the surface of the immovable has greater mass than the movable, is more 
valuable than the movable and that the artwork serves merely as decoration. 
Consequently, regarding the attachment of street art to an immovable, the answer 
provided by Van der Walt and Pienaar (that the owner of the immovable becomes 
the owner of the joined thing) is satisfactory. This finding is specifically supported by 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert who state that ‘[i]f, for instance, a painting is 
effected on the panelling of another’s house, it accedes to the latter.’26 
In some cases, the application of street art to an immovable can be financially 
beneficial to the owner of the immovable. Interestingly, in a few select instances, the 
value of the artwork could be just as valuable, if not more valuable than the 
immovable. For instance, in 2007 a house in the southwest of England which 
exhibited a mural, by Banksy, on one external wall was sold through an art gallery 
as a ‘Banksy mural with a house thrown in’.27 Further, another Banksy mural painted 
on the wall of a privately owned shop was removed and sold for over £1 million.28 If 
a recognised street artist like Banksy ‘bombs’ your immovable property it can 
significantly increase the value, possibly to the extent that it is no longer the 
immovable which gives the joined thing its identity or is the more valuable. 
Despite these anomalous cases, the position of Van der Walt and Pienaar (and 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert), that the identity of the joined thing should be 
determined by the immovable, and consequently that ownership (of the res) should 
devolve to the owner of such, should still be the understanding for the accession of 
movables to an immovable in the case of street art. 
2.2.3 The accession of movables to movables 
Ownership can also be acquired, through accession, where one movable is attached 
to another movable, such that a single thing is formed.29 This is provided that the 
elements of the composite things are still recognisable, that the composite things 
 
26  Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 216. 
27  Delana http://weburbanist.com/2008/08/05/the-art-of-banksy-pieces-sold-and-for-sale/ 
   (Date of use: 9 July 2014). 
28  HuffPost http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-kent-29886166 (Date of use: 26 August 2015). 
29  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 122. 
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are difficult to separate and that the joined thing does not amount to the formation 
of a new thing, then ownership can accrue through accessio.30 Ownership of the 
joined thing is still determined using the identity test. In general, the bigger, heavier, 
more valuable thing, or the part which is not merely decorative, is identified as the 
principal thing and ownership of the composite thing accrues to the owner of such.31 
The question of which of the components gives the thing its identity may also be 
considered.32 In the case of the accession of movables to movables, the identity test 
is not always applied with the ease in which it is applied to inaedificatio. 
There are different forms of accession of movables to movables; namely intextura, 
scriptura, pictura, ferruminatio and the adding of wheels to a vehicle.33 Intextura 
involves the weaving in of materials and the owner of the material becomes the 
owner of the composite thing.34 Scriptura comprises of writing on paper belonging 
to someone else and the writer becomes the owner.35 With pictura the painter of a 
picture becomes the owner of the painting - provided that the painting is worth more 
than the surface on which it is painted.36 Ferruminatio involves welding and the 
owner of the biggest or heaviest part of the composite thing becomes the owner of 
the composite thing, unless the accessory is more valuable.37 When wheels are 
added to a vehicle the owner of the vehicle becomes the owner of the composite 
thing.38 
As stated in the previous paragraph, in the case of accession (in the form of pictura) 
in most instances, ownership ascribes to the artist; the canvas accedes to the 
painting. It is only if the surface on which the artwork is painted is more valuable 
than the painting, that the artwork belongs to the owner of the surface.39 The 
 
30  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123; Olivier, Pienaar and Van der Walt Property 109; 
Knobel 2011 THRHR 296. Knobel discusses the issue of separation in detail at 298. 
31  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123; Knobel 2011 THRHR 297. 
32  Khan v Minister of Law and Order 1991 (3) SA 439 (T). 
33  JL Cohen Motors (SWA) v Alberts 1985 (2) SA 427 (SWA). 
34  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
35  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
36  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
37  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
38  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
39  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
49 
 
 
application of the identity test regarding pictura is predominantly supported by the 
historical sources. For instance, focussing on the physical identity of the composite 
elements, Gaius stated that the tablet (the movable which serves as the surface for 
the painting) accedes to the painting.40 Likewise, Justinian supported the view that 
the painting accrues to the artist, based on relative value. The is when the painting 
is worth more than the surface on which it is painted. The following quote illustrates 
this point accurately: 
‘If a person has painted on the tablet of another, some think that the tablet 
accedes to the picture, others that the picture, of whatever quality it may 
be, accedes to the tablet. It seems to us the better opinion that the tablet 
should accede to the picture; for it is ridiculous, that a painting of Appeles 
or Parrhasius should be but the accessory of a thoroughly worthless 
tablet.’41 
Justinian gave considerable weight to the financial values of the joined things; if the 
material which was painted on remained the more valuable of the two things, then 
ownership would fall to the owner of the material, not to the artist and vice versa.42 
This is still the approach in South African law wherein the artist becomes the owner 
of the composite movable thing, provided that the artwork is worth more than the 
material on which it was painted.43  
Accordingly, accessio in the form of pictura can apply to street art painted on the 
side of a movable, such as a mobile home, a shipping container or a car. Moreover, 
in the case of pictura, it is the artist who becomes the owner of the composite thing, 
provided that the artwork is worth more than the surface on which it is painted. This 
interpretation of accessio, where the value is given considerable weight, could 
ensure that in the majority of street art cases the owner of the movable remains the 
owner of the composite thing; because the value of the artwork won’t exceed the 
 
40  Gaius Institutiones 1.2.78 (De Zulueta The Institutes 1.2.78). See also du Plessis Borkowski 
202. This was also the perspective of Voet. Gane The Selective Voet 41.1.26. 
41  Justinian Digesta 2.1.34 (Sandars The Institutes 2.1.34). See also Du Plessis Borkowski 202-
203. 
42  Du Plessis Borkowski 202 – 203. 
43  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
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value of the movable. What about anomaly cases of street art i.e. artworks that are 
considered to have artistic and, as is the concern for this aspect of the identity test, 
financial value? Much like the accession of movables to immovables, there are 
examples where street art has been applied to a movable and the artwork is 
considerably more valuable than the surface on which it is painted. There are 
international examples where street art painted on a movable is worth considerably 
more as an artwork and, thus, the joined thing is significantly more valuable than the 
surface on which the art is painted. The financial value of Banksy’s street artworks 
has regularly exceeded the value of the movables on which they are placed. To 
illustrate this, one of Banksy’s murals was painted on the side of a mobile home. It 
is noted that the mural was painted with the owner’s permission which would 
exclude this example from the laws on original acquisition of ownership; instead this 
example would fall into the field of contract law. Such abode was put up for sale with 
the price tag of $1 million; the price of the joined thing (the street art) far exceeding 
the value of the mobile home.44 Another example of Banksy’s work, titled, Gangsta 
Rat (1) (circa 2002), was stencilled onto a wheel clamp. This clamp went to auction 
expecting to sell for between $20 0000 to $40 000.45 Again, the value of the artwork 
far exceeds the value of the surface on which it is painted. 
Not many pieces of street art will exceed the value of the movable on which it is 
painted, and thus the owner of the movable becomes the owner of the joined thing. 
However, there are exceptional cases of street art where the artwork does exceed 
the value of the movable. To reiterate, it is these pieces with which this study is 
concerned. As discussed in this part, in these cases, according to property law, the 
 
44  Delana http://weburbanist.com/2008/08/05/the-art-of-banksy-pieces-sold-and-for-sale/ 
   (Date of use: 9 July 2014); BBC 
  http://www.bbc.co.uk/norfolk/content/articles/2008/06/03/arts_banksy_20080603_feature.shtml 
(Date of use: 9 July 2014). 
45  Aitken https://www.eveningexpress.co.uk/fp/news/local/banksys-graffitied-wheel-clamp-draws-
in-crowds-at-successful-aberdeen-art-festival/  (Date of use: 9 January 2019). Sinha-Roy  
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-art-banksy/five-banksy-stenciled-works-to-be-auctioned-in-los-
angeles-idUKBREA3O0YV20140425 (Date of use: 9 July 2014).  
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joined thing should accrue to the artist because it is the financial (and artistic value) 
of the artwork which gives the joined thing its identity.46  
It may only be a matter of time and exposure, for a South African street artist’s work 
to attain a financial value which exceeds the value of the movable on which the 
artwork is painted. Therefore, this legal question may need to be handled by the 
courts to determine the ownership of the movable. 
Importantly, the bona fide intention of the person doing the attachment and the 
knowledge of both parties is not a requirement for the acquisition of ownership 
through accessio.47 Thus, it is possible that a person acting with mala fides could 
acquire ownership of the property. It is this aspect of accessio which makes this 
investigation so interesting; the function of law could result in a street artist acquiring 
ownership of the composite thing even though they are acting mala fides and even 
if they know they are breaking the law in the process of affixing the art to movable 
property belonging to another. The law rewards the criminal (or at least the person 
acting without bona fides) in this situation provided that the artwork is more valuable 
than the surface on which it is painted. 
This outcome is a bizarre solution from our law; it is unpalatable to think that a street 
artist who paints on another person’s movable property and breaks the law in the 
process should become the owner of such property simply because the artwork is 
worth more than the movable on which it is painted. The law should not reward such 
conduct. Consequently, it is necessary to consider if the law can strike a different 
balance in such cases. 
 
46  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
47  Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 39; Du Plessis Borkowski 198. It is 
only Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert who limit this statement by requiring that the artist act in 
good faith (they rely on the work of Van Leeuwen in this regard). Van Leeuwen Rooms-Hollands 
Recht 1.2.5.6 (Kotzé Commentaries I 1.2.5.6). See also Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman 216. This exception will be discussed in more detail under the part 
2.6 on Grotius’ Solution.  
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2.3.1 A delictual claim 
The law of delict provides remedies by which infringements of legally recognised 
interests are compensated for, ‘…all damage caused unjustifiably (iniuria) is 
actionable, whether caused intentionally (dolo) or by negligence (culpa).’48 South 
African law recognises delictual claims for patrimonial loss (damnum inuria datum), 
pain and suffering caused by bodily injury and damages to personality (inuria).49 
Patrimonial loss is claimed through the actio legis Aquiliae while personality injuries 
are satisfied through the actio iniuriarum.50  
To institute a delictual claim, ‘one person…must have caused damage or harm to 
another…by means of an act or conduct’.51 Thus, a person who has suffered 
damage caused by another person who acts voluntarily, with either intention or 
negligence (fault), and the act is wrongful, has a claim for compensation against 
such other person.52  
As street art concerns damage to property or pure economic loss - both being a 
diminishment of a plaintiff’s patrimony - and not bodily injury or damages to 
personality, this part of the study focuses on delictual claims based on the actio legis 
Aquiliae and the elements required to succeed with such a claim. A patrimonial loss 
 
48  Van der Merwe and Olivier Onregmatige daad 1; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 4. 
Overall the work of Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict has guided this part of the study, this 
is because their requirements for a delictual claim are the most comprehensive. Other authors 
do not discuss all the requirements that Neethling, Potgieter and Visser discuss. Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser require the elements of conduct, wrongfulness, fault, causation and 
damage. Burchell requires similar elements, namely; voluntary conduct, unlawfulness (or 
wrongfulness), capacity (which Neethling, Potgieter and Visser deal with under fault), fault, 
causation and loss. Burchell Principles of Delict 23. Van der Walt and Midgley only require 
wrongfulness, fault, causation and damages. Consequently, the requirements of Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser have been followed to ensure that any requirements for a delictual claim 
have been covered.  
49  South African law also recognises delictual claims based on strict liability such as the actio de 
pauperie. Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 5 and Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 1 and 35 – 36. 
50  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 5. 
51  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 23 and the sources referred to therein. 
52  See Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict damages 195-234, for causation 159 – 194, for 
voluntariness 23-30 and for intention and negligence see 109-158. 
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is the reduction of one’s estate, thus, the damage suffered must have affected the 
claimant such that the damage can be quantified in monetary terms.53  
To satisfy the element of conduct for a delictual claim, the damage must have been 
caused by someone who is in control of their actions; in other words, the action 
taken must be voluntary.54 Should the damage be caused by someone who cannot 
control their conduct, then the basis for the action is unfounded. Examples of such 
an exclusion can be found where the actor lacks the mental capacity to control their 
bodily actions (whether this is through exposure to intoxicating substances, 
hypnosis, and extreme anger amongst others).55 
The voluntary action must also be wrongful. Wrongfulness does not mean that the 
person who caused the damage must have acted with intention or negligence (fault 
is a subsequent requirement). Conduct is considered to be wrongful if it results in 
the infringement of a plaintiff’s legally recognised rights or if the conduct results in a 
breach of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff. To reiterate, conduct is considered to be 
wrongful if it impedes on another person’s subjective right/s in a manner which is 
legally improper or if the conduct results in a breach of duty owed by one to another 
(and such duty is recognised in law for the purposes of liability).56 Additionally, the 
damage must be caused in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable way.57 
Wrongfulness is determined by reference to the boni mores of a community; which 
is determined by the criterion of reasonableness. If the conduct was unreasonable 
considering the boni mores of the community, then it is wrongful.58 It is rarely 
relevant whether the person acts  with bona fides or not.59 Physical impact on a 
 
53  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 44. For more on conduct see Burchell Principles 
of Delict 36 – 37. 
54  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 64 – 65. 
55  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 64 – 65; Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 
23-30. 
56  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 68. As discussed in the case of Coronation Brick 
(Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 317 (D) (hereinafter referred to as 
Coronation Brick). 
57  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 33. For more on wrongfulness in general see Burchell 
Principles of Delict 38 – 66 under the topic Unlawfulness. 
58  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 36– 50. See also Burchell Principles of Delict 38. 
59  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 71. 
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person’s corporeal property is prima facie wrongful and, unless some defence is 
offered to explain the conduct, it is actionable.60  
Fault must also be proved to be successful in a delictual claim. Fault can take the 
form of intention (dolus) or negligence (culpa). A finding of fault is a subjective 
decision and, thus, refers to the actor’s state of mind at the time that damage is 
caused. A person who does not have the mental capacity to distinguish between 
right and wrong cannot be held accountable and, thus, fault would be absent, and 
the claim would fail.61 In the case of accessio, (specifically where a street artist 
paints on a movable belonging to another and, thus, acquires ownership through 
accessio) it could be said that fault is apparent in the form of dolus, where a street 
artist does not accidentally apply paint to a movable. ‘An accountable person acts 
intentionally if his will is directed at a result which he causes while conscious of the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.’62  For instance, in the case of S v Ngubane Jansen 
JA stated that if the actor could foresee the damage occurring and still proceeded 
with their action, then dolus is present.63 
The element of causation must then be proved to show that the conduct of the 
defendant must have caused the negative consequences affecting the plaintiff.64 
This requirement ensures that there is a factual relationship between the conduct 
and the harm and whether (or how much) the defendant is legally responsible for 
the harm caused by their action.65 The factual test for causation traditionally uses 
the sine qua non test (what is commonly referred to as the, ‘but for,’ principle). Thus, 
‘but for’, the defendant’s conduct, the harm would not have been caused to the 
plaintiff.66 The test for legal causation therefore requires that the wrongful conduct 
 
60  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 68 – 71. See also Neethling, Potgieter and Visser 
Delict 87 – 123 and Burchell Principles of Delict 67 – 82 for more on defences which exclude 
unlawfulness. 
61  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 129 – 132. See also Burchell Principles of Delict 83 – 84. 
62  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 132. For more on intention see Burchell Principles of 
Delict 91 – 100. 
63  S v Ngubane 1983 (1) SA 381 (A). 
64  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 197. For more on causation see Burchell 
Principles of Delict 114 – 124. 
65  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 197. 
66  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 198 – 199. For more on factual causation see 
198-202. 
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is linked either directly or sufficiently close to the loss; a loss which is considered to 
be too remote from the action does not satisfy the test for legal causation.67 Various 
tests have been used to determine legal causation; the flexible approach, adequate 
causation, direct consequences, fault, reasonable foreseeability, novus actus 
interveniens, and the talem qualem rule.68 The flexible approach is the standard 
approach followed in South African law; the subsequent tests play a persuasive role 
(but not definitive) in the determination of causation.69 
Finally, the applicant must prove that damage has occurred. The applicant must 
prove that they have suffered a loss in their patrimony.70 Damages are intended to 
put the plaintiff back into the position they would have been had the damage not 
occurred and no more, because plaintiffs cannot profit from a delictual claim. In other 
words, the money that is awarded must equate to the patrimonial loss suffered by 
the plaintiff.71 When property has been damaged, it causes a reduction in a person’s 
patrimony.72 Where such damages occur, the damages may be assessed by 
ascertaining the market value of the property pre- and post-delict, and/or by the cost 
of repairs if such repairs would ensure that the property is restored to the pre-delict 
market value.73 Provided that the plaintiff has proved all the elements required, a 
claim for damage to property should succeed, and the defendant will have to 
compensate the plaintiff for their patrimonial loss. 
2.3 Claims for compensation for the accession of movables to movables 
Claims for compensation, for the accession of movables to movables, are noted, by 
Van der Walt and Pienaar, in regard to accession via intextura and scriptura.74 
However, they do not state if claims for compensation are available for accession 
 
67  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 132. For more on legal causation see 132- 133. 
68  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 200-220. These tests will discussed further below at 60-
62. 
69  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 201. 
70  Burchell Principles of Delict 123 – 124. 
71  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 216 – 217. 
72  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 231. 
73  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 219 – 220. 
74  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. 
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via pictura, ferruminatio or the addition of wheels to a vehicle.75 This seems to be 
an omission because the historical sources, on which the South African law of 
accessio is based, included claims for compensation.76 However, there is a lack of 
clarity as to the category of the claim i.e. whether it is based on a delictual action, 
an enrichment action or a claim arising from a theft. 
Several of the historical sources of South African law suggest that a delictual claim 
is the correct action to claim for compensation following the loss of ownership of 
property through the function of accessio. In The Institutes Gaius noted that in the 
case of pictura, the owner of the surface on which the painting is placed can defeat 
a claim for ownership using the exceptio doli mali (a plea for fraud) if the claimant 
refuses to pay the value of the surface material.77 The Institutes read further that,  
‘[i]f the painter is in possession of the picture, it follows that the owner of the 
tablet is entitled to a utilis actio against him; and in this case, if the owner of 
the tablet does not pay the value of the picture, he may also be repelled by 
an exceptio dolus malus; that is, if the painter obtained possession bona 
fide.’78  
This implies that there could be a delictual claim for compensation in the event 
that a graffiti artist acquires property through accession. 
 
75  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 123. Carey Miller also does not discuss claims for 
compensation for the accession of movable to movables. Neither do Badenhorst, Pienaar and 
Mostert. Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 36-39. Badenhorst, Pienaar 
and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman 148. 
76  See for instance Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 90 and the sources referred to therein. There 
is debate in South African law as to whether the improver of a movable does have a claim for 
compensation. Claims for compensation are recognised for improvements to immovables but 
the legal situation is less clear regarding movables. In Reed Bros v Ford 1923 TPD 150 it was 
decided that the person who had affected improvements to a movable did not have a claim 
available to them. In Wipplinger v Wax 1933 EDL 60 found that there was such an action based 
on the older authorities. The argument that there is no claim for compensation for improvements 
to movables has been continued in the work of Nathan 1974 THRHR 101. De Vos has countered 
this argument finding that there is an enrichment claim for compensation, based on the 
predominance of the case law on this matter. De Vos 1974 THRHR 308 and De Vos 
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid. See also Leech 1994 THRHR 696 – 697 and Wipplinger v Wax 
1933 EDL 60 albeit that this case does not concern accessio, but merely an enrichment claim 
for improvements to a car (a movable). 
77  Gaius Institutiones 1.2.78 (De Zulueta The Institutes 1.2.78).  
78  Gaius Institutiones 1.2.78 (De Zulueta The Institutes 2.1.34). 
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In The Digest, Gaius recommends the actio utilis as a remedy for the owner of the 
material (on which the painting is painted) to reclaim such property, provided they 
pay for the value of the painting.79 
Furthermore, the Roman law provided the actio in factum for claims arising where 
the joined things cannot be separated, and the rei vindicatio cannot be used 
because ownership has already been transferred. The rei vindication is an action 
that can be instituted by an owner so it cannot be used to compensate a person who 
has lost ownership through the function of accession.80  
Under Roman-Dutch law, Voet states that: 
‘The owner [sic] of that which has acceded to the other thing is granted 
either an actio in factum [under the lex Aquilia] or an exception and a right 
of retention of the main thing if he is in possession of it, with a view to 
recovery of the value.’81 
While the action Voet is discussing arises from the non-fulfilment of a 
contractual obligation (not in cases of accessio) this would support the argument 
for a delictual claim being the correct claim.82 Groenewegen and Grotius support 
Voet's stance.83 
Notice should also be taken of the South African author Van Warmelo who 
discusses claims arising from accessio. He states that in a situation where the res 
remains in possession of its original owner the new owner (who gains ownership 
through accessio) can use the rei vindicatio to claim the property.84 However, the 
original owner of the surface can use the exceptio doli to maintain possession until 
 
79  Justinian Digesta D9.10 (Watson The Digest of Justinian D9.10). 
80  Justinian Digesta D6.1.23.5 (Watson The Digest of Justinian D6.1.23.5). 
81  Gane The Selective Voet 41.1.27, own emphasis.  
82  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 359. 
83  Groenewegen De Legibus Abrogatis 2.1.29 (as cited in Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 358) 
and Grotius Inleidinge 2.10.7 (see Herbert Dutch Jurisprudence 2.10.7, Lee Jurisprudence of 
Holland 2.10.7). 
84  Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 90. 
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the new owner pays compensation.85 Van Warmelo also discusses the situation 
where the new owner not only has ownership but also possession of the res. In this 
situation, the original owner of the surface can use the actio utilis against the new 
owner of the res to claim possession. In this instance, the actio utilis plays the same 
role as the rei vindicatio. However, if the claimant is not prepared to compensate the 
new owner for their contribution to the new res, then the new owner can use the 
exceptio doli to prevent this, but only the bona fide new owner can use the exceptio 
doli.86 However, the exceptio doli has never been adopted into South African law.87 
Thus, it doesn’t provided a solution for a claim for compensation. Judicial references 
have been made to actio doli, but it is generally accepted that the actio doli has been 
superseded by the Aquilian action in South African law.88 
To add to this, Zimmerman states that: 
‘The law of delict aims at making good some damage that has occurred. It 
looks at the position of the plaintiff … Thus, the law is here concerned with a 
detrimental deviation from the status quo. The law of unjustified enrichment, 
in a way, is the mirror image of the law of delict. It deals with a favourable 
deviation from the status quo. And it is merely concerned with the position of 
the defendant.’89 
Unfortunately, this statement does not clarify whether the correct claim for 
compensation following the loss of ownership through accessio should be a delictual 
claim or an enrichment claim. In this situation, the plaintiff’s (original owner) 
patrimony has decreased, and the defendant’s patrimony (new owner) has 
increased. Moreover, as will be discussed under 2.3.3 on unjustified enrichment 
claims, the elements of this claim require that the plaintiff should have been 
impoverished and the defendant been enriched. Arguably, as it is the person who 
has lost ownership of the property (that has become the property of another through 
 
85  Hawthorne 2014 Fundamina 396. See van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 90. For more on this topic 
see Bauling Latent Defects 81. 
86  Van Warmelo Roman Civil Law 90-91. 
87  Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (AD) 605I and 608 F-G. 
88  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 35. 
89  Zimmerman 1995 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 403 – 404. 
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accessio) who would be claiming compensation (it is their position that has been 
diminished), they would be the plaintiff and Zimmerman may be supporting a 
delictual claim as the correct claim for compensation. 
Hence, it would appear from these historical and some more current sources of 
South African law that compensation arising from the loss of property through the 
function of accessio (in the form of pictura) should be claimed as a delict using the 
Aquilian action (to be discussed in more detail in part 2.3.1). However, delictual 
actions have not been used in South African courts when claiming for compensation 
following the loss of property through the function of accessio.  
In the case of Unimark Distributors v Erf 94 Silvertondale Van de Westhuizen AJ 
said the following: 
‘If the plaintiff lost ownership of some of the items, e.g. by accessio, 
the requirements of unjustified enrichment have to be applied to the 
facts in order to determine whether the defendant has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, who must have been 
impoverished thereby.’90 
From this dictum, it appears that the correct method to claim compensation for 
the loss of ownership caused by the function of accessio would be via a claim 
for unjustified enrichment.91 De Vos discusses the claim for compensation 
following the loss of property through accession in terms of a liability arising 
 
90  Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 10. This case concerned an 
application by the plaintiff for items, he claimed belonged to him, that had been installed on a 
factory site owned by the defendant and such items were alleged to be in the possession of the 
defendant. Unjustified enrichment claims have regularly been used as the form of claim for 
enrichment that is caused by the function of accessio. For examples see Nortje v Pool 1966 3 
SA 96 (A), Fletcher and Fletcher v Bulawayo Waterworks Company Limited; Bulawayo 
Waterworks Company Limited v Fletcher and Fletcher 1915 AD 636, De Beers Consolidated 
Mines v London and South African Exploration Company 1893 (10) SC 359, Meyer’s Trustee v 
Malan 191 TPD 559, Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A), 
Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (Transvaal) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W), Sumatie 
(EDMS) BPK v Venter en ‘n Ander NNO 1990 (3) All SA 145 (T). Albeit that these cases 
predominantly concern inaedificatio.  
91  Admittedly this dictum did not concern accessio in the form of pictura, however what is important 
is that unjustified enrichment may also offer a claim for compensation in the case of accessio 
regardless of the specific form of accessio. See Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 359.  
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from an unjustified enrichment.92 This assertion is supported by Van der 
Merwe and Pope, and Eiselen and Pienaar.93 However, Du Plessis recognises 
that the same set of facts can give rise to both a delictual claim and a claim for 
unjustified enrichment and states that there is no resolution on the correct 
action to take in South African law.94 Despite this, Du Plessis acknowledges 
that De Vos suggested that an enrichment claim is the preferred method. 
Further, although Du Plessis does not agree with de Vos’s reasoning hereto, 
he also supports an unjustified enrichment claim as the correct claim (or better 
claim) for compensation.95 
Despite Van der Walt and Pienaar not specifically addressing whether a claim for 
compensation exists regarding pictura, the fact that a claim for compensation did 
exist in the Roman law suggests that this omission is just that, an omission. The 
original owner of the surface on which the painting is located, who loses ownership 
through the function of accessio in the form of pictura (and consequently 
experiences a diminishment in patrimony), should have a claim for compensation in 
South African law. However, both a delictual action and an unjustified enrichment 
action may offer solutions.96 While case law supports compensation through an 
unjustified enrichment claim, it is worthwhile to pursue both forms of claims for 
compensation. What follows is a discussion of the potential claims in the law of delict 
(the Aquilian action) and the law of unjustified enrichment. Further, the common law 
and statutory crimes which may apply to the defacement of the property will also be 
considered, along with the Proceeds of Crime Act to consider whether these aspects 
of law would also assist a plaintiff claiming for compensation.97 
 
92  De Vos 1960 Juridical Review 134 albeit that De Vos is referring to the Roman historical sources 
of South African law. 
93  Van der Merwe and Pope Property 496. Eiselen and Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment Casebook 
7. 
94  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 335 and 360.  
95  De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 494, Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 359. 
96  For more on the division between a delictual claim and an enrichment claim see Visser and 
Kleyn Between Delict and Enrichment 300. 
97  It is also worthwhile noting that some crimes can also amount to a delictual claim. Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser Delict 7 – 8. 
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2.3.2 The potential success of a delictual claim 
When a person’s patrimony has been diminished through the loss of property as a 
result of accessio in the form of picture, they may have a delictual claim based on 
damage to property or pure economic loss. Arguably (as discussed below in part 
2.3.3) the claim for pure economic loss is the more convincing of the two claims.  
However, South African courts have adopted a very restricted approach to delictual 
actions based on pure economic loss, not wishing to extend the reach of the Aquilian 
action. ‘[C]ourts have been circumspect in allowing a remedy because of the 
possibility of unlimited liability: the economic consequences of an act may far 
exceed its physical effect. There is a spectre of limitless liability.’98 Consequently, 
the preponderance of case law concerns damage to property. In light of this, the 
focus on applying the elements of a delict to street art focuses on damage to 
property before exploring the potential for a claim based on pure economic loss.99  
When considering a delictual claim based on damage to property: it seems obvious 
that the patrimonial loss that occurs due to the loss of ownership of the movable 
property because of accession (through the application of street art to movable 
property belonging to another) would qualify for a delictual claim. The street artist 
has already damaged property belonging to another and such damage results in a 
patrimonial loss for the original owner of the surface on which the artwork is placed. 
However, it is submitted that there are several issues that preclude a delictual claim 
in this instance. 
In the scenario with which this study is concerned, the original owner of the movable 
property, on which street art is placed, suffers a patrimonial loss because their 
estate is diminished through the function of accessio. To satisfy the first element of 
 
98  Viv’s Tippers (EDMS) BPK v Pha Phama Services 2010 26 ZASCA [6] and the case law referred 
to therein. See also Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van Suis Afrika Bpk 
1973 (1) SA 769 (A) 776-777, Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 
824 (A) and Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 1985 (4) 
SA 553 (ZS). 
99  In addition, writers tend to focus on the element of wrongfulness when discussing pure economic 
loss. Thus, in the interest of completeness it is worth exploring a delictual claim based on 
damage to property and then one based on pure economic loss. See for example, Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser Delict 269-274. 
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a delict, it suffices to say that the act which causes the harm, the loss of property 
through accessio due to the application of paint to a movable belonging to another 
is the voluntary action of the street artist.100  
Conversely, the element of causation is not so easily satisfied. Causation enquires 
whether the conduct of the street artist caused the patrimonial loss. Whether there 
is a causal nexus (factual causation) between the conduct and the harm? Whilst the 
act of applying paint to the movable property of another which causes damage to 
such property is the voluntary action of a human being, the harm that this study is 
concerned with is not patrimonial loss caused by the damage to property. Instead, 
it is the patrimonial loss that occurs through the function of accessio. In this case, 
the plaintiff has not suffered damage to property (as the property is no longer theirs); 
rather, their estate has been diminished through the loss of ownership of the 
property due to the function of law. Accessio is a consequence of the law. The action 
of the street artist invokes accessio, but the actual harm (the patrimonial loss) is 
caused by the operation of law and not by the conduct of a person. On the element 
of causation, it may be that a delictual claim for damage to property would fail as the 
street artist does not cause the harm. 
In employing, the sine qua non test, there does appear to be a causal nexus, but for 
the conduct of the street artist, accessio would not have occurred, and the original 
owner would not have suffered patrimonial loss. However, could the reasonable 
street artist have foreseen such loss occurring?101 It is unlikely that street artists 
know about accessio; know that it is possible for them to acquire ownership of the 
movable property on which they paint. What the street artist foresees is damage to 
property, not the loss of property.102 Therefore, it is unclear whether the sine qua non 
test can be satisfied. 
The question of legal causation is somewhat more complicated than factual 
causation. In that, can the consequences of the street artist’s act be imputed to the 
 
100  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 25. Actions such as the actio de pauperi are an exception 
to this rule. 
101  This is the test for negligence which can also satisfy the fault test 
102  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 137 – 139. 
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street artist? Can the street artist be held liable for the additional consequences of 
their action? In terms the flexible approach, it must be considered whether there is 
a close enough relationship between the street artist’s conduct and the patrimonial 
loss caused by accessio, such that the street artist can be held liable for the harm.103 
According to the flexible approach, the street artist’s liability cannot exceed the 
boundaries of reasonableness, fairness and justice.104 While it would seem relatively 
simple that the flexible approach would extend to cover the loss of patrimony in this 
instance, it can also be argued that holding a street artist liable for the consequences 
that occur due to the operation of law (accessio) may well exceed what is reasonable 
and fair. Some of the subsequent tests appear to support this finding.  
According to the fault test, the actor can only be held responsible for the 
consequences for which they had fault.105 Fault can be present through intent or 
negligence.106 Regarding intent, the street artist can only be held responsible for the 
consequences covered by their intent.107 It can be argued that while a street artist 
has the intent to cause damage to the movable property they do not have the intent 
to cause the patrimonial loss that occurs through accessio. However, it could also 
be argued that a street artist does not intend to cause damage to property. Instead, 
they could intend to improve the movable by turning it into art. 
Second, the reasonable foreseeability test also highlights this issue.108 This test 
requires that the harm caused must have been reasonably foreseeable, but it should 
not be far-fetched.109 While the street artist could be said to foresee the damage to 
property, it is highly questionable whether they would have foreseen the patrimonial 
 
103  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 200, as formatted in S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A) 40 -
41. 
104  Smit v Abrahams 1994 4 (SA) 1 (A) 18. 
105  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 207. It should be noted that the fault test is used to 
establish legal causation and is separate from the element of fault. 
106  Van der Walt and Olivier follow the fault test for determining causation and thus liability. 
Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 211. 
107  Van der Merwe and Olivier Onregmagtige Daad 198. 
108  The reasonable foreseeability test is frequently used in South African case law. Neethling, 
Potgieter and Visser Delict 202 and the sources quoted therein. 
109  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 175. 
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loss caused by the operation of accessio. It is doubtful that many street artists would 
be aware of this function of the law. 
Third, in terms of the novus actus interveniens test, it needs to be asked whether 
the transfer of ownership through accessio is an independent event (a novus actus 
interveniens) which occurs after the street artist’s act is complete and whether it is 
this intervention which causes the patrimonial loss.110 Accessio could be a novus 
actus interveniens, and thus there would be no direct link between the street artists 
conduct and the patrimonial loss.  
It would appear from the balance of the above tests that are used to determine legal 
causation that the conduct of the street artist cannot be said to have legally caused 
the patrimonial loss. It is likely that a delictual claim arising from the loss of property 
through accessio would fail due to the lack of causation.111 
It is further debatable whether the element of wrongfulness would be satisfied. It 
appears that the act is prima facie wrongful because it causes damage to someone 
else’s property (resulting in patrimonial loss) and, as already mentioned, ‘physical 
impact on a … person’s corporeal property is prima facie wrongful.' Further, ‘the 
wrongfulness of an act is … always determined with reference to its consequence 
… the act is only wrongful in delict when harmful consequences ensue.’112 The 
harmful consequence is the diminution of the plaintiff’s patrimony. The act would 
also be wrongful because it is unlawful, because graffiti is a crime in terms of the 
GLFA and various municipal by-laws, and because graffiti is considered to be contra 
boni mores. In addition, the artist would have no ground of justification to excuse the 
wrongfulness.113  
 
110  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 216-219. 
111  This view appears to be supported by Du Plessis’ work on unjustified enrichment albeit that he 
is discussing the situation where a third party is enriched rather than the party doing the joining; 
‘[i]f a person takes another’s property and attaches it to the property of a bona fide third party, 
the party is enriched if he becomes owner of the attached property, but without having 
committed a delict.’ Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 335. 
112  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 36. 
113  For defences against wrongfulness see Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 125 – 
155. 
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However, there is a concern with this prima facie finding of wrongfulness because 
the harm is not caused by the conduct of the street artist but rather by the automatic 
legal process of accessio. It is unclear whether the function of the law should be 
regarded as wrongful and thus, the harm caused may not be wrongful either. 
Despite this concern, it is likely that the act and the harm caused would be 
considered to be wrongful. 
Ignoring the issues about the element of causation and the doubts about the other 
elements of a delict, even if a court found that the elements of a delict were present, 
it should be noted that the claimant can only claim monetary compensation for their 
patrimonial loss. The claim would restore the injured party to the same financial 
position they were in before accession took place. Compensation in terms of a 
delictual claim cannot take the form of the return of the property and restoring to it 
to its original state because ownership has passed, and the Aquilian action does not 
cater for the re-transfer of ownership. Thus, even if a delictual claim was 
successfully proven, the result could still be unsatisfactory. The transfer of the 
movable property to the street artist cannot be undone by this action, even though 
the street artist was committing a crime and acting with mala fides. Thus, the street 
artist benefits (possibly substantially) from the crime. Consequently, a delictual claim 
is an unsatisfactory solution to the loss of ownership through accessio. 
Another option, and debatably the preferable option, for instituting a delictual claim 
for patrimonial loss could be for the original owner to claim for pure economic loss.114 
In this instance, the Aquilian action is extended to include financial loss that resulted 
from the damage to property but does not involve the claimant’s property.115 As 
Booysen J stated in Coronation Brick ‘it seems clear that the fact that the patrimonial 
loss suffered did not result from physical injury to the corporeal property or person 
of the plaintiff, but was purely economic, is not a bar to the Aquilian action.’116 A 
claimant need not have suffered damage to property in order to claim for pure 
 
114  For an example of a delictual claim based on pure economic loss see Telematrix (Pty) Ltd v 
ASA 2006 (1) All SA 6 (SCA). 
115  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 296.  
116  Coronation Brick 335. 
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economic loss but the claim may be based on a financial loss that arises from 
damage to property.117 
The original owner must still comply with all the requirements of a delict.118 However, 
the focus is upon the element of wrongfulness.119 In the street art scenario, for pure 
economic loss, ‘wrongfulness lies either in the infringement of a subjective right or 
in the breach of a legal duty to avoid damage’.120 Undoubtedly, there is no general 
duty to prevent pure economic loss for other persons, however, in cases such as 
this the court must look at the circumstances of the case by using the criterion of 
reasonableness or the boni mores to decide whether in this specific instance there 
would be a legal duty to avoid pure economic loss. The following quote from 
Coronation Brick confirms this, 
‘A defendant’s conduct, including an omission, is regarded as unlawful 
when the circumstances of the case are of such a nature that it not 
only incites moral indignation but also that the legal convictions of the 
community demand that it ought to be regarded as unlawful and that 
the damage suffered by the plaintiff ought to be made good by the 
defendant … the Court must …evaluate …the social consequences of 
the imposition of liability in that particular situation’.121 
When considering the boni mores the courts have placed importance on the 
defendant’s knowledge; practical steps taken to prevent the loss; professional 
knowledge or competence; the extent of the risk; the extent of the loss; statutory 
provisions and miscellaneous factors.122 
In relation to street art, the fact that the defendant knew that their conduct would 
lead to damage the claimant’s property (knowledge) would be an integral factor in 
 
117  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 268; Neethling and Van Aswegen 1989 THRHR 607-608. 
118  Jowell v Bramwell-Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) 877. 
119  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 269. 
120  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 297. See also Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 94-95. 
121  Coronation Brick 343. 
122  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 270-273. See Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of 
Delict 94 for a greater list of factors. 
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determining the boni mores and in turn, the wrongfulness of the action.123 The 
relevant legislation that criminalises graffiti would also be deemed persuasive 
(statutory provision).124  The GLFA and the relevant municipal by-laws which 
criminalise the conduct of street artists implies that the defendant should have 
prevented the economic loss suffered by the defendant.125 A court may also take in 
account the common law of theft  which by implication prescribes that the defendant 
must prevent the economic loss, i.e. must not commit the crime that causes the 
damage. Further considerations such as the fact that the number of potential 
plaintiffs is limited, that the amount of the loss is limited and that the defendant was 
responsible for creating the situation which gave rise to the loss will count in favour 
of the plaintiff.126 
From this perspective it appears that the defendant should be responsible for the 
pure economic loss arising from the commission of a crime. Indeed, even if the 
defendant were not found guilty of theft in a criminal case (as discussed in part 2.4, 
and the rei vindicatio), the plaintiff can still institute and succeed with the civil, 
delictual action for the pure economic loss arising from theft.127  
While this may be a more persuasive argument for wrongfulness and therefore 
increase the likelihood of success of a delictual action, many of the issues which 
would defeat a delictual claim for damage to property could also affect the claim for 
pure economic loss. The element of causation remains problematic: did the harm 
occur due to the conduct of the defendant or due to the operation of law?128 Further, 
despite the prima facie wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct is it reasonable and 
fair to hold the defendant liable for the consequences of the function of law? 
 
123  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 299. The knowledge that the defendant’s action would 
cause harm was one of the deciding factors in Coronation Brick. Coronation Brick 386. 
124  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 94. 
125  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 273. 
126  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 94. 
127  See for instance Hohne v Super Stone Mining (Pty) Ltd 2016 JOL 36993 (SCA) in which Hohne 
was found liable for patrimonial loss arising from the theft or diamonds despite not having been 
found guilty of theft in the criminal case (unreported) arising from the same facts. 
128  Steenkamp v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2006 (3) SA 151 (SCA) 163B-C wherein 
it was held that an action cannot be found wrongful if doing so would compromise legal doctrines 
and principles in other branches of law. 
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Moreover, because courts have been reluctant to extend the Aquilian action to 
different forms of patrimonial loss, they may be hesitant to extend the action for the 
pure economic loss that occurs due to the function of law.129 
Over and above this, a claim for pure economic loss will still not ensure the return 
of the property. As stated in the previous part, damages are intended to put the 
plaintiff back into the position they would have been, had the damage not occurred. 
Where the owner has suffered pure economic loss the amount of damages is 
calculated by calculating, 
 ‘the negative difference between the relevant person’s current 
patrimonial position (after the event complained of) and his 
hypothetical patrimonial position that would have been the current 
position had the event not taken place. Therefore, the calculation 
entails a comparison of an actual current patrimonial positional sum 
with a hypothetical current patrimonial sum.’130 
It would be possible to calculate the patrimonial loss that occurs from the painting 
of street art on the movable property and the original owner could receive financial 
compensation if the delictual claim is successful. However, the original owner should 
not benefit from a delictual claim.131 The test for quantifying the damage does not 
provide an adequate answer in the case where the act that caused the loss 
increased the value of the movable.132 If the value of the movable has increased 
significantly calculating the difference between the plaintiff’s current patrimonial 
position and the hypothetical patrimonial position they would have been in had the 
event not taken place would mean that the plaintiff benefitted, and a delictual claim 
is not the appropriate remedy in such cases. 
To conclude, with regard to the delictual claim for compensation based on damage 
to property, it is submitted that there are far too many questions that arise (as to the 
 
129  Van der Walt and Midgley Principles of Delict 94. 
130  Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Delict 231-233. 
131  Burchell Principles of Delict 123-124. 
132  This would also be a problem in the case of immovable property where the street art has 
increased rather than decreased the owner’s property. 
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claim for compensation following the loss of movable property through accessio in 
the form of pictura). It is not certain whether a delictual claim would be successful 
and even if it was, the result is unsatisfactory. Moreover, while a delictual claim for 
pure economic loss is more convincing than a delictual claim for a loss that occurs 
due to damage to property, the street artist still acquires the property and may still 
benefit from their conduct. As such it is an unsatisfying and still uncertain remedy. 
The law needs to offer a more definite and acceptable resolution. Thus, the law of 
delict does not offer an agreeable solution to the diminution of patrimony (by 
damage to property) through accessio in the case of pictura where the joiner has 
acted illegally and/or in bad faith. 
2.3.3 An unjustified enrichment claim 
The second potential claim for compensation for the loss of movable property 
through the function of accessio (in the form of pictura) is a claim for unjustified 
enrichment. A claim for unjustified enrichment arises when one party receives: 
‘an unfounded patrimonial transfer resulting from an obligation created by the 
increase of one party’s estate at the expense of the estate of another without 
such cause as the law may regard as conclusive for the transfer to (or 
maintenance of the value in) the estate of the first party.’133  
An unjustified enrichment claim is intended to restore financial profits from the party 
who, with no legal justification, received such benefits, to the party at whose 
expense the benefits were obtained.134 Thus, an unjustified enrichment claim, ‘gives 
rise to an obligation to provide restitution.’135 Within the field of unjustified 
enrichment there are several available actions arising from different forms of 
enrichment. First the condictiones, which is enrichment caused by a transfer made 
to another (gift). Second, the condictio indebiti  which is enrichment caused by a 
transfer that failed to fulfil an obligation. Third, condictio causa data causa non 
 
133  Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 1. 
134  Visser Unjustified Enrichment 4. 
135  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 1. This part of the work primarily refers to du Plessis 
Unjustified enrichment, Visser Unjustified Enrichment and Sonnekus Unjustified enrichment are 
equally important. 
70 
 
 
secuta; this is enrichment produced by a transfer that failed to accomplish an 
impending lawful purpose other than fulfilling an obligation. Fourth, the condictio ob 
turpem vel iniustam causam which is enrichment produced from a transfer made for 
an illegal or immoral purpose. Fifth, the condictio sine causa; enrichment caused by 
transfer not covered by the previous actions (enrichment resulting from the 
unauthorised improvement of another’s property). Sixth enrichment arising from the 
unauthorised fulfilment of another’s obligation and, seventh, enrichment caused by 
taking from another or infringement of another’s rights.136  
To institute any of these unjustified enrichment claims four general requirements 
must be met; the defendant must be enriched, at the plaintiff’s expense, such that 
the plaintiff is impoverished, and the enrichment of the defendant must be 
unjustified.137 
To prove that the defendant has been enriched, it must be determined whether they 
have enjoyed an increase in assets or a decrease in liabilities, or whether the they 
have avoided a decrease in assets, or if the defendant has avoided an increase in 
liabilities.138 In addition, it must be established that the enrichment was patrimonial 
in nature.139 Enrichment is determined by establishing the overall effect on the 
defendant’s patrimony. The net effect of the action must be considered, if, 
objectively, the actual, overall effect of the action has caused an increase in the 
 
136  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment see specific sections on the condictiones 59- 94, the condictio 
indebiti 95-176, the condictio causa data causa non secuta 177-194, the condictio ob turpem 
vel iniustam causam 195-213, the condictio sine causa 215-252, unauthorised improvement of 
another’s property 267-307, unauthorised fulfilment of another’s obligation 309-330 and 
enrichment by taking from another or infringement of another’s rights 331-343. Sonnekus also 
includes the condictio furtiva (enrichment where a thief has acquired possession of property) 
and the actio negotorium gestio contraria (where enrichment has resulted through the 
unauthorised administration of another’s affairs. Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 147 – 150 
and 151-225. For a discussion of the historical development of the enrichment actions and their 
reception into South African law see Zimmerman 1985 CILSA 1. 
137  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 24 albeit that Du Plessis accidently confuses the terms 
plaintiff and defendant. See also McCarthy Retail Limited v Shortdistance Carriers (3) SA 482 
(SCA) specifically [15] of Schutz JA’s judgement and [2] of Harms JA’s judgement. 
138  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 25 -27 and sources quoted therein. In general, see Sonnekus 
Unjustified Enrichment 42 – 56 and Visser Unjustified Enrichment 158 – 164. 
139  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 27. 
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defendant’s patrimony then they have been enriched.140 The defendant may be 
enriched by; acquiring corporeal property (such as through accession), acquiring 
incorporeal property, attaining property in the form of a claim to money held in a 
bank account, providing services or doing work (a factum), and infringement of 
another’s rights (using another’s property).141 
Along with the requirement that the defendant be enriched, the plaintiff must also be 
impoverished through either; a decrease in assets, or the impoverishment caused if 
assets did not increase as otherwise would have occurred, or an increase in 
liabilities, or an impoverishment caused if liabilities did not decrease as otherwise 
would have occurred.142 Again, this is established by determining the net effect on 
the plaintiff’s patrimony.143 Then, it must be determined whether the defendant’s 
enrichment occurred at the plaintiff’s expense; the plaintiff must show that there is 
a sufficient causal link between themselves and the defendant’s enrichment in order 
to be successful with the claim.144 The element of causation is not well defined in 
unjustified enrichment law. However, in the South African courts causation is 
interpreted flexibly.145 The factual causation test (the sine qua non or the ‘but for’ 
test) cannot be applied in all cases of enrichment and nor can the direct link test (is 
the link between the action and the harm too tenuous to be considered directly 
linked).146 Du Plessis considers this element by looking at examples of causation 
that have already been considered by the courts.147 There are some suggestions 
that the causal theory is followed in South Africa.148 
 
140  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 28. The enrichment must be measured objectively; the value 
of the enrichment must be established according to market value. Further, the enrichment must 
have occurred; the claim cannot be based on the possibility of future enrichment. See Du Plessis 
Unjustified Enrichment 30 -32 for discussion of these factors.  
141  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 32 – 40. 
142  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 41 – 43. 
143  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 43 – 44. See also Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 79 – 76. 
144  See Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 48. 
145  Visser details the need for a causal link in detail, Visser Unjustified Enrichment 165 – 171. 
146  See Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 49. 
147  See Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 50 – 52. Other legal systems use the sine qua non test 
to determine legal causation just as South African law does for delictual claims. Visser 
Unjustified Enrichment 167. 
148  Gouws v Jester Pools (Pty) Ltd 1968 (3) SA 563 (T), ABSA Bank t/a Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW 
Peneelkloppers 1998 (1) SA 939 (C). 
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The final requirement for a successful unjustified enrichment claim is to prove that 
there was no legal basis for the defendant’s enrichment; in other words, that the 
enrichment is unjustified. This is done by proving that the plaintiff meets all the 
requirements for the specific action (which form of unjustified enrichment is being 
claimed for). The plaintiff must prove both the general elements of an unjustified 
enrichment claim and the specific elements of the specific action. Thus, if the plaintiff 
is not able to satisfy the specific actions requirements, then there is considered to 
be a legal justification for the enrichment, and the claim fails.149 Further, the plaintiff 
must prove that there is no ground which would support the enrichment. For 
instance, if the enrichment occurred due to the fulfilment of a contractual obligation, 
then the enrichment has a legal ground.150 In S Polwarth and Co (Pvt) Ltd v 
Zanombairi, it was acknowledged that ‘[w]hen one person’s property comes into the 
hands of another without lawful justification, the former owner may in general claim 
that be restored to him.’151 Van der Walt (JC) states in the case, ‘enrichment is in 
principle sine causa if there is no obligatory relationship between the enriched and 
impoverished parties on the basis of which the enriched party could claim the 
transfer of the benefit’.152 However, Scott suggests that the definition set out by Van 
der Walt (JC) is too narrow as it excludes modes of enrichment that are provided for 
by law, such as the acquisition of property through testate succession, court orders 
and forms of original acquisition of ownership.153  
But, even if such a legal ground is absent, it does not automatically mean that the 
plaintiff can institute an enrichment claim, the plaintiff must still meet the rest of the 
requirements for the specific action.154 Therefore, if all the elements of the specific 
action are present, then the claim is sine causa.155 What forms a legal ground is still 
 
149  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 52 – 53, and the sources quoted therein. 
150  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 52 – 53, and the sources quoted therein. For more on the 
historical basis of this requirement see Du Plessis 2005 SALJ 143 – 148. 
151  S Polwarth and Co (Pvt) Ltd v Zanombairi 1972 (2) SA 688 (R) [692]. 
152  Van der Walt 1966 THRHR 222. 
153  Scott Unjust Enrichment 7 – 8. Although she bases her argument on De Vos’s recognition of 
this narrow formulation. De Vos Verrykingsannspreeklikheid 355. 
154  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 54 – 58. 
155  First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC 2000 (4) SA 137 (D). In 
general, see Visser Unjustified Enrichment 171 – 193. 
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open to debate since; there is no list of acceptable legal grounds that would exclude 
an unjustified enrichment claim or indeed a list of situations in which a legal ground 
is absent. Visser suggests that determining where there is a legal ground for 
retaining enrichment should be decided on a case by case basis.156 
2.3.3.1 The specific enrichment action for accession: 
enrichment by taking from another 
Du Plessis notes that forms of accession such as inaedificatio, the accession of 
movables to movables, the acquisition of fruits and forms of specificatio, namely 
comixtio et confusio, are forms of enrichment.157 However, Du Plessis does not 
specifically state that these are forms of unjustified enrichment. Despite this lack of 
clarity, it would appear that this is intended because he also states that:  
‘Certain cases of unjustified enrichment involve ‘taking’ or infringement of 
another’s rights. A simple example is where A builds on his land with B’s 
materials, and becomes owner of these materials by virtue of the law of 
accession. A is now enriched by ‘taking’, through depriving B of his right of 
ownership of the materials. This infringement of B’s rights is the basis of 
an enrichment claim.’158  
Du Plessis further notes that accession falls into the category of enrichment by 
taking from another; specifically including inaedificatio, plantatio et satio, acquisition 
of fruits and the accession of movable to movables under this type of claim.159 This 
compensation for unjustified enrichment caused by accession can be claimed using 
the specific enrichment action for taking from another.160 This claim is not based on 
any traditional action (such as the condictio sine causa), and because of this, there 
are no specific requirements for the action. Thus, for claims of this nature, the focus 
is placed on the general requirements for an unjustified enrichment claim. This is to 
 
156  Visser Unjustified Enrichment 171 – 193. 
157  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 32 – 33. 
158  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 331 – 332. This is based on the work of Zimmerman 1995 
CILSA 1. 
159  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 359 – 362. 
160  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 33 and 331 – 332. 
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say that; the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was enriched and they were 
impoverished, that the enrichment occurred at the expense of their impoverishment 
and that the enrichment was unfounded (and there is no legal basis preventing 
restitution).161  
However, Du Plessis notes that the civil law is not clear regarding the nature of relief 
for the accession of movables to movables. He also points out that an original mode 
of acquisition of ownership may not be a legal ground for retaining enrichment.162 
The absence of legal ground requirement functions similarly to the legal causation 
requirement for a delictual claim. Thus, as accessio is a function of law, one needs 
to enquire whether this amounts to a legal ground that would exclude an unjustified 
enrichment claim? The original acquisition of ownership through acquisitive 
prescription is a sufficient legal ground for retaining ownership and, thus, it is not 
considered to be unjust enrichment and no claim for compensation can be 
instituted.163 It is unclear why acquisitive prescription is exempt from payments for 
compensation, or why other forms of original acquisition of ownership are not.164 
Much like acquisitive prescription, it could be argued that accessio is a legal ground 
for retaining enrichment; after all, the purpose of accessio is to transfer ownership 
and thus increase the ‘defendant’s’ assets. In addition, the delictual argument that 
the defendant’s liability cannot exceed the boundaries of reasonableness, fairness, 
and justice, may also suggest that even in a claim for unjustified enrichment it may 
be unreasonable, unfair, and unjust to hold the defendant liable for enrichment that 
occurs through the function of law.165 
Arguably, these questions have been answered by precedent as case law has 
allowed compensation for loss of ownership via some forms of accession. However, 
precedent is unclear about compensation for the accession of movables to 
movables. Most cases regarding unjustified enrichment claims following the loss of 
 
161  Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 42 – 93. 
162  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 334. 
163  Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 4. Sonnekus 2011 TSAR 79. 
164  Southwood Compulsory Acquisition 118. 
165  Smit v Abrahams 1994 4 (SA) 1 (A) 18. There is a need for further exploration of this issue, 
however, for the purposes of this study it will be assumed that the function of law in the 
accession of movable to movables is not a legal ground excluding an enrichment claim. 
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property through accessio are based on inaedificatio. For instance, while Khan v 
Minister of Law and Order involved the accession of vehicle components to the car 
it does not concern a claim for compensation; rather, the case forms a precedent 
for the determination of ownership (which is the principle thing).166 Similarly, JL 
Cohen Motors V Alberts involved the accession of wheels to a vehicle but did not 
concern an unjustified enrichment claim, rather a determination of ownership.167 In 
the case of, Aldine Timber Co. v Hlatswayo is about the accession of building 
materials to a movable house structure, but the case concerns payment of a debt 
as opposed to an unjustified enrichment claim.168  
Despite these issues, it is likely that the unjustified enrichment claim is the correct 
claim following the loss of ownership through accessio because precedent exists. 
Furthermore, because courts can extend the enrichment action where it is 
appropriate, it is likely that the action would be extended to include claims for 
compensation following the accession of movables to movables. 
2.3.3.2 An unjustified enrichment action for the diminution in 
patrimony following the loss of movable property through the 
function of accessio (in the form of pictura) 
In the case of street art, it is apparent that the defendant (the artist) is enriched 
through the acquisition of property (or enrichment through taking from another). 
Through accessio the street artist becomes the owner of movable property 
previously owned by the plaintiff; the defendant’s assets have been increased (the 
presumption exists that the defendant is enriched through the transfer of 
property).169 It is also clear that the plaintiff (the original owner of the movable 
property on which the street art is painted) has suffered a decrease in assets 
because the movable property no longer belongs to them; thus the plaintiff is 
 
166  Khan v Minister of Law and Order 1991 (3) SA 439 (T). 
167  JL Cohen Motors SWA (PTY) Ltd v Alberts 1985 (2) 427. 
168  Aldine Timber Co v Hlatswayo 1932 TPD 337 
169  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 25, 32 -34 and 381 – 382. 
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impoverished.170 Further, this enrichment occurs at the plaintiff’s expensive because 
their ownership is terminated.171  
However, assuming that accessio would not be considered as a sufficient legal 
ground to exclude a claim, and a claim for unjustified enrichment could be 
successful against the street artist, the result would still be unsatisfactory. As with a 
delictual claim, the unjustified enrichment action is aimed at the plaintiff recovering 
the value of the lost movable and not the movable itself.172 An unjustified enrichment 
claim only allows for the restoration of wealth, not the restoration of assets. Thus, 
the movable property would still belong to the street artist, and the original owner of 
the material would still lose their res and only be compensated monetarily for the 
value of the movable.  
It is submitted that even monetary compensation for the value of the movable 
property is unjust where the accession of property occurs through the commission 
of a crime. Thus, while compensation may be offered by the law of unjustified 
enrichment, such a solution is an imperfect one, and the law should seek a better, 
more just, solution for people who are impoverished by the loss of movable property 
through the operation of accessio in the form of pictura. Therefore, claims for 
compensation are inadequate, the law should seek restoration of property, this may 
be offered by the remedies for common law and specific crimes. 
2.4 Common crimes, specific crimes, and the rei vindicatio 
Unfortunately, the common law crimes and the various legislation (creating specific 
crimes) concerning graffiti is confusing; there are various legislative approaches.173 
 
170  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 41. 
171  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 48. 
172  Du Plessis Unjustified Enrichment 360. The provision of financial restitution instead of the return 
of property is an exception in the South African legal system (the rei vindicatio being the general 
action) but this exception applies to the loss of ownership through accessio. Eiselen and Pienaar 
Unjustified Enrichment Casebook 7. 
173  A significant amount of this part of the work is based on an article written by the author before 
commencing with this study. See Smith 2014 SACJ 181. Consequently, the common law crimes 
and statutory crimes will not be explored in detail. Although, the study of the common law crimes 
relating to street art raises interesting questions and is a topic that warrants further exploration 
it is not the focus of this study. 
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Initially, graffiti could be prosecuted in terms of the common law crime of malicious 
damage to property.174 Most cases of street art would meet the requirements of such 
crime; namely, that the perpetrator intentionally commits an act which is unlawful 
and that act causes damage to another’s property.175 However, this common law 
method is often unhelpful as prosecution can only be implemented if that damage 
to the property is not trivial in nature (the de minimis principle); graffiti crime may not 
be considered to be serious enough to warrant prosecution.176 Graffiti is also 
criminalised in terms of the GLFA; an obscure piece of legislation the majority of the 
statute has been repealed and replaced by new (and often more specific) 
legislation.177 Section 44(1) of the GLFA states that a person convicted of, ‘placing 
any placard, poster, writing, word, letter, sign, symbol, drawing or other mark on any 
property, whether movable or immovable, of any other person or of the state, and 
thereby defaces or disfigures such property’, may be sentenced to imprisonment for 
up to six months (or any other penalty deemed appropriate). Section 44 (2) of the 
GLFA states that if the person (or state) whose property has been defaced, can 
apply for compensation in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act.178 Likewise, s300 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act allows an injured party or the prosecutor to implement a 
claim for compensation.179 Should the victim not claim in terms of this section, the 
court may also implement a fine equal to the restoration costs of the property or 
another period of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months.180 In addition to this 
specific crime, various municipal by-laws regulate graffiti.181 
While these crimes go some way to preventing and punishing graffiti crime, as well 
as offering compensation to the injured party, they offer limited help and are 
contentious. For instance, the crime of malicious damage to property can only be 
instituted for property belonging to another or in which the instituting party has a 
 
174  Labuschagne 1998 Obiter 309. 
175  Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal Law 849 – 852. See also Smith 2014 SACJ 181 
regarding the potential specific crimes for graffiti. 
176  Labuschagne 1998 Obiter 311. 
177  GLFA s44(1). 
178  GLFA s 44(2). 
179  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 300. 
180  It is unclear whether this fine accrues to the State or the injured party. 
181  Such as the JHB Graffiti By-law and the CPT Graffiti By-law. 
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legal interest, and the question arises whether the injured party has a legal interest 
in property they no longer own. If ownership of the property was transferred to the 
street artist, then the disposed owner no longer has a legal interest in the property. 
It is submitted, that despite this concern, at the time the crime is committed the 
injured party (the original owner of the movable) does have a legal interest in the 
property, they are still the owner of the property and thus could lay a criminal 
charge.182 However, much like the delictual action and the unjustified enrichment 
action, ownership of the movable still transfers to the street artist via accessio and 
the criminal law solutions can only offer monetary compensation in the form of a 
fine. The movable property cannot be restored to its previous owner. 
In addition to the fact that the criminal law options do not restore ownership of the 
movable, there are further unhelpful issues. Albeit, in the unique cases with which 
this study is concerned, the financial and artistic value of the artwork may exclude 
the de minimis principle; it is uncertain whether the financial and artistic value of the 
artwork would mean that the case would no longer be considered to be too trivial to 
prosecute.183 If graffiti crimes are considered to be too trivial (despite the value of 
the artwork), then the de minimis rule may still prevent a lot of graffiti crimes from 
being prosecuted.184 Also, the nature of graffiti crimes can prevent the state from 
commencing a criminal case; the street artist is anonymous and often not caught in 
the act. The likelihood of criminal prosecution is limited if there is no one to 
prosecute. Of course, despite the anonymity of the street artist, ownership of the 
 
182  This is assuming that ownership only transfers via accession upon completion of the painting. 
This is, again, an uncertain aspect of the law on accessio. At what point has an artist done 
enough work to result in accession of the movable? There are many paintings by renowned 
artists that are unfinished and, yet, are still considered to be aesthetically and financially 
valuable. Referring to the work of Justinian in The Institutes he considered it nonsensical that 
the work of Appeles or Parrhasius would accrue to the owner of the tablet. Justinian Digesta 
2.1.34 (Sandars The Institutes 2.1.34). Thus, even an unfinished doodle by the right artist may 
change the nature of the movable on which it is placed to the extent that it becomes art and 
ownership passes by accessio. Indeed, Cézanne was well known for incomplete works, yet 
these are still considered to be artworks rather than a canvas with paint. For examples of 
unfinished artworks see Tames http://www.artsheaven.com/art-interrupted-the-5-most-famous-
unfinished-paintings.html (Date of use: 5 August 2016). However, the issue of when accessio 
takes place is beyond the scope of this study. 
183  Director of Public Prosecutions (Eastern Cape) v Klue 2003 (1) SACR 389 (E). See Burchell 
and Milton Principles of Criminal Law 355 – 356 for a discussion of cases where the triviality of 
the case has (and has not) excluded prosecution. 
184  Labuschagne 1998 Obiter 311. 
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movable is still acquired. Admittedly the anonymous nature of street art also means 
that the new owner of the movable is anonymous and may not actually claim the 
property, nevertheless, ownership still passes despite the anonymity. 
An argument could be raised that the acquisition of ownership through the 
commission of a crime would amount to theft of property; however, theft occurs 
where there is unlawful appropriation with intent to steal of property capable of being 
stolen.185 Theft of property cannot be proven in these circumstances, because a 
street artist does not have the required intention to take the property, merely to adorn 
the property.186 Thus, charging a street artist for theft of property is unlikely to 
succeed, even though the street artist acquired the movable through accessio 
because they lack the intent to commit the crime of theft (they do have the intent to 
commit the crime of malicious damage to property). Therefore, because a charge 
for theft is not viable, the original owner of the surface cannot use the condictio 
furtiva to recover the value of property lost or damaged after being stolen.187  
The common law remedy of the rei vindicatio also does not offer a solution to the 
diminished party because the rei vindicatio can only be implemented by the owner 
of the property to recover such property. The original owner of the movable property 
is no longer the owner; therefore, they cannot institute action using the rei 
vindicatio.188 Ironically, the rei vindicatio could be used by the street artist to claim 
possession of the movable property if such property remains in the control of the 
original owner. 
Despite these issues, it is trite that criminals should not be allowed to retain the 
proceeds of their crimes.189 POCA is an attempt to approach (organised) crime from 
a new perspective; it focusses on racketeering and the assets of crime (confiscation 
 
185  Burchell and Milton Principles of Criminal Law 167 – 168. 
186  As previously stated, it is unlikely that the street artist is aware that they acquire ownership of 
the movable property through accessio. 
187  The condictio furtiva is a specific delictual remedy used to recover the value of property which 
is lost or damaged after being stolen. Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 174-175. 
188  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 163-171 and Du Bois (ed) Wille’s Principles 539 – 
541. 
189  NDPP v Mohamed 2002 (2) SACR 196 (CC) [15 – 16]. For an overall discussion of organised 
crime and the statutory framework see Burchell and Milton Criminal Law 970 – 1019. 
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and forfeiture) as opposed to focussing on the perpetrator. Section 6 of POCA 
criminalises the conduct of a person who acquires, uses or has possession of 
property that is reasonably suspected to be part of unlawful activities.190 To assist 
with the implementation of POCA the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
created the Asset Forfeiture Unit in 1999. This unit is responsible for recovering 
assets gained through the commission of a crime. Where there is a victim of a crime 
and the Asset Forfeiture Unit has recovered the property the Unit returns the asset 
to the victim and where there is no victim the asset remains in possession of the 
state.191 The recovery of assets occurs through the issuing of a confiscation order 
in terms of s18 of POCA. 
POCA targets the instruments and proceeds of crime and,  
‘shifts the focus of prosecution from the individual and individual criminal 
events to the entity or enterprise, with the object of eliminating the 
organisation rather than the traditional objective of stopping the individual 
from committing additional offences’.192  
POCA may also assist where the criminal cannot be identified.193 
While organised crime is commonly understood to refer to crimes committed by 
criminal syndicates, POCA can assist in the case of individual wrongdoing (and thus 
POCA can apply to gangs of street artists as well as to individual artists).194 
Thus, POCA offers a legislative method for the recovery of property lost through the 
commission of a crime. Though, unfortunately, POCA does not expound on what 
acquires property in s6 actually entails.195 Nor has this aspect of POCA been subject 
to academic debate. It is submitted that the legislature did not intend for acquires to 
 
190  Burchell and Milton Criminal Law 991. 
191  Kruger Organised Crime 9. 
192  Kruger Organised Crime 1. 
193  Prevention of Organised Crime Bill 118 of 1998 [2.3] of the Memorandum to the Bill. 
194  NDPP v Geyser 2008 ZACSA 15 (25 March 2008). POCA deals with certain crimes specifically 
such as racketeering, gang crime, terrorism and money laundering. Indeed, the focus and use 
of POCA has been on such crimes. Despite this the ambit of POCA includes graffiti crime. 
195  POCA s6(a). 
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include the acquisition of ownership because crime involving property does not 
usually result in the transfer ownership of such property. Nor can ownership of stolen 
property (or is the proceeds of a crime) be acquired by a third party; the third party 
cannot acquire ownership of stolen property even if they do not know that the 
property is stolen. Usually, only possession of the proceeds of a crime (the property) 
may be acquired in the commission of a crime. It is unusual for a criminal to acquire 
ownership (as is the case in this study). It is unlikely that the legislature intended to 
include the acquisition of ownership (through the function of law) within the term 
acquires when POCA was drafted. 
Further, it is debatable whether the movable property with which this study is 
concerned should even be considered to be the proceeds of crime. It is necessary 
to remember that accessio does not require good faith on the part of the joiner. 
Ownership still passes via accessio in the case where the party acts mala fide.196 
Accessio is a legal function of the law in that ownership transfers regardless of 
whether the action involved can be characterised as criminal or not. In the case of 
street art, the artwork is not the proceeds of crime, rather it is the proceeds of the 
function of law. Moreover, in the case of accession of movables to movables in the 
form of pictura, the asset transfers to the artist and should not be able to be claimed 
by the state in terms of POCA. 
Further, POCA does not resolve the practical issues that defeat the usefulness of 
the crimes of malicious damage to property and theft. POCA can only be 
implemented following prosecution, and graffiti crime is notoriously difficult to 
prosecute. The criminal may not be known, the state may consider the case to be 
trivial (the de minimis principle) in nature, and the elements of the crime may not be 
proven. Thus, none of the potential criminal law solutions discussed offer an 
acceptable solution to this dilemma. 
 
196  Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership 39; Du Plessis Borkowski 198. 
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2.5 A temporary summary 
When a street artist paints on the surface of immovable property, ownership of the 
joined res accrues to the owner of the immovable. However, where a street artist 
paints on movable property ownership accrues to the artist (provided that the value 
of the painting is worth more than the surface it is painted on) even though the 
application of paint to the movable involves the commission of a crime. This is 
because accessio in the form of pictura does not require the bona fides of the person 
doing the attachment.197  
It is unlikely that compensation can be claimed in terms of the law of delict. The 
possible claim for compensation through an unjustified enrichment claim is 
unsatisfactory because it does not restore ownership of the movable to the original 
owner of the movable. The common law and statutory crimes also do not offer a 
satisfactory solution to this issue. Further, it is doubtful that the property can be 
returned using the POCA, as cases of malicious damage to property, or the specific 
offences, are rarely (if ever) prosecuted.198  
It seems that there is no acceptable solution in the South African law that provides 
satisfactory compensation (restoration of ownership) for this unique form of 
acquisition of ownership through the commission of a crime. This outcome is most 
disturbing because people who commit crimes should not be able to benefit from 
them because it is contra boni mores.199 A different solution is needed to resolve 
this issue. Fortunately, the Roman-Dutch jurist Grotius may provide a solution. 
 
197  As discussed in part 2.2.3 
198  Labuschagne 1998 Obiter 311. 
199  The ridiculousness of this aspect of South African law has already been highlighted by Coleman 
in Coleman 22 Quaint Cases 83 – 88, in which Coleman uses the example of an artist who 
paints upon the motor vehicle of another and consequently becomes the owner of such vehicle. 
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2.6 Grotius’ solution 
Grotius suggested that ownership of paintings should not be acquired through 
accessio but rather through specificatio (he did recognise that he was digressing 
from the Roman law on this matter).200  
Van der Walt and Pienaar describe specificatio as: 
‘Manufacture [specificatio] is the acquisition of ownership in a 
manufactured thing by a person using the materials or thing of another 
person, without the owner’s permission, to manufacture a completely 
new thing.’201  
Thus, specificatio is different from accessio in that it involves the creation of a new 
thing, whereas accessio concerns a joined thing. In South African law specificatio 
applies to five industrial processes namely; agricultural processes, smithying 
processes, tailoring, carpentry, and apothecary processes.202  
In order for ownership to pass through specificatio, the following requirements 
must be met; the material used must result in a new thing, and the new thing must 
be such that the accessory things cannot be returned to their original states.203 
Specificatio implies that a person who has performed some form of labour on a 
thing, such that the economic and/or social function of the thing is changed, may 
acquire ownership of such thing as a result of their labour.204 Like accessio, 
ownership may only pass to the manufacturer if the new thing was created without 
the permission of the owner of the material (if the permission of the owner was 
given this would amount to a contract). 
 
200  Grotius Inleidinge 2.8.3 (see Herbert Dutch Jurisprudence 2.8.3, Lee Jurisprudence of Holland 
2.8.3). 
201  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 124. 
202  Van der Merwe 2004 Roman Legal Tradition 99. See also 102 – 108 for more on the Roman-
Dutch law regarding specificatio. 
203  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 124. Again, the historical application of specificatio 
is not consistent see Kaser Roman Private Law 26 III 5, 6 and Stoop 1998 Tjidschrift voor 
Rechtgeschiedenis 5-6. 
204  Stoop 1998 Tjidschrift voor Rechtgeschiedenis 3. 
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Further, the owner of the materials may claim compensation from the owner of 
the new thing.205 Grotius supported this compensation; he stated that the 
acquisition of ownership by the artist, through specificatio, encouraged the 
science of painting and that the owner of the material should only have a claim 
for compensation.206 
An argument can be made that original acquisition of ownership of paintings 
should be decided according to the rules of specificatio and not accessio in South 
African law. For one, accessio requires that joined things must be difficult to 
separate but not impossible, whereas specificatio requires that the product cannot 
be changed back into its original form. While paint can be removed from the 
surface on which it is painted (with varying degrees of success), the paint cannot 
be returned to its original form. The paint will be destroyed if it is removed from 
the surface. Thus, because the paint cannot be returned to its original form, the 
painting could be accepted as a form of manufacture. 
Further, in the cases with which this study is concerned, the application of paint 
to the surface of the movable changes the nature, appearance, and function of 
the thing, such that it is a new thing. In the case of Banksy’s Gangsta Rat (1) 
(circa 2002) it is no longer a wheel clamp; rather, it is a piece of artwork; the 
application of paint to the surface changes its function. Never again will the 
surface which is painted upon function as a wheel clamp, instead the new product 
will be displayed as art; its nature and function are altered – it is a nova species. 
Thus, specificatio may be a better approach to the original acquisition of artwork. 
Admittedly, changing the original mode of acquisition for paintings may seem to 
be no more of a solution than that offered by accessio. After all, Van der Walt and 
Pienaar do not require that the manufacturer of the nova species be acting with 
bona fides and, as is the case for specificatio, ownership devolves on the 
 
205  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 124-125. 
206  Grotius Inleidinge 2.8.3 (Herbert Dutch Jurisprudence 2.8.3 and 4, Lee Jurisprudence of Holland 
2.8.3 and 4). 
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manufacturer (in this case the artist).207 Even if ownership of the painting were 
determined by the rules of specificatio ownership would still devolve upon the 
artist.  
However, importantly, Grotius provides a solution to this problem by stating that 
the rules of specificatio only apply to acts that are bona fides, 
‘Dominium, or right of property, is obtained by the act of the person 
acquiring (aquisitoris), as when anyone acting in good faith gives to the 
material of another new character (species). … for instance, if a man 
brews beer out of another’s malt and corn, or makes mead of another 
man’s wine and honey, or even partly out of his own and partly out of 
another man’s, what is thus made becomes his own, if he thought that all 
the component parts belonged to himself; but if he were aware that the 
material belonged either wholly or in part to someone else, then the 
owner of the material would preserve his right, and the party giving it a 
new character must lose his labour and the material.’208 
It is clear that Grotius did not think that ownership should accrue through 
specificatio to a person acting in bad faith. Only where the manufacturer acts in 
good faith should the rules of specificatio be applied to determine ownership.209 
Where a manufacturer acts in bad faith, Grotius did not even think that the 
manufacturer should have a claim for their labour and material. Instead, where a 
manufacturer does not act in good faith, Grotius thought that the new product 
should belong to the owner of the material and that no compensation could be 
claimed by the manufacturer.210 
 
207  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 124. Whilst, Van der Walt and Pienaar recognise 
that the common law required bona fides on the part of the manufacturer was required they find 
that for practical reasons it would be better if bona fides was not required and state that the 
owner of the material can claim compensation for the loss of their material. 
208  Grotius Inleidinge 2.8.2 (Herbert Dutch Jurisprudence 2.8.2, Lee Jurisprudence of Holland 
2.8.2). 
209  Grotius Inleidinge 2.8.2 (Herbert Dutch Jurisprudence 2.8.2, Lee Jurisprudence of Holland 
2.8.2). 
210  Grotius Inleidinge 2.8.2 (Herbert Dutch Jurisprudence 2.8.2, Lee Jurisprudence of Holland 
2.8.2). 
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Grotius’ solution is partly supported by Van Leeuwen. While Van Leeuwen 
included the original acquisition of ownership of paintings under the rules of 
accessio, he agreed with the bona fides requirement suggested by Grotius: 
‘In conclusion it should be observed that where the one person’s goods 
or materials are mixed up with the materials of another, and the 
commixion has taken place bona fide, the party to whom the ownership 
is given must make reasonable compensation to him who is obliged to 
part with his property. Secus if the commixion has taken place mala fide, 
for then the owner of the materials retains his right, and he who has mixed 
them together loses his labour and his own materials.’211  
It is this requirement of good faith that should be significant in deciding the 
ownership of street art. Grotius thought that art should transfer via specificatio 
but only when the artist acts in good faith, ‘in honour of the painter’s art it is 
understood that that if a person in good faith has painted upon another’s 
canvas or board he acquires ownership of it’.212 Grotius did not think ownership 
of art should transfer, by any mode of original acquisition, where the artist did 
not have bona fides. This does not mean that ownership should instead accrue 
through accessio, it means that Grotius thought that where painting is 
concerned, for an original mode of acquisition to apply, (and in his case 
specificatio) the artist must be acting in good faith.  
Guidance can also be garnered from the Roman Law on inaedificatio. If a 
builder built on land belonging to another knowing that they did not have 
permission to do so, then the builder is presumed to have forfeited their 
materials. Whereas if the builder mistakenly built on land belonging to another, 
then they do not lose ownership of the materials because ‘no-one should gain 
profit to the detriment and injury to another’.213 If this principle is applied to the 
 
211  Van Leeuwen Rooms-Hollands Recht 1.2.5.6 (Kotzé Commentaries I 1.2.5.6). 
212  Grotius Inleidinge 2.8.3 (Herbert Dutch Jurisprudence 2.8.3, Lee Jurisprudence of Holland 
2.8.3). 
213  Justinian Digesta D50.17.206. (Watson The Digest of Justinian D50.17.206.). 
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accession of pictura then there is no problem because the street artist would 
not benefit from the act. 
To acquire ownership of paintings (in the case of Grotius through specificatio 
and for Van Leeuwen through accessio), the artist must be acting in good faith. 
If the artist is not acting in good faith, then ownership does not transfer, and 
the artist will not have a claim for compensation for their labour and materials. 
2.7 The res derelicta intervention (occupatio) 
An argument could be made that once an artist has completed the artwork (located 
on movable property) and, ownership transfers to the artist, the artist abandons the 
property when they ‘walk away’ from the artwork.214 Consequently, the joined thing 
becomes a res nullius, that is, ownership of the joined thing is abandoned and the 
res becomes ownerless. 
Property that has purposely been abandoned by the previous owner can be 
acquired by another. Arguably, a street artist who leaves the movable res (on which 
they have located their street art) abandons the res when they ‘walk away’ from their 
completed work. Importantly, the person abandoning the property must have the 
intention to abandon the property, and it is debatable whether the street artist can 
be said to have this intention, especially if they are not aware that ownership has 
transferred to them via accessio. After all, intention to acquire ownership is not 
required in the transfer of ownership through accessio; the intention required for the 
accession of property relates to the joining of the movables.215 As it is unlikely that 
a street artist acting in good faith would be aware that the movable property would 
be transferred to them, then it is likely that the street art does not have the intention 
to continue owning the property when they ‘walk away’.  
Admittedly, not having the intention to be the owner and intending to abandon the 
property are different intentions and it cannot be decisively determined that the 
 
214  The phrase ‘walk away’ is used here to suggest the scenario where the street artist has 
completed the work and leaves the location whether, simply because they are finished, or 
because they need to leave the scene of the crime. 
215  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 120 -121. 
88 
 
 
street artist abandoned the property. Nevertheless, when a street artist ‘walks away’ 
from the movable property, and they do not intend to maintain ownership of the 
property, then the res becomes a res derelicta.216 
Ownership of res derelicta can be acquired through occupatio: the ‘unilateral 
exercising of control over a corporeal thing that can be owned … but which is not 
owned by anyone (res nullius) with the intention of becoming the owner.’217 This 
form of acquisition requires that the person acquiring the property has physical 
control over the property and to show that they intend to take ownership of the 
property and that the property does not belong to anyone else.218 In light of this legal 
intervention, a third person could become the owner of the property after the 
ownership has transferred to the street artist. 
This intervention would provide a solution to the original owner of the movable 
property. Provided that the previous owner of the movable property is the next 
person to gain physical control of the res derelicta, and they intend to be the owner, 
then ownership will transfer back to them. The result will be as if transfer via 
accessio did not occur; the parties will be restored to the positions they were in prior 
to the creation of the artwork. 
However, what if the next person to acquire possession is not the previous owner 
but a third person? Admittedly, this makes this remote scenario even more remote, 
but there is a small possibility that once the street artist’s work is completed the third 
person to possess the movable is not the original owner. The movable could be 
stolen. Someone else could take physical control; an ambitious street art collector 
could use this loophole in law to build their collection, to profit from the street art. 
Appropriation of property via occupatio does not require that the physical control of 
the property be lawful; even if the physical control is a crime ownership can still be 
acquired by an intervening third party.219 Consequently, occupatio may also create 
 
216  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 115. 
217  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 113. 
218  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 113 -114. 
219  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 113. 
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an even more bizarre, but lawful manner in which ownership of street art could be 
acquired. 
While this is a very unlikely scenario, it is still a possible method through which street 
art can be acquired; a method which, like the acquisition of movable property 
through accessio, is unjust. The original owner of the movable still suffers a 
decrease in their estate due to the illegal activity of another. Thus, requiring good 
faith in the process of accessio would also prevent this from occurring because 
ownership would not pass from the owner of the movable to the street artist. If 
ownership does not pass through accessio, then the property would not become 
abandoned property. The good faith requirement offers a ‘fix all’ solution. 
2.8 A conclusion partway 
It is submitted that the approach of Grotius and Van Leeuwen to acquiring original 
ownership of paintings through accession is a better approach than the current 
approach taken in South African law. While the original mode of acquisition of 
ownership regarding pictura could be either accessio or specificatio what is 
important is that the artist should only acquire ownership if they are acting in good 
faith. Requiring this element for the acquisition of pictura is essential. Otherwise, the 
law allows for the acquisition of property through the commission of a crime which 
is contra boni mores. Consequently, when the original ownership of pictura is in 
question (whether through accessio or specificatio) the South African law should 
require the element of bona fides (and thus, ownership of the new res should accrue 
to the artist). Moreover, where bona fides is not present the ownership of the new 
res should not be in question, it merely belongs to the owner of the material on which 
the painting was painted, and no compensation for the artist should be allowed. A 
criminal should not be allowed to benefit from their crimes. 
If the South African law follows this approach to pictura, then the ownership of 
movable property will not be questioned when street art is painted on the side of 
such movable. Whether the value of the street art far exceeds the value of the 
movable, or whether the street art is considered to be a nova species, the property 
will still belong to the owner of the surface on which it is painted. If bona fides is not 
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incorporated into the requirements for the accession of ownership of paintings, then 
as South African street artists gain recognition and as their illegal artwork becomes 
artistically and financially valuable, South African property owners may lose their 
movable property through the commission of a crime. Moreover, they will have no 
recourse to restore ownership – only a debatable claim for compensation through 
the law of unjustified enrichment, which places the burden of proof on the victim (the 
plaintiff). 
Thus, it is submitted that the South African law concerning the original acquisition 
of paintings (pictura) be developed such that there is a requirement that the artist 
act with bona fides for the rules of accessio to be applied to determine ownership. 
Having resolved that street art (whether painted on  immovable or movable property) 
should belong to the owner of the surface on which it is painted (and that the artist 
should not have a claim for compensation for their labour and materials) it is now 
necessary to consider whether that finding of ownership is appropriate for culturally 
significant street artworks.  
The public’s interest in protecting and preserving street art which is culturally 
significant may require the limitation of private ownership to ensure this. Or indeed, 
it may be appropropriate for the state to assume ownership of these (potential) 
cuultural heritage resources. Afterall, individuals hold many different values in 
relation to cultural heritage resources, and it is possible that the property owner will 
see the street art as a saleable commodity as opposed to a national icon, or not 
view the art as valuable in any sense.220 Therefore, the state may need to intervene 
to ensure the protection of culturally valuable street art either by limiting an owner’s 
property rights or by expropriating the property. 
Consequently, this study will continue with an analysis of the cultural heritage 
legislation i.e. the legislation regulating the identification of cultural heritage 
resources and their protection and preservation. This will include what sites and 
objects can acquire heritage status, why such sites and objects acquire heritage 
 
220  Roodt Cultural Heritage xxiii. 
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status and what protection heritage status offers. Further, whether selected South 
African street artworks qualify for such protection.  
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CHAPTER 3 PROTECTING AND PRESERVING STREET ART THROUGH 
CULTURAL HERITAGE LEGISLATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The art that is created by street artists by painting on property belonging to someone 
else should belong to the owner of the property on which it is painted. Ownership of 
these artworks includes the entitlements that accrue to such status i.e., physical 
control, to use and benefit from the property, to encumber the property and to 
alienate the property.1  Private ownership of culturally significant street art can be 
problematic because of these entitlements. For instance, an owner who does not 
appreciate the art may destroy it, or an owner who recognises the value of the piece 
may remove the artwork from public view (either for their own enjoyment or for sale 
as was the case with Mobile Lovers). In addition, if an owner does not take steps to 
protect a piece of street art that holds cultural value, it is at risk of defacement, 
damage and environmental decay.  
Culturally significant street art could be preserved and protected by the limitations 
placed on the ownership by South Africa’s cultural heritage legislation if it were 
recognised as a cultural heritage resource. However, no South African street art is 
recognised as a cultural heritage resource. The lack of recognition means that any 
South African street artworks which are culturally significant are unprotected and 
are vulnerable to the whim of the owner.  
It is only in recent years that street art has come under consideration for heritage 
status in other countries.2 Works, situated in Melbourne, Australia, by Mike Brown 
and Keith Haring are included in the Australian national heritage register, and in 
Aachen, Germany street artworks by the street artist Klaus Paier have federal 
 
1  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 48. These rights are distinguished from the 
intellectual property rights of the artist. The artist retains the intellectual property right (copyright) 
to control the reproduction of the work, the publication of the work, and the making of an 
adaptation of the work inter alia. The artist also maintains the moral rights to the artwork 
Ramsden Intellectual Property Law 7, 34-35, 46-47, 49-50 and 55. 
2  Merrill 2015 International Journal of Heritage Studies 369. 
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protection.3 In addition, works by Blek le Rat in Leipzig have been considered for 
heritage protection.4 In Hong Kong, China, although not recognised through national 
heritage legislation, municipal authorities have undertaken to protect and preserve 
in situ examples of the calligraffitist Tsang Tsou Choi’s work.5 Also, the cities M+ 
Museum (which is a local authority development project) has acquired some of his 
illicit artworks.6 
In New York, the non-commissioned street art installation by Arturo Di Modica, 
known as the Charging Bull statue (which originally appeared outside the New York 
stock exchange in 1989) is not officially recognised as a heritage resource, or as 
owned by the state. Despite this, public funds have been spent to ensure the 
protection and preservation of the artwork. State funds were used to move the 
statute to a temporary site, two blocks away from its original position (the statue is 
still located at such temporary site) as well as to erect surrounding barriers (when 
necessary), and to provide for a police guard to protect it. The street art also appears 
in the online catalogue of Permanent Art and Public Monuments for New York’s 
Parks and Recreation Department. Thus, even though the Charging Bull is not a 
recognised heritage resource, it is treated as one because it is considered worthy 
of public spending and as a public monument.7 
In the UK, there has been a varied approach to the protection of street art by the 
state or local authorities. In some instances, the state has failed, or chosen not to 
act; as was the case for the Slave Labour artwork discussed earlier.8 This failure is 
also seen in the case of Banksy’s No Ball Games (circa 2006) even though the 
community considered the piece to be a national treasure.9 However, a few local 
authorities are beginning to take a more informed, pro-active response towards 
 
3  Merrill 2015 International Journal of Heritage Studies 375. Regarding the Australian street art 
see also MacDowall 2006 Continuum 471. 
4  Merrill 2015 International Journal of Heritage Studies 375. 
5  Yip Conservation of ‘graffiti’ 69 – 88. 
6  Yip Conservation of ‘graffiti’ 99 – 102. 
7  Yip Conservation of ‘graffiti’ 140 – 148. The catalogue also includes the Carmine Street Pool 
Mural, a street artwork by Keith Haring, see 153 – 157. 
8  Hansen 2016 Crime Media Culture 292. 
9  Hansen Crime Media Culture 289 – 306. 
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graffiti. For example, the London Borough of Hackney developed a policy document 
on graffiti which recognises that: 
‘Some public opinion on what constitutes graffiti has changed and that 
some “Graffiti” is now considered to be “Street Art” and that some 
members of the community now consider that “Street Art” actually 
makes a positive contribution to the urban environment.’10 
Through this policy, and provided that the necessary permissions have been 
acquired and that the artwork is not seen as a blight on the urban environment, the 
local authority can recognise and support street art. Thus, a private property owner 
who appreciates an artwork that has been attached to their property can apply to 
the borough council’s Environmental Enforcement Service for recognition of the 
artwork. The Environmental Enforcement Service must weigh up several qualities 
when deciding whether the work can remain. These qualities include: whether the 
street art can be seen from a public area; whether the street art is offensive, gang-
related, racially provoking, insulting or contrary to the public interest; the context of 
the work in relation to its site placement; the amount of graffiti / street art in the 
surrounding areas; whether there have been any complaints regarding the artwork; 
the type of property on which the art is located; amongst other considerations.11 
Some authorities in the UK have participated in the restoration of street art, although 
there is no official policy on this.12 The UK Heritage Lottery Fund conducted a study 
to understand how much culture contributes towards to the economy. Included in 
such study was the fact that a Banksy exhibition held at the Bristol City Museum 
(funded through public funds) resulted in 50 000 beds in local hotels and 
guesthouses.13 It is apparent that the Heritage Lottery Fund consider this street art 
 
10  Hackney Council Graffiti Policy 2013 available at https://www.hackney.gov.uk/graffiti (Date of 
use: 23 January 2017). For more on the developing approach of English heritage bodies see 
Zhang Heritage Protection. 
11  Hackney Council Graffiti Policy 2013 available at  
http://www.hackney.gov.uk/Assets/Documents/Hackney-graffiti-policy.pdf (Date of use: 23 
January 2017). 
12  Yip Conservation of ‘graffiti’ 171-172. 
13  Aspden https://www.ft.com/content/e2860dc2-7d06-11e2-8bd7-00144feabdc0 (Date of use: 25 
January 2018). 
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exhibition to be an element of UK culture and, bearing in mind that it was the 
Heritage Lottery Fund doing the study, it can be argued that they also viewed this 
exhibition to be an aspect of cultural heritage. 
As discussed in 1.1 Banksy’s artwork, Spy Booth was recognised as being worthy 
of protection by Historic England. Retroactive planning permission for changes to 
be made to the historic building upon which the artwork was located was granted to 
extend the protection awarded to the house to the artwork.14  
The lack of recognition for the cultural heritage significance of South African street 
art means that it is unprotected; these artworks are in danger and if they are not 
protected and preserved, they will be lost to future generations. The significance of 
the artwork will also be lost. The Free Nelson Mandela resistance art piece that was 
in Observatory, Cape Town is an example of street artwork that should have been 
preserved because of its cultural significance. Not only because it was one of the 
few remaining examples of this form of art (Apartheid resistance graffiti) but also 
because it held social significance and was a landmark for the community of 
Observatory. The Observatory area has a long history of colonial resistance pre-
dating the arrival of Dutch settlers in South Africa and has many connections to the 
Apartheid resistance movement.15 Observatory was also one of a few de facto “grey” 
neighbourhoods in South Africa, in that the Group Areas Act was never fully 
enforced in the area and people from multiple races and cultures were resident in 
the neighbourhood during Apartheid. The artwork thus had special meaning and 
symbolism to the Observatory community; it represented their history of resistance 
and their unity in Apartheid resistance. The street artwork was also a reminder that 
Apartheid is over, that the fight for freedom is won and that South Africa is no longer 
segregated. The loss of that artwork is a loss to a South African culture of unity. This 
 
14  Historic England https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/the-list/list-entry/1333239 (Date of use: 24 
January 2017). See also BBC News http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-gloucestershire-
32252609 (Date of use: 24 January 2017). A grade II listed building in England is a particularly 
important building of ore than special interest. 
15  Mallet http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/observatory-steeped-history-and-heritage-patric-
mallet (Date of use: 8 November 2017). 
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piece is an example of why the protection of specific pieces of street art, such as 
this, is important. 
Considering these examples, it may be asked whether it is time for certain pieces of 
South African street art to be recognised as heritage resources, i.e. to recognise the 
cultural significance of these pieces and to ensure their protection and preservation 
for future generations. Indeed, when considering that street art can be described as 
free public art, the protection and conservation of existing street art (which has 
cultural significance) is one way and, arguably, an easier and cheaper way, to 
promote the appreciation, understanding and enjoyment of the arts and to provide 
greater access to the arts.16  
There is potential for the South African legal framework concerning cultural heritage 
resources to be used (and developed) to protect and preserve selected pieces of 
street art. Through such frameworks, these artworks could be recognised as South 
African cultural heritage resources. The foundation of South African cultural heritage 
legislation are the constitutional rights to culture and cultural communities. Thus, the 
first part of this chapter highlights the importance of the cultural rights in South 
Africa.  The discussion of the cultural rights will emphasise the potential value of 
recognising selected street artworks as heritage resources; and how recognising 
selected pieces of street art fulfils (in part) the constitutional mandate regarding 
culture. In other words, recognising selected street art objects or sites as cultural 
heritage resources exemplifies the cultural rights in contemporary South Africa. The 
chapter continues by examining the relevant legislation concerning cultural heritage 
and analysing whether street art falls into the ambit of the cultural heritage legislation 
and therefore receive the care and protection that such legislation is intended to 
provide. 
 
16  NHRA, Preamble and the Arts Council Act of 56 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the Arts 
Council Act) s 3(b) and (f). Barnett touches on this argument, albeit in regard to the USA, in 
Barnett 2013 Chi-Kent J Intell Prop 210. See also Bengsten 2013 Journal of Art History 63. 
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3.2 The constitutional rights to culture 
The right to culture and South Africa’s cultural heritage resources form an integral 
aspect of South African society post-1994 because of our segregated history. During 
Apartheid, the state (and the relevant supporting bodies) strove to create and 
support a uniform South African culture based on white supremacy and the western, 
colonial foundations of Europe, while segregating people/s whose cultures did not 
represent this ideal. The state policy did not support the advancement and/or 
protection of such cultures.17  
During Apartheid, most South Africans were denied the ability to decide their political 
status freely and to pursue economic, social, and cultural development freely.18 The 
disregard for indigenous cultures was a significant aspect of Apartheid since a 
person’s or a community’s culture contributes towards self-determination. Thus, by 
denying the indigenous cultures, the Apartheid state denied indigenous peoples the 
right to self-determination, and this re-enforced the idea of white supremacy and the 
separation of the races.19  
The desire for self-determination in South Africa (and for South Africans) was the 
main component of Apartheid resistance and, consequently, in the founding of the 
South African democracy in 1994.20 The Apartheid conception of culture was, and 
is, unacceptable in the new, diverse South Africa.21 Thus, the recognition of the 
importance of the role of culture in allowing for and promoting self-determination 
resulted in, inter alia, the inclusion of the cultural rights and protections in the 
Constitution.22 
 
17  Zegeye and Krige Culture in the New South Africa 1 – 2. See also Goodsell 2007 BYU J Pub L 
118 – 124. 
18  For more on this topic see Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008 Journal of Material Culture 153. 
Meskell and Scheermeyer also refer to several resources that expand on the role of culture in 
the new South Africa. See also Silverman and Ruggles Cultural Heritage 3 – 22. See in general 
Henrard Minority Protection. 
19  Klug 1989-1990 Wis Int'l LJ 251. 
20  Roodt Cultural Heritage xxi. 
21  Roodt Cultural Heritage 11, see also 237.  
22  The Constitution s30. 
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The Constitution protects two cultural rights,23 namely: language and culture in s30: 
‘Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the 
cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do 
so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights …’24 
and cultural, religious, and linguistic communities in s31: 
‘Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may 
not be denied the right, with other members of that community  
a. to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; 
and 
b. to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society.’25 
In addition to these rights, the Constitution also enshrines freedom of expression 
which includes freedom of artistic creativity,26 and the right to the environment, to 
have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations 
and to take reasonable legislative and other methods to ensure conservation.27 The 
responsibility for the fulfilment of these rights is then designated to national, 
provincial, and local governance in schedules four and five.28 The Constitution also 
sets out the creation of the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Cultural, 
Religious and Linguistic Communities.29 
 
23  For a concise discussion on the inclusion of s30 and s31 in the Constitution and how these 
rights were worded see Grant 2006 JAL 2–10. 
24  The Constitution s30. 
25  The Constitution s31. 
26  The Constitution s16(1)(b). 
27  The Constitution s24(2)(b). The environmental right extends to include the built environment. 
Du Bois and Glazewski The Environment 2B4.1. This is also supported by the Department of 
Environment Affairs publications detailing the list of legislation relating to the environment; not 
only is there a publication concerning the built environment but also the cultural environment. 
See Teurlings Part III and Teurlings Part IV. 
28  For a more detailed breakdown of the competencies at national, provincial and local levels see 
Du Preez 2004 SAMAB 37 and Roodt 2006 Fundamina 208–212. 
29  The Constitution s181, 185 and 186, Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights 
of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities Act 19 of 2002. For more on this commission 
see Morrow 2005 Human Rights Dialogue. 
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These constitutional protections reify the role that culture plays in pursuing the 
values of the South African democracy.30 The cultural rights and protections work 
towards ensuring the values of the Constitution and South Africa; such as self-
determination, acceptance of diversity, reconciliation, black consciousness and 
decolonising the mind, amongst others. In the case of MEC for Education: Kwa-Zulu 
Natal v Pillay Langa CJ touched on the importance of culture in self-determination 
and its place in the new South Africa.31 He expressed the relevance of ubuntu in 
understanding the individual in African thinking and recognised the importance of 
the role of culture in promoting self-determination. Langa CJ, ‘emphasise[d] the 
importance of community to individual identity and hence to human dignity’ and 
noted that, ‘[c]ultural identity is one of the most important parts of a person’s identity 
…’32  
Further, a generous interpretation of s31 requires the state to take positive 
measures to ensure cultural pluralism and the survival and advancement of minority 
cultures.33 Thus, not only do the cultural rights promote and protect majority cultures 
such as the IsiZulu (who comprise approximately 22.7 per cent of the South African 
population) but also serve minority cultures such as the IsiNdebele (who account for 
approximately 2.1 percent of the population). Likewise, the cultures of South 
Africans who identify with the European cultures of their forebears such as the 
Afrikaaners (who comprise approximately 13.5 percent of the population).34 
Culture unquestionably contributes towards individual self-determination, it shapes 
the way in which people think of themselves.35 It also creates and/or reinforces 
 
30  As discussed in the Constitution Preamble and s1. It should be noted, at this point, that these 
rights (like the rest of the rights in the Constitution) are not absolute and are subject to internal 
limitation and the s36 limitations clause.  
31  MEC for Education: Kwa-Zulu Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) [53] (hereinafter referred to 
as MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay). See also Roodt Cultural Heritage 52, 284. The Constitution 
notes that self-determination applies to national unity as well as to communities sharing a 
common cultural and language heritage. The Constitution s235. 
32  MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay [53]. Human dignity is one of the most important values 
underlying South Africa’s constitutional dispensation and Langa CJ recognises the importance 
of culture in relation to this value.  
33  Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 631. 
34  StatsSA Census 2011 24. These statistics are based on numbers of people who identify 
  themselves as first language speakers of such cultures. 
35  Müller 1998 IJCP 399. 
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shared social identities of people who share a common history. O’Regan J has 
related the cultural rights to human dignity (and, by inference, to self-determination) 
and has also highlighted how the right is a community orientated right.36 She stated, 
‘cultural rights are protected in our Constitution in light of a clear constitutional 
purpose to establish unity and solidarity amongst all who live in our diverse 
society’.37 The cultural rights seek to build, promote and protect a “new South 
African” culture - a national identity as the rainbow nation. In addition, the cultural 
rights promote and protect individual and communities’ culture/s as an aspect of 
autonomy. They function at a national level (in enhancing a South African identity, 
a national unity) at a community level and, at an individual level (recognising our 
diversity and encouraging the acceptance and respect of our various individual 
cultures/identities).  Through the practice, participation in, and enjoyment of our 
individual cultures we build a unified South African cultural identity which celebrates 
our diversity. Hence the motto on the South African coat of arms in Khoisan: ǃke e: 
ǀxarra ǁke – which translates to ‘diverse people unite’ or ‘people who are different 
joining together’.38 
In addition to self-determination and enhancing other values and rights that form the 
basis of the Constitution and the new South Africa, culture and our shared and 
diverse cultural heritage is part of South Africa’s appeal to foreign and domestic 
tourists. Tourism makes up for roughly 9% of the country’s GDP.39 Therefore, not 
only does South Africa’s tourism profile bring in foreign money it also contributes to 
job creation.40 ‘[Cultural] Heritage is thus seen as a resource, which not only 
preserves historic memory but if used creatively, can also bring various social and 
 
36  MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay [141]–[147] and [150]. 
37  MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay [157]. 
38  The Department of Arts and Culture  
http://www.dac.gov.za/sites/default/files/NationalSymbols.pdf (Date of use: 24 October 2017) 
39  South African Government http://www.gov.za/about-sa/tourism (Date of use: 9 January 2017). 
For more on this topic see Binns and Nel 2002 The Geographic Journal 235; Van der Merwe 
2013 Urban Forum 574 – 577; Baxter Heritage Values 241. 
40  Roodt Cultural Heritage xxxiii. 
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economic benefits to a variety of stakeholders.’41 Consequently, protecting and 
promoting culture and cultural heritage is important for South Africa’s economy.42 
3.2.1 Outlining culture, cultural heritage, and cultural heritage 
resources 
The term culture is extremely difficult to define, and the definition in South Africa, 
because of the history, is especially complex.43 Despite the importance and value 
of the cultural rights, the Constitution does not define culture. There is also very little 
case law concerning the cultural rights.  MEC for Education: Kwa-Zulu Natal v Pillay 
is the only landmark Constitutional Court case that deals with culture in depth. 
O’Regan J stressed in the judgement that the term culture is ineffable.44 Further, the 
basis of the case was the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of 
religion and culture in terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act and the equality clause.45 Therefore, it is uncertain what the 
cultural rights include. While this study does not seek to definitively determine what 
these cultural rights mean, and what they include, it is necessary to establish that 
the rights extend to include cultural heritage resources. Then if selected pieces of 
 
41  The contribution of cultural heritage resources to tourism is noted in the NHRA s5(5). See also 
Dümcke C and Gnedovsky M  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a70/d26f9adf6b277216b8f3acf7909927bf2bc5.pdf (Date of 
use: 16 January 2017) at 142. This is in line with the general trend to view cultural heritage as 
an economic resource. Okamura Heritage Values 56. For a detailed discussion of the inherent 
attributes of cultural resources see Merryman 1989 CAL LR 339. 
42  Despite the focus on these two aspects of culture, cultural heritage and cultural property fulfil 
many other purposes. See Turner 2006 International Journal of Cultural Property 351. It should 
also be noted that there are downsides to monetizing culture such as damage or crime caused 
by increased tourism to a heritage site. See for instance Irandu 2004 Asia Pacific Journal of 
Tourism Research 134-135 and Thorpe Between Rights 123 and 137 for examples of issues 
that arise for the heritagisation of sites.  
43  Nafziger, Paterson and Renteln Cultural Law 64. Benson and Prinsloo highlight the unique 
issues of defining culture in South Africa in Benson and Prinsloo 2013 SAMAB 28. Roodt notes 
that the literature on South African cultural heritage is not extensive. Roodt Cultural Heritage 
287. Whilst the literature has expanded since the completion of such thesis the field is still not 
considerable. 
44  MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay [141]. 
45  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and the Constitution 
s9. The right not to be discriminated against on the grounds of culture was touched on in 
Hassam v Jacobs NO CCT83/08, Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) 
(hereinafter referred to as Bhe), and Zondi v Member of the Executive Council for Traditional 
and Local Government Affairs and Others CCT73/03. However, these cases do not investigate 
the meaning of the cultural rights. It is noted in Bhe [41] that s30 and 31 entrench respect for 
cultural diversity. 
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street art can be awarded cultural heritage resource status (as heritage sites or 
heritage objects), these artworks can be viewed as the embodiment of the cultural 
rights.46  
Currie and de Waal promote a two-pronged definition of culture. First, they see 
culture as the ‘practice of intellectual and artistic activity, and the works that result 
from this activity’.47 This first definition thus includes cultural sites and objects. 
Second, they define culture as a way of life of an identifiable community, including 
traditions, customs, civilisation, race, nation, and folkways.48 This approach is 
evidenced in the case of MEC for Education: Kwa-Zulu Natal v Pillay, albeit with 
different terminology.49 O’Regan J supported three aspects of culture, namely: 
‘[T]he first is the concept of culture as involving the arts; the second 
concept is culture in a more plural form including handicraft, popular 
television, film and radio; and the third is anthropological conception 
of culture which refers to the way of life of a particular community.’50 
She suggests that s30 and 31 of the Constitution relate to the third conception of 
culture but may extend to include the first two conceptions. Thus, O’Regan J 
recognises that culture can include objects (in the form of art, handicrafts, etc.) In 
the same judgement, Langa CJ stated that ‘culture generally relates to the traditions 
and beliefs developed by a community.’51 Further on, he suggested that a restrictive 
interpretation of a cultural group would be one which is defined by, ‘a combination 
of religion, language, geographical origin, ethnicity, and artistic tradition’, albeit that 
he did not recommend a restrictive interpretation of the right/s to culture.52  
 
46  For a discussion of the right to culture see Grant 2006 JAL 4–10. 
47  Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 632. 
48  Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 632. 
49  There are a few cases that touch on these rights, however most of these Constitutional Court 
cases arguments are based on the equality right or customary law. See for instance Department 
of Correctional Services and another v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and others 2013 
(7) BCLR 629 (SCA) and/or the Bhe case. 
50  MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay [149]. O’Regan J relies on the work of O’Keefe. See O’Keefe 
1998 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 904–923. 
51  MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay [47]. 
52  MEC for Education: KZN v Pillay [50]. 
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Roodt suggests that in,  
‘legal discourse, ‘culture’ may be defined as an all-encompassing and 
all-determining concept …. [including] texts, images, talk, codes of 
behaviour, the narrative structures organising these, law and legal 
science: all that is created within an ethnical context to ensure survival, 
adaptation and development.’53 
Further, Roodt also suggests that communal practices (within a sociological 
perspective of culture) can include the conservation of historical objects.54 Further, 
she postulates that cultural objects, ‘distinguish a culture’s expression and possess 
an identity-giving function’.55 Indeed, property can symbolise a culture or community 
– it is ‘cultural property’.56 And, after all, often objects with cultural significance can 
exist for much longer than one or two generations. Thus, it is cultural objects which, 
to a degree, ensure the continued existence of a culture.57 
Du Plessis and Rautenbach explore various definitions of culture put forward by 
different researchers; they conclude with the formulation offered by Throsby wherein 
culture is defined in two ways. One, to refer to ‘a set of attitudes, beliefs, mores, 
customs, values and practices which are common to or shared by a group’.58 And 
two, to mean specific activities of people as well as the products of those activities.59 
 
53  Roodt Cultural Heritage 36-37. 
54  Roodt Cultural Heritage 10. 
55  Roodt Cultural Heritage 15. Roodt also explores different international definitions for cultural 
heritage see 17 – 39 and the sources consulted therein. 
56  Smith 2016 St John’s Law Review 378. The term cultural property is the preferred term in 
international law to refer to cultural objects. Beukes 2004 SAYIL 236 – 237. 
57  Pearce Museums, Objects and Collections 24. 
58  Throsby as quoted in Du Plessis and Rautenbach 2010 PER 36. Based on Throsby 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001572/157287E.pdf (Date of use: 19 January 2017) 
3-4. See also Hawkes The Fourth Pillar of Sustainability 3. 
59  Throsby as quoted in Du Plessis and Rautenbach 2010 PER 36. Based on Throsby 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001572/157287E.pdf (Date of use: 19 January 2017) 
4. 
104 
 
 
From this overview, it is apparent that the cultural rights, at the least, include rights 
to culture as a way of life and the activities and practices of that lifestyle, and rights 
to the objects arising from that way of life.60  
The term heritage links to the cultural rights because of the link between culture and 
history (cultural rights assume a relationship with the past).61 Cultural heritage 
includes our attitudes and relationship to the past, our reverence for and attachment 
to certain places, practices and objects which exemplify the history of a culture.62 
Further, history is central to a human being’s self-definition; who you were 
compliments who you are.63 Heritage is thus an aspect of culture and the cultural 
rights, hence the term cultural heritage; cultural heritage joins people together and 
develops and supports their current collective identities.64  
In a paper written at the request of the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology, researchers at the Human Sciences Research Council defined cultural 
heritage as:  
‘any cultural forms (buildings, languages, arts, crafts) that we value as 
a society. Intangible heritage (symbolism) and living heritage (music, 
dance, narrative, etc.) form part of our heritage resources. Even 
natural environments can have significance as part of our heritage.’65 
Some researchers highlight that cultural heritage falls within Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs, i.e. the human spiritual needs of self-actualisation.66 Thus, they see cultural 
heritage as being essential to an individual’s identity (personal self-determination). 
 
60  For more on the function of cultural heritage objects see Müller 1998 IJCP 399-400. 
61  Harrison Heritage 14. 
62  Harrison Heritage 14. 
63  Hunner and Westergren 2011 Museum International 121. 
64  Nafziger, Paterson and Renteln Cultural Law 206. Nafziger and Kirkwood detail several 
examples of cultural heritage, namely: ‘art, architecture, rural and urban landscapes, crafts, 
music, language, literature, film, documentary and digital records, folklore and oral history, 
culinary traditions, indigenous medicine, ceremonies and rituals, religion sport and games, 
dance and other performing arts, and recreational practices such as those involving hunting and 
fishing …tangible artefacts’. Nafziger and Paterson Cultural Heritage Law 1. 
65  Deacon, Mngqolo and Prosalendis Protecting our Cultural Capital 1. 
66  Reeves and Plets Heritage Studies 204 – 207 and the sources quoted therein. See also 
Chirikure 2013 South African Journal of Science 17 wherein he highlights the low ranking of 
heritage ranks in the hierarchy in Africa in comparison to more pressing socio-economic needs. 
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Regarding the spiritual (or psychological and emotional) needs, cultural heritage can 
act as a form of therapy reminding and reaffirming all South Africans of who we are 
and how we are all part of the new South Africa.67 After all, ‘[c]laiming value in the 
past is all about claiming prestige in the present’.68 Consequently, cultural heritage 
plays an important role in the constitutional value of reconciliation – to heal the 
divisions of the past.69 Cultural heritage is, therefore, an aspect of South African 
nation building. 
However, cultural heritage is not only a culture’s or a community’s connection with 
the past, but it also develops and changes with human development. Cultural 
heritage can thus include objects that do not have any age or are not considered to 
be historical objects. For instance, the Harwell / WITCH computer (the world’s first 
‘modern’ computer) can be viewed as an example of the cultural heritage of the UK 
(and world cultural heritage) even though it only became operational in 1951.70 Even 
the iPhone can be considered as an aspect of cultural heritage.71 Afterall, 
‘[h]eritage is not just about the past. Heritage need not be old or 
beautiful, though old, beautiful or threatened things may have more 
appeal or urgency, or might make a more dramatic story; but this is 
not heritage fully and properly understood.’72 
The protection of such heritage, both historical and contemporary, is vital not only 
to ensure the survival of the physical object but also to ensure its future enjoyment. 
The protection is necessary to ensure the role the object plays in the stimulation of 
imagination and human creativity; to preserve the role cultural heritage objects play 
in mental health and wellbeing and the connection between cultural heritage and 
human rights protection.73 Thus, the conservation of cultural heritage is a necessary 
 
67  Holtorf Heritage Values 46. See also; Wienberg 1999 Current Swedish Archaeology 183, 
Meskell The Nature of Heritage and Daly and Chan Heritage Studies 491. 
68  Turner 2006 International Journal of Cultural Property 356. 
69  The Constitution, Preamble. 
70  Hendry 1984 Business History 280. 
71  Burgess The iPhone Moment 28. 
72  Evans Principles of Environmental and Heritage Law 297. 
73  Kotze and Jansen Van Rensburg 2003 QUTLJJ 130. 
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fulfilment of the cultural rights.74 And further, the conservation of cultural heritage 
would allow South Africans to enjoy, participate in, and live their cultural life of 
choice.75 ‘[O]ne needs to protect the physical manifestation of cultural heritage to 
protect the intangible element of cultural heritage’.76  
Overall, these commentators read s30 and 31 of the Constitution as including 
cultural heritage resources and view their conservation as necessary to fulfil the 
rights.77 This perspective is embodied in the mission of the South African 
Department of Arts and Culture (as both patron of the arts and as the responsible 
guardian, ensuring that all citizens have access to, and the right to enjoy their 
cultural heritage) and in the legislation concerning cultural heritage. 
3.3 The legislative framework 
In 1994, seeking to pursue the constitutional commitment to culture, the then 
Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, Dr BS Ngubane, appointed the 
Arts, Culture Task Group (ACTAG). ACTAG sought and provided recommendations 
on new policies for the department’s portfolio.78 The process resulted in the 
submission of a White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (ACH White Paper) in 
1996.79 This document had six commitments, namely: funding arrangements and 
institutional framework creation; ensuring adequate public subsidies for the arts, 
culture and heritage; achieving the full potential of arts, culture, science and 
technology for social and economic development (whilst promoting creativity, 
innovation and South Africa’s diverse heritage); recognising the industrial potential 
of these fields and address any related issues; locating the activities of the Ministry 
 
74  Kotze and Jansen Van Rensburg 2003 QUTLJJ 130. 
75  Roodt Cultural Heritage xxxv and 220.  
76  Woodhead 2013 Art, Antiquity and Law 3. 
77  Albeit that s30 and s31 is not the main focus of enquiry for all these writers. 
78  Zegeye and Krige Culture in the New South Africa 3. In this chapter, the term Minister refers to 
the South African Minister for Arts and Culture, this government department has gone through 
a name change since 1994, developing from the Ministry for Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology to the Ministry for Arts and Culture, as it is currently known. Thus, the term Minister 
refers to the relevant cabinet member responsible for the ministry, at the relevant period. 
Currently, the ministry is headed by Emmanuel Nkosinathi “Nathi” Mthethwa. 
79  DACST White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage 4 June 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 
ACH White Paper). Such paper was revised in 2013 and again in 2016. 
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of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology within the framework of reconstruction and 
development; and setting out the Ministry’s vision for arts, culture and heritage.80  
The need for transformation of the culture and heritage sector was and still is one 
of the primary concerns of the DAC since native history had been ignored under the 
Apartheid administration; there was a need (and still is) to recognise that the history 
which is most important to individuals is their personal history.81 Thus, the sector 
needs to reflect the many histories (and cultures) that make up South Africa; and 
provide special accommodation to those cultures and peoples that had not been 
included in the past. Further, the ACH White Paper recognised the ‘healing and 
recreational potential of arts and culture in a period of national regeneration and 
restoration.’82 
The ACH White Paper culminated in the development or adaptation of inter alia: the 
Culture Promotion Act, the National Arts Council Act, the Cultural Institutions Act, 
the National Heritage Council Act, and the National Heritage Resources Act. The 
National Heritage Council Act in turn creates various bodies tasked with realising, 
‘the full potential of arts, culture, science and technology, in social and economic 
development, nurture creativity and innovation, and promote the diverse heritage of 
our nation’.83 
What follows is a chronological study of the cultural heritage legislation which is 
relevant to the preservation and protection of street art and the associated bodies.84 
 
80  ACH White Paper, s1 Purpose. 
81  Hunner and Westergren 2011 Museum International 121. 
82  ACH White Paper s2(5) and s7. 
83  ACH White Paper s1(3). 
84  For a complete list of legislation concerning culture see Department of Environment Affairs Part 
IV: Guide to Legislation Concerning the Cultural Environment compiled by Teurlings P. 
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3.3.1 The Culture Promotion Act 
The Culture Promotion Act, passed in 1983, and amended in 1998, intends to work 
towards the conservation, advancement, fostering and extension of culture in South 
Africa.85 
Through this legislation the Minister is empowered to nurture, promote, and develop 
arts and culture through acquiring, developing and maintaining property and by 
awarding bursaries/grants for foreign study; developing pilot projects for this 
purpose in the country; conferring honours; assisting informal community based art 
projects and; any other services deemed necessary.86 It also empowers the Minister 
to foster educational relationships and, develop and promote cultural relationships 
internationally, such as through funding for foreign students wishing to study in 
South Africa; visitors to South Africa; South African exhibitions abroad and foreign 
exhibitions in South Africa; foreign university programmes or staff with the object 
being to publicize South African culture; donating South African literature to foreign 
libraries and institutions or; any other services deemed necessary.87 Further, the 
Culture Promotion Act provides for the creation of regional councils for cultural 
affairs to fulfil the purpose of this legislation in their designated region.88  
3.3.2 The National Arts Council Act 
The purpose of the National Arts Council Act is to create the National Arts Council 
(NAC) and set out the Council’s powers, duties, and functions. The National Arts 
Council is established to achieve many goals. The mandate of the Council is: 
 
 
85  The Culture Promotion Amendment Act 59 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the Culture 
Promotion Amendment Act). 
86  Culture Promotion Act 35 of 1983, s2(1) (a) (hereinafter referred to as the Culture Promotion 
Act), read with the Culture Promotion Amendment Act, s1. The word Minister will be used in this 
chapter to refer to the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology or the Minister of Arts 
and Culture (as the Department is now known). 
87  Culture Promotion Act, s2(1)(b), read with the Culture Promotion Amendment Act, s1. 
88  Culture Promotion Act, s3(1) and (5). 
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(a) to provide, and encourage the provision of, opportunities for persons 
to practise the arts; 
(b) to promote the appreciation, understanding and enjoyment of the arts; 
(c) to promote the general application of the arts in the community; 
(d) to foster the expression of a national identity and consciousness by 
means of the arts; 
(e) to uphold and promote the right of any person to freedom in the 
practice of the arts; 
(f) to give the historically disadvantaged such additional help and 
resources as are required to give them greater access to the arts; 
 (g) to address historical imbalances in the provision of infrastructure for 
the promotion of the arts; 
(h) to promote and facilitate national and international liaison between 
individuals and institutions in respect of the arts; [and] 
(i) to develop and promote the arts and to encourage excellence in regard 
to these.89 
Further, the functions of the council are, amongst others, to investigate and 
determine the need for support of individuals and organisations and to provide 
support where appropriate in the form of inter alia financial, advice, information; to 
conduct research into the arts. As well as to, ‘purchase or otherwise acquire, or 
possess, … or otherwise encumber movable and with the approval of the Minister, 
granted with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, immovable property’.90 
 
The NAC is authorised in several ways to achieve these objectives; such as: by 
providing funding, advice, or information; doing research and, generally doing 
anything which is deemed necessary and appropriate.91 The NAC recognises the 
relationship between arts and culture, i.e. that the arts are an expression of culture 
 
89  Arts Council Act s 3 (a) – (i). 
90  Arts Council Act s6(1) (a), (c-d) and (n). Only the functions of the NAC relevant to this study 
have been included. 
91  Arts Council Act s6(1) and (2). 
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however, they distinguish their mandate from the mandate of culture.92 Domains 
which the NAC include within their directive are books and press; visual arts; 
performing arts; audio-visual and multimedia and; arts craft. In addition, the NAC is 
responsible for: the production or publishing; the dissemination or trade and; the 
preservation, education and management or regulation of these domains.93  
The council specifically excludes film; advertising; architecture; heritage; archives 
and libraries from their responsibilities.94 This means that, where specific art is 
declared a heritage resource, the responsibility for such property (the responsibility 
that arises from the heritage status) does not reside with the NAC; unless the NAC 
(or an institution supported by the NAC) is the owner of such property. 
Consequently, the NAC will not offer protection to street art that is a declared cultural 
heritage resource unless they are the owner of the property on which it is located. 
3.3.3 The Cultural Institutions Act 
The purpose of the Cultural Institutions Act (CInA) is to: provide funding for cultural 
institutions; to create cultural institutions under the control of councils; to establish 
a National Museums Division and; to provide for matters connected with such. 
Through the CInA the DAC Minister is permitted to declare any existing institution 
to be subject to the conditions of the act and to create institutions which are subject 
to the act. The Minister may also amalgamate flagship institutions or declare 
institutions to be flagship institutions; the Iziko Museums and the Ditsong Museums 
are examples of such flagships.95 Such establishments are subject to various 
 
92  National Arts Council  
http://www.nac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Strategy-Document-Version-7.pdf (Date of 
use: 5 July 2018) at 12. 
93  National Arts Council  
http://www.nac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Strategy-Document-Version-7.pdf (Date of 
use: 5 July 2018) at 17. 
94  National Arts Council 
  http://www.nac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Strategy-Document-Version-7.pdf (Date of 
use: 5 July 2018) at 18. 
95  Cultural Institutions Act (hereinafter referred to as CInA) s3 as amended by the Cultural Laws 
Second Amendment Act 69 of 2000 (herein after referred to as the Cultural Laws Amendment 
Act 2) s1. The Iziko Museums of South Africa (previously called the Southern Flagship) is a 
collection of 11 national museums in the Eastern cape, such as the South African Museum and 
the South African National Gallery. Iziko http://www.iziko.org.za/static/page/governance (Date 
of use:26 October 2017). The Ditsong Museums (previously known as the Northern Flagship) 
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statutory controls and must have a council through which they function.96 
Importantly, a declared institution cannot purchase or otherwise acquire immovable 
property without the permission of the Minister (whose permission is granted after 
consultation with the Minister of Finance).97 However, they may purchase or 
otherwise acquire movable property without the Ministers’ permission.98  
Further, any movable property which belongs to the state (or has been given or 
bequeathed to the state) may be placed under the care and management of a 
declared institution. Thus, the responsibility for the conservation of any part of the 
national estate can be placed on a declared institution.99 Significantly the South 
African National Gallery is part of and curated by the Iziko Museum. Thus, the Iziko 
Museum is a role player in the South African art industry and may (or should) take 
an interest in protecting and preserving street art.  
3.3.4 The National Heritage Council Act 
This legislation creates the National Heritage Council (NHC). The ACH White Paper 
envisaged that this council would be involved in the promotion and preservation of 
South Africa’s living heritage: our oral traditions, and the incorporeal aspects of 
South African culture/s.100 Thus the NHC is one of the institutions that is tasked to, 
 ‘develop, promote and protect the national heritage for present and future 
generations.’101 
 
Further, the NHC serves as the oversight body for this section of government. The 
council has several functions, amongst which are: the responsibility to advise the 
 
includes the Museum of Cultural History, the Museum of Military History and the Museum of 
Natural History (previously the Transvaal Museum) amongst others. CInA s6(1) and (2). CInA 
also establishes the National Museums Division and sets out the functions of such at s12 and 
13. 
96  CInA s5 as amended by the Cultural Laws Amendment Act 2 s3. The functions of the various 
councils are compiled at s8, as amended by Cultural Laws Amendment Act 2 s6. 
97  CInA s4(3)(a). 
98  CInA s4(5) (b). 
99  CInA s10(1). 
100  The National Heritage Council Act 11 of 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Heritage Council 
Act) s 4(c), (d), (e) and 10(1)(f). 
101  Heritage Council Act s4 (a) and (c). 
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Minister of the DAC on national policies concerning heritage matters and any other 
matters concerning heritage and; to advise the Minister on the allocation of 
funding.102 Further, the NHC must heighten co-operation, consultation and co-
ordination on a variety of matters, including the transformation of the heritage sector 
… [and] co-ordinate the activities of public institutions involved in heritage 
management in an integrated manner to ensure optimum use of state resources and 
consult and liaise with relevant stakeholders … [and] … explore repatriation 
methods which will ensure the return of heritage objects held by foreign states, 
institutions or individuals.103  
Despite the NHC being empowered to investigate ways to repatriate property, the 
National Heritage Council Act does not empower the council to obtain property in 
support of South Africa’s heritage. The NHC may provide funding, to people or 
institutions, to promote and develop national heritage activities and resources but 
they cannot do this themselves.104 Instead, the acquisition of heritage resources 
(tangibles) is legislated through the NHRA. 
3.3.5 The National Heritage Resources Act 
Following the National Heritage Council Act is the NHRA. The purpose of the NHRA 
is to ensure the management of the national estate and to support communities in 
the development and conservation of cultural heritage resources so that these 
resources may be preserved for future generations.105 Benson and Prinsloo state 
that the Act was created, ‘with the aim of developing an integrated framework to 
facilitate the management, development, participation and access to the national 
heritage resources’.106 This legislation recognises that, 
 
102  Heritage Council Act s10(1) (a) (i – ii) and (b). For the full functions, power and duties of the  
Council see s10(1) and (2). 
103  Roodt Cultural Heritage 292.  
104  Heritage Council Act, s10(1)(d). 
105  NHRA, Preamble. The national estate is the total amount of heritage resources in South Africa 
that are deemed worthy of preservation. SAHRA 
  http://www.sahra.org.za/sahris/about/heritage-objects (Date of use: 21 December 2015). 
106  Benson and Prinsloo 2013 SAMAB 36. 
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‘our heritage celebrates our achievements and contributes to 
redressing past inequities. It educates, it deepens our understanding 
of society and encourages us to empathise with the experience of 
others. It facilitates healing and material as well as symbolic 
restitution…’107 
The Act emphasises the importance of these resources in working towards 
reconciliation, understanding, and respect, and in developing a unified South African 
identity.108 The NHRA highlights the importance of heritage resources to South 
African communities’ histories and beliefs and that they, in turn, contribute to 
research, education and tourism.109 As such, the NHRA recognises the power of the 
Constitutional cultural rights and the role these rights play in supporting the new 
South Africa and promoting the underlying values, and in turn how the Act supports 
these rights. Indeed, one of the general principles of heritage management is to give 
further content to the fundamental rights.110 The NHRA represents those rights by 
working towards the conservation of South Africa’s heritage resources so that they 
can be experienced and enjoyed by current and future generations. This fulfils the 
requirement of s30 to allow people to participate in the cultural life of their choice 
and the requirement created by s31(a)’s obligation to allow people to enjoy their 
culture. 
The NHRA begins by determining what property (whether corporeal or incorporeal) 
can be part of the national estate.111 These include: places, buildings, structures 
and equipment, landscapes and natural features which are of cultural significance 
… graves and burial grounds … movable objects (… objects related to oral history 
and living heritage, ethnographic art and objects, … objects of decorative or fine art, 
 
107  NHRA, Preamble. 
108  Holtorf is one researcher who explores the potential of (cultural) heritage in exploring and 
promoting the reconciliation of disparate groups of people. See Holtorf 2010 Museum 
International 91. 
109  NHRA, s5(1)(a) – (c), (4) and (5). 
110  NHRA s5(3)(c). 
111  NHRA, s3. 
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objects of scientific or technological interest, and various media).112 Of relevance to 
this study are places, buildings, structures and equipment, ethnographic art and 
objects of decorative or fine art.113 
Determining whether such place or object should become part of the national estate 
is determined by its cultural significance or other special value. This requires 
consideration of any of the following: 
• The importance of the res to a community, or pattern of South Africa’s history. 
• On condition that the res has uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of 
South Africa’s natural or cultural heritage. 
• If the res provides information relevant to South Africa’s natural or cultural 
heritage. 
• The aesthetic characteristics of the res considering that a community or 
cultural group values it. 
• Prodigious creative or technical achievement displayed in the res. 
• On condition that a community or social group has a strong social, cultural, 
or spiritual association with the res. 
• If the res is an outstanding example of the work of a person, group or 
community which is of importance to South African history.114 
The NHRA then legislates the creation of the South African Heritage Resources 
Agency (SAHRA) as well as any necessary provincial heritage resource authorities. 
Moreover, although not specifically stated in the same section of the NHRA, it is 
apparent in other sections that the creation of local heritage authorities is allowed 
 
112  NHRA, s3(2). In general, cultural heritage objects are considered to be, ‘the physical remains of 
the past, man-made objects that are of archaeological, historical, pre-historical, artistic, 
scientific, literary or technical interest’. Roodt Cultural Heritage 15. 
113  Consequently, the sections of the NHRA dealing with the other types of heritage resources will 
not be focussed on herein. 
114  NHRA s3(3)(a) – (h). 
115 
 
 
(or intended).115 SAHRA is charged with managing the national estate, and 
awarding heritage status to new (or previously unrecognised) sites and objects.116  
In addition to SAHRA, the NHRA also legislates the creation of the SAHRA 
Council.117 The SAHRA Council is the managing body for SAHRA. Such body 
advises and reports to the Minister and provides the Minister with any required 
information; takes accountability for the functioning of SAHRA; provides advice and 
assistance to SAHRA and; supports the organisation of policy creation and planning 
for the national estate at both national and provincial levels.118 
The NHRA requires bodies such as SAHRA to recognise the unique value of 
heritage resources because they are finite, non-renewable, and irreplaceable and 
thus, require careful management to ensure preservation for future generations.119  
SAHRA and provincial and local heritage authorities provide protection to sites or 
objects by declaring them to have national heritage status.120 This protection works 
towards ensuring that sites cannot be damaged or demolished; it also controls the 
export of movable heritage objects (although it does not prevent the sale or 
ownership of such objects).121 It also allows the heritage authority and the owner to 
agree on the conditions of care for the resource. 
 
Heritage resources are either listed as a grade I, II or III resources. A grade I 
resource is one that has exceptional qualities to the extent that it is of national 
significance,122 and such a resource is identified and managed (including protection 
and preservation) by SAHRA i.e. at the national level.123 This means that a grade I 
 
115  The NHRA refers to local authorities numerous times, for instance s8(1) states, ‘[t]here is a 
three-tier system for heritage resources management, in which … local level functions are the 
responsibility of local authorities.’ 
116  NHRA s4 (d). For more on the functions of SAHRA see Roodt Cultural Heritage 296 – 297 and 
SAHRA  
https://www.sahra.org.za/publications/information-booklets/ (Date of use 11 January 2017) 
117  NHRA s14. 
118  NHRA s16. 
119  NHRA s5(1)(a). 
120  NHRA s7. 
121  SAHRA http://www.sahra.org.za/sahris/about/about-sahra (Date of use: 15 December 2015). 
122  NHRA s7(1) (a). 
123  NHRA s8(2). 
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listed resource must have outstanding significance in terms of any of the 
characteristics set out in s3(3) of the NHRA (some of which were discussed above). 
The resource must also be authentic in terms of its design, materials, craftsmanship 
or setting, and must hold significant universal value and symbolism such that it 
contributes towards human understanding and nation-building. Further, the loss of 
such a resource would considerably reduce South Africa’s national heritage.124  
 
A grade II resource is one which is considered to have qualities which make the 
resource significant to specific province or region, displays any of the characteristics 
listed in s3(3) of the NHRA and contributes to the understanding cultural, historical, 
social and scientific development in the province or region (but must still fulfil the 
criteria for grade I classification).125 Grade II resources are identified and managed 
by a provincial heritage resources authority.126  
 
Then, grade III listed heritage resources are other resources that are deemed worthy 
of conservation.127 They must also hold any of the characteristics listed in s3(3) of 
the NHRA and, in the case of a site, contribute towards the environmental or cultural 
significance of an area (which also satisfies one of the s3(3) criteria) but does not 
qualify for grade II status.128 These resources are identified and managed by a local 
authority such as a Metropolitan Municipality.129  
 
Interestingly, in detailing the responsibility of SAHRA for grade I resources the 
NHRA specifically refers to the management of the national estate.130 Grade II 
resources are also considered to fall within the national estate and thus the 
management of SAHRA.131 But it is not clear whether SAHRA is responsible for the 
 
124  Government Gazette No. 24893 of 30 May 2003 (hereinafter referred to as GG 24893) s43(1). 
This gazetted notice is entitled National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 Grading System 
and Heritage Resources Assessment Criteria (section 7(1) of the National Heritage Resources 
Act). 
125  NHRA s7(1)(b) and GG 24893 s43(2). 
126  NHRA s8(3). 
127  NHRA s7(1)(c). 
128  NHRA s8(4) and GG 24893 s43(3). 
129  NHRA s8(4). 
130  NHRA s8(2). 
131  Nafziger and Paterson Cultural Heritage Law 358. 
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management of grade III listed resources. However, Kotze and Jansen Van 
Rensburg suggest that the national estate is intended to, ‘encompass everything, 
whether movable or immovable, tangible or non-tangible, privately or publicly which 
is regarded and valued as the cultural heritage of South Africa’.132 This view of the 
national estate is supported by Ndoro who sees the national estate as including, 
‘any property movable or otherwise, which by virtue of its importance to the heritage 
of the country, remains the property of the people, held in trust and controlled by 
heritage authorities.’133 It is submitted that national estate is a hold-all term which 
includes all heritage resources regardless of grade listing and that the purpose of 
grade listing is to identify who is responsible for the management of the different 
types of resources. 
3.3.5.1 Heritage sites and protected areas 
SAHRA is responsible for identifying and protecting heritage sites of national 
importance (grade I) while provincial heritage sites are responsible for identifying 
and protecting heritage sites within a province or region (grade II).134 Anybody can 
nominate a site for consideration to SAHRA or the provincial authority.135 No 
provisions are made in this section of the NHRA for identification, management and 
protection of local heritage sites (grade III). It is uncertain whether the protection 
guaranteed by these clauses extends to include the preservation of local heritage 
sites. 
The NHRA safeguards declared heritage sites by stating that no one is permitted to 
destroy, destruct, damage, disfigure, excavate, alter, subdivide or make any 
changes to the planning status of the site without a permit which may be issued by 
the relevant heritage authority upon application for permission.136 Further, if 
necessary, the relevant heritage authority may, with consent from the owner, 
develop regulations pertaining to individual sites to ensure these safeguards as well 
 
132  Kotze and Jansen Van Rensburg 2003 QUTLJJ 136. 
133  Ndoro Legal Definitions 31. 
134  NHRA s27(1) and (15) for grade I and s27(2) and (16) for grade II. A site is defined in s2(xiil) as 
any area of land, including that covered by water, and structures or objects thereon. 
135  NHRA s27(3).  
136  NHRA s27(18). Hereinafter these safeguards will be referred to as the destruction limitations. 
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as to regulate the conditions of use and the admission of members of the public to 
the site.137 The relevant heritage authority may also, with the consent of the owner, 
take steps to ensure the conservation or improvement of a site. This may include 
constructing fences, walls or gates, along with the possible acquisition, to ensure 
access to the site, and to erect signage at the site.138 A heritage site can be identified 
with a badge indicating its heritage status where it is appropriate to do so.139 
Significantly, the owner is involved in negotiations to stipulate the conditions under 
which the status is granted, i.e. what responsibilities the owner has and how the 
heritage authority may use the resource.140 Any limitations of the owner’s property 
right are created through the agreement between the two parties. 
SAHRA and provincial heritage bodies can also designate the area surrounding a 
heritage site as a protected area to ensure the protection of the site better, promote 
the enjoyment of the site or protect the view of and from the site.141 Again, local 
authorities or local heritage sites are not authorised to declare protected areas. 
Local authorities are authorised to designate an area as a heritage area 
(distinguished from a protected area) and must provide protection for a heritage 
area.142 However, it is unclear what the difference between a heritage site and a 
heritage area is. The term ‘area’ is not defined in the NHRA, and confusingly the 
definition of site includes, ‘any area of land’.143 In addition, s27(1) and (2) on heritage 
sites refers to the identification of places of cultural significance and places is 
defined in the Act as a ‘site, area or region’ thus, s27 can be applied to heritage 
areas, and the need for s28 is questionable.144 Further, none of the items which are 
listed as the types of immovable property that may be included in the national estate 
include area(s) nor do any of the characteristics of heritage resources.145 Thus, 
there is no clarity as to what characteristics would qualify an area as a heritage area, 
 
137  NHRA s27(19). 
138  NHRA s 27(21). 
139  NHRA s27(17). 
140  NHRA s27(8)(d). 
141  NHRA s28. 
142  NHRA s31(5) and (7). 
143  NHRA s2(xiil). 
144  NHRA s 2(xxxii). 
145  NHRA s3(2) and (3). 
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other than that it surrounds a heritage site, and whether this section of the Act could 
be used to protect local heritage sites because they are not included in s27 of the 
NHRA on heritage sites. Admittedly, the Act states that local authorities are 
responsible for the identification and management of grade III resources, but it is 
concerning that grade III sites are not specifically provided for as heritage sites.146 
Interestingly, if a heritage site is owned by the state or a state-supported body the 
site must be maintained to an agreed minimum standard.147 Private owners of 
heritage sites are not subjected to a minimum standard of maintenance. Nor is 
maintenance listed as one of the safeguards for heritage sites. Therefore, the NHRA 
does not require private owners to take any positive action regarding heritage site, 
it only limits what they may do at a heritage site.  
Finally, it is up to the provincial heritage authorities to keep a heritage register of the 
heritage resources that have been identified in terms of the NHRA.148 Whilst this 
section of the NHRA refers to heritage resources and not specifically to heritage 
sites or protected areas, it is assumed that it is these forms of heritage resources 
which must be included in this register (kept by provincial heritage authorities) as a 
separate register is kept for heritage objects. In other words, it is assumed that the 
heritage register referred to in s30 of the NHRA is a register of heritage sites and 
protected areas not heritage objects. A register of heritage objects must be compiled 
and kept by SAHRA as opposed to a provincial heritage authority.149 
3.3.5.2 Heritage objects 
According to Lesley, 
‘All artefacts carry messages about cultural heritage. These are 
embedded in the choices that people make about the style in which 
they are made. When these objects, for secular or religious reasons, 
 
146  NHRA s8(3). 
147  NHRA s27(20). 
148  NHRA s30. In NHRA s2 (xv) a heritage register is defined as a list of heritage resources in a 
province. 
149  NHRA s32(7). The register for heritage objects will be discussed in more detail below. 
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come to embody or represent aspects of our heritage that are very 
important to us we may wish to protect them and bequeath them to 
future generations.’150 
The NHRA also makes provision for the protection of heritage objects. The 
protection of heritage objects is similar to that of heritage sites in that no person may 
damage, destroy, disfigure, or alter any heritage objects without a permit issued by 
SAHRA.151 The heritage status of the object may be indicated by a certificate or 
badge.152 The NHRA also limits the exportation of such objects unless a permit from 
SAHRA is acquired and, in the case of certain objects an export permit may never 
be granted due to the nature and significance of the object.153 The NHRA places the 
responsibility for protection and preservation of the heritage object on the owner (or 
custodian). Thus, unlike heritage sites, owners of heritage objects are required to 
maintain them. SAHRA may assist with funding for restoration or repair work on the 
object.154 SAHRA is responsible for keeping a register of heritage objects (listed by 
type in part I of the register), specific heritage objects kept in public museums or 
other secure conditions (as part II A) and other specific heritage objects (as part II 
B).155 
 
Overall, SAHRA is responsible for keeping an inventory of the national estate.156 
 
3.3.5.3 The process for acquiring heritage status 
The NHRA details the process for applying for heritage status for sites, areas, and 
objects. This process is set out to ensure that the declaration of property as a 
resource qualifies as a fair administrative action in terms of the Promotion of 
 
150  Lesley 2001 SAMAB 9. 
151  NHRA s32(13). 
152  NHRA s32(11). 
153  NHRA s32(19)-(31). For more on the control and protection of cultural heritage objects detailed 
in the NHRA see Beukes South Africa 354, specifically 361-371. 
154  NHRA s32(15) and (18). 
155  NHRA s32(7)(a). 
156  NHRA s39. 
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Administrative Justice Act (PAJA).157 PAJA requires that an institution (SAHRA) 
which exercises a public function (declaring the property as a heritage resource) in 
terms of legislation which adversely affects a person must be procedurally fair.158 In 
order for such action to be fair, the person affected must be given adequate notice 
of the nature and purpose of such, the opportunity to make representations, a clear 
statement of the administrative action, notice of a right of review or internal appeal 
and notice of the right to request reasons for the action.159 This provision is fleshed 
out in s4 and s5 of the NHRA and the specific requirements for the declaration of 
heritage sites in s27 and heritage objects in s32. 
 
For heritage sites, any person may apply with a written motivation to SAHRA or the 
relevant provincial authority requesting for a site to be granted heritage status.160 It 
is not specified in the Act who may nominate objects for heritage status; the Act only 
refers to SAHRA. However, the process designed by SAHRA to nominate an object 
for heritage status allows anyone to submit an application, so it is assumed that the 
NHRA intends for anyone to nominate an object.161 SAHRA processes an 
application for heritage status through the online South African Heritage Resources 
Information System (SAHRIS). SAHRIS is a ‘free open-source, web-based heritage 
management system’.162 The system allows for the online processing of permits, 
impact assessments, surveys, grading and declarations. It also acts as a national 
heritage resources repository (digital inventory system), a collections management 
system (descriptions, photos etc.) and the permit process governing the movement, 
conservation and, treatment of heritage resources.163  
 
157  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as PAJA). 
158  PAJA s1(i)(a)(ii) and s3(1) read together with the Constitution s239 “organ of state”. 
159  PAJA s3(2). 
160  NHRA s27(3) and (4). 
161  NHRA s32(1). SAHRA  
http://www.sahra.org.za/sahris/sites/default/files/website/articledocs/Site%20and%20object%2
0nomination%20process.pdf (Date of use: 19 June 2018). 
162  Smuts 2015 ISPRS 398. 
163  Smuts 2015 ISPRS 398, albeit that Smuts refers to heritage sites not heritage resources. As of 
March 2003, SAHRA stopped accepting paper and non-digital applications. Wiltshire 
http://www.sahra.org.za/sahris/sites/default/files/website/articledocs/SAHRIS%20CIPA%2020
13%20Final%20N%20Wiltshire.pdf (Date of use: 11 January 2017) at 2.1. 
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Amongst other requirements that must be fulfilled, the nominee (applicant) must: 
register on SAHRIS, submit a/the name for/of the heritage resource, designate the 
appropriate heritage authority (i.e. the national authority would be SAHRA or a 
provincial authority such as the Provincial Resources Authority Gauteng), provide a 
summary of the reasons for the nomination and a full statement of significance, 
provide images, and upload any consent letters (such as consent from the owner of 
the property).164 In addition to the online application process, but before a 
declaration regarding the heritage status can be made, the NHRA requires further 
steps to be taken; these requirements differ depending on the type of heritage 
resource. 
3.3.5.4 Heritage sites application process 
SAHRA is permitted to declare a site as a heritage site by placing a notice in the 
Government Gazette, and a provincial authority may do so by publishing a notice in 
the Provincial Gazette.165 However, before this can be done, the heritage authority 
must notify owner of the site and/or, mortgage holder, occupier, or other party with 
a registered interest in the property, and/or a conservation body that has registered 
their interest in the property to allow such parties to make submissions regarding 
the application.166 Such notification begins a sixty-day period in which these parties 
may make submissions regarding the declaration and for the owner to propose 
conditions upon which the declaration is acceptable.167 The notice also begins a six-
month provisional protection period so that the site is protected as if it were a 
declared site until a final decision is made regarding the declaration.168 During this 
time the owner (or another interested party) may object to the proposed declaration 
or propose conditions to the declaration; should SAHRA consider the proposals to 
be unacceptable, they can get an extension of a further six months, in order to 
provide for the protection of the site until contestations to the declaration are 
resolved. However, if an acceptable compromise cannot be reached within the 
 
164  SAHRA Site and Object Nomination Process. 
165  NHRA s27(5) and (6). 
166  NHRA s27(8). A conservation body registers their interest in the area in terms of s25(1)(b). 
167  NHRA 27(7). 
168  NHRA s27(10). 
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extended time, SAHRA can declare the site as a heritage resource (SAHRA has 
unilateral authority to ensure the protection of sites deemed worthy of heritage 
status).169 If the owner of the property is the state, a local authority or supported 
body, they can object to the declaration if the site does not meet the criteria for grade 
I or II listing, or if such declaration would jeopardise state security, or if they have 
offered to transfer ownership to the relevant heritage authority, and such offer has 
been refused.170  
 
Thus, while there is a negotiation process from the time of the submission of the 
application through SAHRIS, SAHRA has a veto-like power to declare a privately- 
owned site as a heritage resource. This means that SAHRA has the autonomous 
authority to limit an owner’s rights over immovable property. However, as there is 
no minimum standards clause or maintenance clause for heritage sites the unilateral 
action only prevents the owner from taking actions such as building on the site. It 
however does not place the responsibility on the owner to protect or maintain the 
site. SAHRA may, with the agreement of the owner, make regulations preventing 
harm to the site, to regulate the use of the site and potential development of the site, 
and to regulate admission to the site.171 Further, SAHRA may also undertake work 
at the site to protect and preserve the site with agreement from the owner.172 But an 
owner who has objected to the declaration is unlikely to assent to any regulations 
or work being performed on the site once SAHRA has unilaterally declared the 
heritage status of the site. SAHRA should be empowered to undertake any 
reasonable actions they deem necessary to ensure the protection and preservation 
of the site where an owner is not cooperating. Otherwise, in these instances, the 
heritage status will do little to achieve what it is intended to do. 
 
 
169  NHRA s27(11). 
170  NHRA s27(12). 
171  NHRA s27(19). 
172  NHRA s27(21). 
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3.3.5.5 Heritage objects application process 
Like heritage sites, the NHRA empowers SAHRA to declare objects as heritage 
objects.173 Unlike heritage sites, this duty is not designated to provincial heritage 
authorities. The wording of s32(1) is perplexing as only objects that are part of the 
national estate may be declared to be heritage objects. This suggests that a decision 
on the cultural significance of an object must already have been taken before 
consideration of the declared heritage status can occur. It is uncertain whether there 
are objects which are not declared heritage objects but still form part of the national 
estate. This is ineffectual because the cultural significance of an object can only be 
considered if an application for declared heritage object status is submitted.174  
Before a declaration is made, SAHRA may provide the owner of the object with 
reasonable time to make any recommendations or submissions regarding the 
declaration (unless the circumstances would work against this).175 There is a 
significant difference between a heritage site declaration where parties must be 
given notice and a heritage object declaration where SAHRA may give notice. This 
is reiterated in s32(4) where it is stated that SAHRA may (with the approval of the 
Minister) declare an object/collection/type of object/list of objects, to have heritage 
status by placing a notice in the Government Gazette.  
However, in s32(5)(a) of the NHRA it is stated that SAHRA may not exercise the 
power to declare a specific object or collection as a heritage resource unless the 
owner of the object or collection is given a sixty-day notice period to allow them to 
make submissions, or to suggest reasonable care and safety conditions regarding 
the deceleration of heritage status for the object or collection. In addition, regarding 
a type of object, SAHRA must: publish a provisional notice in the Government 
 
173  NHRA s32(1). 
174  It is possible that the sections that regulate the export of objects intend to control the export of 
objects that are part of the national estate but are not yet declared as heritage objects. Thus, 
an application for permission to export an object would provide SAHRA with the opportunity to 
consider whether the object should be declared as a heritage object. For more on export control 
see International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa 
  www.itac.org.za/pages/services/import-export-control/export-control (Date of use: 9 April 2019). 
175  NHRA s32(3). 
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Gazette, make a public advertisement regarding the declaration and its purpose and 
effect, notify any interested party such that they have sixty days to provide 
submissions or objections regarding the declaration, and SAHRA must take such 
submissions, conditions, and objections into consideration.176  
The terminology used in s32(3) and (4) appears to conflict with s32(5)(a). In s32(3) 
and (4) SAHRA is not required to give notice of the declaration. The use of may 
suggests that the notification is optional, and this is re-emphasised by the statement 
‘[n]othing herein shall oblige SAHRA to give such prior opportunity if circumstances 
militate against this’. But s32(5)(a) states that, for specific objects or collections 
SAHRA may only make the declaration if they have given the owner notice and 
allowed time for submissions and objections regarding the heritage status. The 
wording in s32(3) and (4) also seems to conflict with s32(5)(b) because on the one 
hand SAHRA has the authority to act independently but on the other hand, it has to 
publish the Government Gazette notice, the advertisement and notify all interested 
parties.  
Section 32(6) confuses the process further. The specific wording of the clause reads 
as follows: 
‘An object or collection shall be deemed to be protected as a heritage 
object for six months from the date of service or publication of a notice 
under subsection (5)(a) or (5)(b)(i), or until such notice is withdrawn or 
the object or collection or type of objects is declared to be a heritage 
object, whichever is the shorter period.’ (Own emphasis). 
Thus, an object or collection is deemed to be protected for six months beginning at 
the service of the notice (s32(5)(a)) or publication of a notice (s32(5)(b)(i)). 
Otherwise, an object, collection or type of object is deemed to be protected for six 
months if declared as a heritage object. This emphasises the lack of clarity over 
whether SAHRA has the unilateral declaration authority that it has for heritage sites. 
Then as the first part of the clause only applies to objects and collections, it is 
 
176  NHRA s32(5)(b). 
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unclear whether type of objects has this provisional protection period. The use of 
publication of a notice suggests that it also applies to type of objects, but this does 
not explain the exclusion of these resources from the first part of the clause. The 
clause also makes no mention of listed objects. Thus, it is unclear whether SAHRA 
has the veto-like authority to declare heritage objects as they do for heritage sites 
and/or whether they must give notice of the declaration. 
However, considering the requirements in s27(8) of the NHRA on the procedure for 
heritage sites, in conjunction with the wording of s32(5), it is suggested that SAHRA 
must give due notice to relevant parties, allowing time for any submissions, 
suggested conditions or objections to be presented, and that SAHRA must take 
such into consideration before making a declaration on a heritage object. It is only 
when the circumstances surrounding the safety or condition of the object (or any 
other relevant factor) make this impractical, or where the negotiations with the owner 
for the declaration of the property have failed, that SAHRA is empowered to declare 
an object as a heritage object without making such concessions. Even in such as 
circumstances, the declaration can only be made with the approval of the Minister. 
Thus SAHRA would have to inform the Minister of the situation and explain the 
urgency of the situation and the risk it poses to the object, to obtain the required 
approval for a heritage status declaration. This process ensures that, for potential 
heritage objects, SAHRA is empowered to act in precarious situations, but such 
power is fettered by requiring approval from the Minister. 
3.3.5.6 Penalties for offences and non-compliance 
If a heritage resource has been allowed to fall into disrepair (such that the resource 
no longer holds value and the destruction or demolition of the resource becomes a 
possibility, or enables development of the designated land or adjoining land) SAHRA 
can serve an order for repair or maintenance on the owner.  SAHRA may also serve 
a repair or maintenance ordrer if the resource has been neglected (such that the 
potential for conservation is hindered). And, should that order not be complied with, 
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SAHRA can take on responsibility for the work and claim compensation from the 
owner for the costs of repair/restoration/rehabilitation.177  
 
In addition, the NHRA legislates a number of offences and the punishments for such 
negligence. First, any person who contravenes the sections dedicated to the 
protection and preservation of heritage resources may be liable to a fine and/or 
imprisonment, or in the case of vandalism community service.178 Second, the 
Minister may also prescribe a fine (of up to R10 000.00) or imprisonment (not 
exceeding six months) for any contravention or failure to comply with any regulation 
set by a heritage resource authority or local authority by-laws.179 Third, the Minister 
can authorise district magistrates to implement an admission of guilt fee (up to R10 
000.00) for contravening any clause of the NHRA or a daily fine of R50.00 (to a 
maximum 365 days) for as long as the contravention continues.180 Fourth, there are 
also offences for failing to provide relevant information, providing false information 
(when seeking a permit), failing to comply with or contravening any orders, in terms 
of the NHRA, from a heritage authority, obstructing the holder of a permit, damages 
or receives any badge/sign/display or other property erected by a heritage authority, 
or any other; unlawful act, contravention, or failure to comply with orders in terms of 
the act (or guiding someone to do so).181 Fifth, the Minister may require that the 
convicted offender put right in a specified manner the result of their action, or pay 
an amount of money equal to the costs of such restoration.182 Sixth, the Minister 
may issue an order preventing a convicted owner from developing a heritage site or 
area for ten years, unless such work is to restore the property.183 And, finally, the 
Minister may order forfeiture, of an asset which was involved in the committing of 
the offence, to SAHRA.184 
 
 
177  NHRA s45. 
178  NHRA s51(1) and (13) 
179  NHRA s51(2), Government Gazette No. 21051 of 31 March s8. 
180  NHRA s51(3). 
181  NHRA s51(5). 
182  NHRA s51(8). 
183  NHRA s51(9). 
184  NHRA s51(14). 
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Other than those already specified, and depending on which section of the NHRA 
is contravened, the period of imprisonment may vary from three months to five 
years.185 For instance, damaging a heritage site will result in a class one penalty 
(fine and/or imprisonment for up to five years). Damaging a heritage object could 
result in a class six penalty (fine and/or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months).  
Desecrating a burial site/grave could result in both a class two and class five penalty 
(fine and/or imprisonment not exceeding 3 years for class 2 or not exceeding six 
months for class 5).186  
 
In sum, there are various penalties which may be implemented for the damage or 
destruction of a heritage resource.  It is all but clear as to why the penalty for an 
offence concerning a heritage site is more severe than the penalty for an offence 
concerning a heritage object or why desecrating a burial ground or grave is subject 
to two different penalties. 
3.3.5.7 Purchasing heritage resources 
To acquire ownership of cultural heritage resources, SAHRA is empowered to 
purchase property in various sections of the NHRA. Section 21(5)(b) empowers 
SAHRA (with approval from the council) to purchase any property. No ministerial 
approval is required in this clause. 
Section 32(24)-(31) requires that SAHRA must purchase a heritage object when the 
owner has applied for permission to export the object permanently, and such 
permission has been refused.187 Section 32(26)(b) states that SAHRA must ‘offer to 
purchase the object either by immediate cash payment or by payment of 
compensation in such manner as the Minister in consultation with the Minister of 
Finance may determine’. Here, the Ministers’ approval is not required for cash 
payments but is required for other forms of compensation. This may be because this 
only applies to a limited number of heritage objects and/or that heritage authorities 
 
185  NHRA Schedule. 
186  NHRA s51(1)(a), (b), (e) and (f), in conjunction with the Schedule. 
187  These objects must be of outstanding significance and their loss would diminish South Africa’s 
heritage. NHRA s32(24) read with s32(7)(a)(i). 
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may not have sufficient funds at their disposal so that the only heritage objects they 
can purchase without the Ministers’ approval will not be a substantial cost.  
3.3.5.8 Heritage agreements 
SAHRA or a provincial heritage authority may, with the consent of the owner, enter 
into a heritage agreement (in the form of a binding contract) with a provincial 
authority, local authority conservation body, person or community to provide for the 
conservation, improvement or presentation of a specific resource provided that the 
owner has consented.188 The specific terminology of ‘conservation, improvement or 
presentation’ suggests that heritage agreements may not extend to include the 
purchasing of resources i.e., that the legislation did not intend for the relevant 
heritage authority to conclude a heritage agreement to purchase the property. 
Therefore, it appears that heritage agreements can only be concluded for the 
purpose of protecting and preserving the heritage resource. However, it is possible 
that purchasing could be read into the clause because the definition of conservation 
includes management, and SAHRA is responsible for the management of heritage 
resources is empowered to make purchases in terms of s26(1)(a). 
It is odd that a heritage agreement cannot be concluded with the owner of the 
property. The specific listing of whom the heritage authority can enter into an 
agreement with (which does not include the owner) and the requirement that the 
owner’s consent must be acquired suggests that the section on heritage agreements 
does not extend to include owners. It would be beneficial to include an owner should 
a heritage agreement need to be concluded to change the conditions agreed to upon 
the declaration of the heritage status of the resource. This would also be beneficial 
for any other purpose necessary to ensure protection and preservation or 
management of the resource. 
 
188  NHRA s42(1). 
130 
 
 
3.3.5.9 Expropriation of heritage resources under the NHRA 
Section 46(1)(a) and (b) of the NHRA empowers the Minister for Arts and Culture 
(with the agreement of the Minister of Finance) to purchase or expropriate (subject 
to compensation), any property for conservation or any other purpose contained in 
the NHRA provided that it is in the public interest or for the public benefit.189 It is 
unclear why ‘purchase’ is included under the section on expropriation because a 
purchase is not an expropriation. It is also interesting that the public interest/public 
benefit requirements are not included in the other sections authorising purchases. 
Why is the Minister only empowered to purchase property in the public interest or 
the public benefit, but the same standard is not a requirement for when SAHRA 
makes purchases? It is probably assumed that SAHRA is working in the public 
interest/public benefit and that these requirements are infused in the principles of 
heritage management. The expropriation of cultural heritage resources will be 
analysed further in the following chapter. 
3.3.5.10 Concerns regarding the protection and preservation of 
heritage sites and objects in the NHRA 
Other than those already identified, there are other inconsistencies and unclear or 
confusing sections in the NHRA. The following identified issues with this legislation 
may have an impact on the protection of street art as a cultural heritage resource 
(although the impact extends to all forms of cultural heritage resources regardless 
of the type). 
To begin, s25(e) of the NHRA requires a heritage authority, such as SAHRA, to 
make arrangements for the protection of all heritage resources, and s27(15) places 
a duty on SAHRA to protect national heritage sites. While SAHRA is permitted to 
make arrangements regarding the protection of heritage resources, what these 
arrangements may include and to what extent the protection may limit an owner’s 
property rights over a heritage resource is unclear.190 Further, the term ‘protection’ 
 
189  NHRA s46(1)(a) and (b). It is noted the s46 is not essential as expropriation of property is 
empowered through the Constitution and the Expropriation Act. 
190  NHRA s25(1)(e). 
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is not defined in the NHRA. The act is unclear as to the extent to which property 
rights may be interfered with in the interest of protection. This lack of clarity could 
be significant if the declaration of a person’s property as a heritage object was 
subjected to a constitutional enquiry, i.e. if the declaration was challenged by the 
owner as an unjustifiable limitation of their Constitutional property right.191 
Admittedly it is not uncommon for protection to be undefined in heritage legislation. 
For instance, the World Heritage Convention does not define protection.192 Nor do 
the UNESCO Operational Guidelines which use the word interchangeably with 
conservation, preservation and safeguarding.193 Some guidance could be garnered 
from the terms conservation, preservation and safeguarding if they were defined in 
the Convention or the Operational Guidelines but they are not; each definition notes 
that the terms are used interchangeably without defining any one of them. Further, 
the NHRA does not define preservation or safeguard and defines conservation as 
including the ‘protection, maintenance and sustainable use of places or objects so 
as to safeguard their cultural significance’.194 The interchangeable use of these 
terms is discordant, and it is unclear what is actually meant by protection (or 
preservation and safeguarding). 
Next, there is significant confusion regarding the management of heritage objects in 
the NHRA. In terms of s12 of the NHRA, ‘[t]he object of SAHRA is to co-ordinate the 
management of the national estate’ and s13(1)(c) declares that ‘[t]he general 
functions of SAHRA are to – (c) identify, record and manage nationally significant 
heritage resources’. Both these clauses are problematic due to a lack of clarity on 
the terminology used. The term ‘management’ (which is used in both these clauses) 
 
191  This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
192  UNESCO http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf (Date of use: 2 November 2017).  
193  UNESCO http://whc.unesco.org/archive/gloss96.htm (Date of use: 25 May 2018) ‘Protection’, 
‘Conservation’, ‘Preservation’ and ‘Safeguarding’. The glossary does refer to the definition of 
conservation as presented in the UNESCO “Nara Document on Authenticity” 
https://whc.unesco.org/archive/nara94.htm (Date of use: 25 May 2017) namely, ‘all operations 
designed to understand a property, know its history and meaning, ensure its material safeguard 
and, if required, its restoration and enhancement’. South Africa’s World Heritage Convention 
Act 49 of 1999 (which incorporates the world heritage convention into South African law also 
does not define the terms. 
194  NHRA s2(iii). 
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is defined in the NHRA as including the conservation, presentation, and 
improvement of a place protected in terms of this Act.195 In turn, the definition of 
conservation includes the ‘protection, maintenance, preservation and sustainable 
use of places or objects so as to safeguard their cultural significance’.196  
The definition of the term improvement includes, ‘the restoration, repair and 
rehabilitation of a place’.197 Presentation is described as the exhibition and display 
of, access and guidance to, the provision, publication or display of information about, 
and performance and oral presentations related to heritage resources.198 Therefore, 
there is a lack of consistency in the terminology in regard to heritage places and 
heritage objects. It is unclear why heritage objects are not included in the definitions 
of management and improvement but are included in the definition of conservation.  
In addition, as previously noted, s32 on heritage objects does not include a similar 
SAHRA protection clause as is provided for heritage sites. The lack of protection 
clause and the lack of inclusion in the terminology suggest that cultural heritage 
objects do not fall under the management of SAHRA and therefore, that SAHRA 
does not have the authority to interfere with the property rights of cultural heritage 
objects, nor do they hold any responsibility for the improvement of heritage objects. 
However, heritage objects still form part of the national estate, and as stated in s8(1) 
-(4) of the NHRA, SAHRA (or other relevant heritage authority) is responsible for the 
management of heritage resources.199 As heritage resources include objects, this 
part of the legislation read together with the definitions of conservation and 
presentation (which are included in the definition of management) suggest that 
heritage objects do fall within the management of SAHRA. Nevertheless, if this is 
the correct reading of the legislation, SAHRA’s management of heritage objects is 
a hollow responsibility because there is no protection clause.  
 
195  NHRA s2(xxiii). Place is itself defined in s2(xxxii) but does not include objects. 
196  NHRA s2(iii). 
197  NHRA s2(xix). 
198  NHRA s2(xxvi). 
199  NHRA s3(2)(i). 
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There is a lack of conformity between the sections for heritage sites and heritage 
objects. There is no minimum standard/maintenance clause for heritage sites yet, 
this is required for heritage objects.200 Similarly, there is a lack of uniformity 
regarding whether SAHRA has the unilateral authority to declare heritage objects 
without consulting the owner, compared to the requirement that the owner must be 
consulted before their property is declared as a heritage site. The added emphasis 
that, ‘[n]othing herein contained shall oblige SAHRA to give such prior opportunity if 
the circumstances militate against this’ suggest that SAHRA has more power 
regarding heritage objects than it does for heritage sites.201 It is also uncertain why 
SAHRA and provincial heritage authorities may declare on the status of/investigate 
the potential of/protect sites whereas it is only SAHRA who is empowered to do this 
for heritage objects. Plus, the veto-like authority of SAHRA to declare sites as 
heritage resources does not require any positive action to be taken by the owner for 
the protection and preservation of these sites. And it is unlikely, having used the 
veto-like authority, that the owner will agree to any conditions or responsibilities 
regarding the property or to letting SAHRA undertake any work on the property. The 
veto-like authority for heritage sites only enforces the destruction limitations. 
Further, while the definition of presentation is unproblematic, s44 of the NHRA which 
deals with the presentation of heritage resources is problematic. Section 44 
empowers a heritage resources authority to coordinate and promote the 
presentation of places of cultural significance and heritage resources which form 
part of the national estate; this includes placing explanatory plaques, training guides, 
holding exhibitions, erecting memorials, and, ‘any other means necessary for the 
effective presentation of the national estate’.202 ‘Any other means necessary’ is far 
too wide authority to be acceptable, it could be interpreted to allow public access to 
privately owned houses because the house is a culturally significant building or 
because a cultural heritage resource is located inside the house, or it could mean 
taking possession of a cultural heritage resource to present it. The power provided 
 
200  NHRA s32(15). 
201  NHRA s32(3). This suggests that private ownership of immovable property is stronger (and 
therefore less likely to be interfered with) than private ownership of movables. 
202  NHRA s44(1). 
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to heritage authorities by this clause is too vague and needs to be expounded upon 
in order to limit the acceptable steps that may be taken to present a resource. 
The lack of guidelines regarding what form of limitations can be placed on the owner, 
what form of protection the owner may be required to provide and/or what steps the 
owner is required to take to preserve and maintain the property (albeit there is only 
a maintenance clause for heritage objects) is concerning where SAHRA exercises 
their veto-like authority to declare on the heritage status of property. If the owner 
and the heritage authority agree on the conditions of the declaration, this is not 
problematic. However, the unilateral authority to enforce limitations on the property 
when an agreement cannot be reached may be challenging in terms of the 
constitutional property right.203  
Indeed, because there is no negotiating process as to what is required of the owner 
(what steps the owner must take to protect and preserve the property) SAHRA may 
unilaterally enforce severe limitations on an owner. To protect themselves SAHRA 
should develop guidelines on what limitations may be enforced when exercising the 
veto-like authority. Further, while SAHRA may suggest conditions for the protection 
and preservation of the resource in the negotiation process, the negotiation process 
may fail and SAHRA may declare the property as a heritage resource unilaterally. 
In this instance, there is no provision that requires SAHRA to serve the owner with 
a notice on the conditions for protection and preservation 
Section 45 which deals with the compulsory repair order is also concerning. This 
provision allows a heritage authority which is responsible for a heritage site to serve 
the owner of the site with a compulsory repair owner if they consider that the site, 
‘(a) has been allowed to fall into disrepair for the purpose of—  
(i) effecting or enabling its destruction or demolition;  
(ii) enabling the development of the designated land; or  
(iii) enabling the development of any land adjoining the 
 designated land; or  
 
203  This will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
135 
 
 
(b) is neglected to such an extent that it will lose its potential for 
conservation’204  
This clause conflicts with the lack of a maintenance clause or minimum standards 
clause in s27. It is unfair to require an owner to effect repairs when they were never 
required to maintain the site in the first place. The heritage authority must specify 
the work which in its opinion is necessary to prevent further deterioration to the site, 
and the repairs must be completed to the satisfaction of the heritage authority. 
Should the owner not comply with the order, the heritage authority may complete 
the repairs themselves and recover the costs from the owner.205 It is unclear how 
the heritage authority will determine disrepair or to what extent the heritage authority 
can require repairs, the repairs may be extensive and costly, potentially beyond the 
means of the owner. It is also unclear how the heritage authorities will determine 
whether the disrepair was intentional or what qualifies as neglect. For instance, a 
heritage site may be damaged in a natural disaster and should the owner fail to 
repair the damage would that failure be considered to be neglect? The clause also 
allows the heritage authority to effect repairs themselves at the owner's cost, even 
if the owner did not agree to the repairs or think them necessary. Consequently, the 
power given to heritage authorities in s45 is again too far-reaching. 
Further, the interaction between the s45 compulsory repair order and the penalties 
listed in s51 is confusing. A compulsory repair order places a financial burden on 
the owner, and if found guilty of an offence in terms of the NHRA they may also 
have to pay a fine. Thus, an owner may be required to financially compensate the 
state twice for the same action or failure to act (paying the fine and either restoring 
the property or repaying the state for the costs of restoration). 
It is also unclear why s45 does not apply to heritage objects. Section 32(15) requires 
that an owner keep a heritage object in good condition and in a secure place, and 
the heritage object cannot be repaired or restored without the permission of SAHRA. 
However, SAHRA is not empowered to order the repair or restoration of a heritage 
 
204  NHRA s45(1). 
205  NHRA s45(2)-(3). 
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object. The only recourse a heritage authority has for heritage objects are the 
relevant penalties contained in s51, and these penalties can only be enforced once 
the person who causes the harm to the object has been found guilty of contravening 
the relevant section of the NHRA. This means that the repair and restoration of 
heritage objects is subject to the functioning of South Africa’s criminal justice 
system; which could be time-consuming (during which time the object could 
deteriorate further, potentially to the extent that it can no longer be repaired), costly 
and unsuccessful. Moreover, should the criminal case prove unsuccessful, a 
heritage authority has no recourse to ensure protection and preservation of the 
object. For this reason, the exclusion of heritage objects from s45 on compulsory 
repair orders is a failure of the Department of Arts and Culture to ensure the 
protection and preservation of heritage objects. Again, the lack of uniformity 
between the responsibilities for heritage sites versus objects is highlighted; site 
owners are not required to maintain a site but can be issued with a repair order 
whereas object owners are required to maintain the object, but SAHRA is not 
empowered to issue a repair order if the owner does not live up to this responsibility. 
Finally, it is confusing to include the word ‘purchase’ in s46 on expropriation. As 
noted, an expropriation is not a purchase. 
There are many problematic areas of the NHRA, and it is clear that amendments to 
the legislation need to be effected. The following recommendations are suggested 
to improve the functioning of the legislation and ultimately to better ensure the 
protection and preservation of South Africa’s heritage resources.  
• The NHRA should define what is meant by protection and preservation. In 
addition, the terms protection, preservation, conservation and safeguarding 
should not be used interchangeably, nor should they be used to define each 
other (such as when conservation is defined as including protection). It is also 
recommended the Act be amended to limit the use of these words to protect 
and preserve. This would ensure uniformity and resolve the many issues 
regarding the definitions and their applications. 
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• SAHRA must develop guidelines on the type of limitations that may be 
enforced when exercising their veto authority. SAHRA needs to prescribe the 
extent of their authority in these circumstances. There needs to be greater 
detail regarding the basic types of interventions the heritage authorities can 
implement in the fulfilment of their management task; this could be done 
either in the NHRA or with the publication of regulations. For example, if the 
declaration of a person’s property requires an owner to secure the property, 
then regulations need to contain the ways in which an owner could be 
required to secure the property, this could include: erecting protective 
fencing, installing an alarm/electronic security system, hiring a security 
company and may extend to requiring the owner to have adequate insurance 
over the property. This suggestion does need not be a comprehensive list of 
interventions as different resources will require different interventions, but it 
will provide greater clarity as to the heritage authority’s power to limit an 
individual’s property right, the responsibilities of the heritage authority and 
the responsibilities of the owner. It is especially recommended that financial 
limits be provided so that an owner is aware of the financial implications of 
having their property declared as a cultural heritage resource as well as 
limiting the financial impact that the declaration may have on an owner.  
• It must be clarified whether s27 only intends for SAHRA or the relevant 
heritage authority to preserve heritage sites or whether the bodies are only 
responsible for the protection of heritage sites. 
• Local sites should be included in s27 while not falling under the responsibility 
of SAHRA. Thus, a new clause similar to s27(1) and (2) for the identification 
of local sites should be included along with a clause confirming who is 
responsible for the protection of local sites as s27 (15) and (16) do for national 
sites and provincial sites. 
• It needs to be clarified whether the intention of s27 is only to provide 
protection for heritage sites or whether both protection and preservation are 
intended. Protecting a heritage site which is not preserved is pointless thus 
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the wording in s27 (10), (11), (15), (16), (18) and (23) should include the 
words “preserve” or “preservation”. 
• It may be beneficial to include a minimum standards clause for heritage sites 
such that the site is at least maintained at the same standard as it was upon 
declaration. Including a minimum standards clause would at least ensure the 
preservation of the site in its current state. 
• It needs to be clarified whether upon the unilateral declaration of a heritage 
site, the heritage authority can enforce any regulations regarding the site or 
undertake any work on the site. Currently, these require the consent of the 
owner no matter how the heritage status was achieved.206 However, it might 
be productive to provide the heritage authority with the power to enforce 
certain regulations and allow certain work. Again, the publishing of guidelines 
as to the types of limitations and responsibilities regarding heritage sites that 
can be implemented would be beneficial. Admittedly, a minimum standards 
clause would partially fulfil this role, but, certain sites may require more 
interventions than the destruction limitations and maintenance to a minimum 
standard, and the heritage authority needs to be empowered to act in these 
cases without the consent of the owner. However, the types of limitations and 
responsibilities placed on an owner in these circumstances must be curtailed. 
The heritage authority must be limited to the actions they can take or enforce, 
and this will likely be significantly less than the potential interventions allowed 
for in s27 (19) and (21).  
• The distinction between heritage sites and heritage areas must be clarified. 
This would mean redefining the term site in the NHRA so that it does not 
include “area” and defining what an area is and what it includes. Alternatively, 
it could be considered whether s31 on heritage areas is necessary. The use 
of the term place (which includes sites and areas) in s27(1) and (2) means 
that areas are included within the scope of s27, and this may be sufficient; 
 
206  NHRA s27(19) and (21). 
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s31 may be superfluous and only adds to the significant confusion created 
by the lack of definitive terminology and the interchangeability of terminology. 
Indeed, the use of the term heritage place could replace both heritage sites 
and heritage areas, since the definition of place includes sites and areas. 
• The confusion whether heritage objects are included in management and 
improvement needs to be resolved so that the heritage resources which fall 
under the management of the various heritage authorities is apparent. This 
would require the redefinition of the terms: management and improvement 
so that they include heritage objects within their ambit. 
• The nomination process for heritage objects must be clarified, to make it clear 
who may nominate an object as a heritage object. It is suggested that, like 
heritage sites, any person should be able to nominate an object for 
consideration and the wording of s32(1) be amended accordingly. 
• The nomination process for heritage objects should also clarify that any 
object which is thought to be culturally significant can be nominated for 
consideration. An object should not already have to have been identified as 
part of the national estate. 
• More clarity needs to be provided on the consultation process with the owner 
of heritage objects. SAHRA must be required to notify the owner and allow 
the owner to make submissions regarding the declaration unless this would 
impede the protection and preservation of the object due to the urgency of 
the situation. This would require the term may in s32 (3)-(5) be changed to 
must.  
• The confusion regarding the publishing of a provisional notice in a 
Government Gazette and advertisement must be clarified over which 
heritage objects require such and which ones only require the notification of 
the owner (and therefore what forms of objects are protected for sixty days 
while the declaration process is pursued). To clarify for a specific object or a 
collection only the owner needs to be notified but types of objects and lists of 
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objects require a provisional notice in the Government Gazette and public 
advertisement. Plus, all forms of heritage objects should be protected for sixty 
days from the date of notice. 
• A clause needs to be included in s27 for heritage sites and s32 for heritage 
objects that requires SAHRA to present an owner with a notice of the terms 
for the protection and preservation of the resource when SAHRA acts 
unilaterally i.e. what steps an owner is required to take (or not to take), the 
standard at which the resource must be maintained and so forth. These 
stipulations will probably be the same conditions that SAHRA suggested in 
the negotiating process.  
• Heritage objects also need to be included in s45 on compulsory repair orders. 
This would better ensure that the purpose of the NHRA can be fulfilled for 
heritage objects. There also needs to be more clarity on the process for 
declaring objects as heritage objects; the owner’s participation in the process 
should be necessary as it is for heritage sites. In addition, the unilateral power 
to declare property as a heritage resource without the consent of the owner 
needs to be amended; perhaps by including an independent third-party at the 
end of an unsuccessful negotiation process. This would ensure that SAHRA 
may only use the unilateral authority where it has been independently 
assessed that it is necessary to do so.  
• Section 45 also needs to be amended so that it is clear that the issuing of a 
compulsory repair order happens prior to pursuing criminal action. Thus, it is 
only when an owner fails to comply with the repair order, that the heritage 
authority can pursue criminal sanctions against an owner. In other words, 
there needs to be a distinct separation between the compulsory repair order 
and the penalties. An owner cannot be responsible for the costs of repair and 
the financial penalty. Further, the extent to which a heritage authority can 
require repair needs to be limited. At the least, regulations should be 
established to limit the amount of repair and restoration costs which an owner 
can be held responsible for.  
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The fines payable for contravening the NHRA may offer some guidance as 
to the amounts that an owner can be held responsible. For instance, the 
admission of guilt fine is limited to R10 000.00 and the fine payable for 
contravening a provision in the Act is limited to R18 250.00.207 Therefore the 
criminal penalties could offer guidance as to the financial limits that an owner 
can be held responsible for.   
Alternatively, the regulations would have to include different limits for sites 
and objects, and different limits for intentional damage and accidental 
damage. It may be preferential to hold an owner responsible for repairs 
amounting to a percentage of the value of the property (possibly on a sliding 
scale as the value of the property increases). The percentage of repairs to 
which an owner can be held responsible could be different for accidental or 
unintentional damage and intentional damage. This suggestion would clarify 
the extent to which the state can interfere in property rights by placing limited 
financial burdens on an owner and provide guidance on the responsibility of 
the state in maintaining cultural heritage resources.208 It would also highlight 
the responsibility that comes with owning a cultural heritage resource. 
• Owners should be included within the list of people and organisations with 
whom a heritage agreement may be concluded.209 
• The word ‘purchase’ needs to be removed from s46 on expropriation. As 
noted, an expropriation is not a purchase. Whilst this is not an impediment to 
the expropriation of cultural heritage resources it is beneficial for legal 
certainty not to include purchase within s46. Rather, ‘purchase’ should be 
included in s42(1) on heritage agreements and that this clause be extended 
to include agreements with the owner of the resource.  
 
207  NHRA s51(3)(a)-(b). The contravention of a specific provision fine is calculated at R50.00 per 
day for a maximum of 365 days. 
208  This recommendation highlights that the criminal fines may be inadequate. An owner should not 
be faced with a choice between complying with law (and incurring a greater expense) and 
breaking the law (and paying the lesser amount of the fine). 
209  NHRA s42(1)(a). 
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• To ensure consistency, the public interest or public benefit requirements 
should be included for purchases made by SAHRA, as well as for the 
conclusion of heritage agreements.  
• In addition, regulations should be published to specify the financial limits at 
which higher levels of approval are required for making purchases.  The 
regulations would permit SAHRA to conclude agreements independently up 
to amount A. However, where the costs to purchase property exceed amount 
A the approval of the SAHRA council is required up to amount B. Where the 
costs to purchase the property exceed amount B the approval of the Minister 
is required up to amount C. And where the costs will exceed amount C the 
approval of the Minister of Finance is required. These regulations could be 
amended periodically to allow for inflation and budget allocations.210  
Implementing these recommendations ensure that the NHRA functions better and 
that the intention of the Act can be better pursued and achieved.  
3.3.6 Independent South African cultural heritage organisations 
There are many independent South African organisations concerned with cultural 
heritage. Below is a selection of organisations that support cultural heritage in the 
contemporary, urban and street art genres. 
The Zeitz Museum of Contemporary Art Africa (Zeitz MOCCA) is a registered public 
benefit organisation.211 The museum opened in 2017 and is the first significant 
museum dedicated to collecting, preserving, researching, and exhibiting 21st century 
African art.212 The gallery collects and exhibits the works of artists from Africa and 
its diaspora, but, does not yet possess examples of South African street art or exhibit 
the works of known South African street artists. Despite this, the Zeitz MOCCA is 
 
210  These recommendations need not affect the compulsory purchase of heritage objects when 
export permission has been denied. 
211  A public benefit organisation is a non-profit company (which purpose is to perform public benefit 
activities that are altruistic or philanthropic) registered in terms of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
s30 for tax benefits. 
212  Zeitz MOCCA https://zeitzmocaa.museum/about-us/ (Date of use: 16 May 2018). 
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an example of a museum that views contemporary art forms as worthy of 
preservation and protection, as expressions of a developing South African cultural 
heritage. As well as functioning as a gallery the Zeitz MOCCA intends to start a 
school education program. The Museum also runs a curatorial training program 
which provides graduates and professionals with the opportunity to work at the 
museum and gain practical curatorial experience and skills over the course of a 
year. 
 
AwethuArt is an artist collective founded in 2015. The group focusses on making art 
accessible, affordable and relevant to South African communities.213 In 2015 they 
held a Graffiti Day in Newtown, Johannesburg. The day included a presentation by 
Cale Waddacor (a photographer of and author on graffiti in South Africa), a tour of 
street art sites in Newtown, as well as a collaborative stencil making and painting of 
a graffiti wall project for attendees.214 AwethuArt like other graffiti artists, street 
artists and collectives, recognises that street art makes art available to everyone, 
that it does not cost on the viewer and that it breaks down class barriers.215 
 
Grayscale Art and Concept Store is a Johannesburg based retailer focussed on the 
urban art market. Whilst Grayscale sells graffiti equipment, they also have a gallery 
that represents alternative artists, specifically those that would not be represented 
in traditional ‘high art’ galleries. The gallery sells art but also works to inspire youth 
to explore different forms of self-expression and educates the public about the 
positive features of urban art.216 In addition, Grayscale have co-sponsored the City 
of Gold Urban Art festival held in Johannesburg. The festival included an exhibition, 
a mural project, film-screenings and street art tours.217 
 
 
213  AwethuArt https://awethuart.wordpress.com/about/ (Date of use: 16 May 2018). 
214  AwethuArt https://awethuart.wordpress.com/2016/11/25/wanna-banksy-with-us/ (Date of use: 
16 May 2018). See also Morrissey 9-12-2015 The Star 6. 
215  Francis Re-facing Societies 8. Albeit that Francis is discussing the art of Faith47. 
216  Grayscale http://grayscalestore.co.za/#about (Date of use: 16 May 2018). 
217  City of Gold Urban Arts Festival https://www.cityofgoldfestival.co.za/node/5 (Date of use: 16 
May 2018). 
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Similarly, the WorldArt gallery in Cape Town exhibits and represents numerous 
artists who began as graffiti artists.218 The gallery has also participated in 
international contemporary art festivals such as the Stroke Art Fair held in Munich, 
Germany.  
 
3.4 Overview of the South African heritage industry 
The South African heritage industry is vast with many pieces of legislation, statutory 
bodies, and independent South African and international stakeholders. The sheer 
density of the legislation and the number of role players in this industry underscores 
the importance of cultural heritage to South Africa and to South African people. The 
government and the South African people view cultural heritage and cultural 
heritage resources as an essential aspect of South Africa’s rebuilding and 
reconciliation project and as essential to Constitutional values. 
Against this backdrop, it is noted that, no street art is listed as a cultural heritage 
resource in South Africa. What is it about sites and objects that acquire heritage 
status that makes them deserve the protection and preservation that such status is 
intended to provide? Also, could any South African street art be considered a 
cultural heritage resource? 
3.5 Understanding cultural significance 
Neither the NHRA nor SAHRA provide detailed criteria for the assessment of 
heritage resources, other than those detailed in s3(3) of the NHRA. It is unfortunate 
that SAHRA has not developed their own guidelines as, ‘a distinctive culture test is 
a helpful way to bring implicit biases out into the open so that they can be challenged 
and changed, and so that a fair and systematic guide to the assessment of cultural 
claims can be developed.’219 However, until such guidelines are developed, South 
African heritage authorities rely on the Australian Burra Charter for guidance.220  
 
218  WorldArt http://www.worldart.co.za/artists (Date of use: 16 May 2018). 
219  Eisenberg 2005 Human Rights Dialogue 27. 
220  Kotze and Jansen Van Rensburg 2003 QUTLJJ 138 – 134.  
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The Burra Charter is popular amongst the international heritage community.221 The 
Burra Charter uses the concept of "cultural significance” to determine the heritage 
status of a site, i.e. a site which has cultural significance is valued (and thus 
protected and preserved) as a heritage site. This concept refers to the ‘aesthetic, 
historic, scientific, social or spiritual value for past, present or future generations.’222 
The Burra Charter is specific to places of cultural significance. However, the 
definition of place is a geographic area but may include related objects (these are 
objects which contribute to the cultural significance of a place but are not at that 
place).223 It is recommended in the Burra Charter that related objects which 
contribute to the cultural significance of a place should remain at such place unless 
removal is necessary for the protection and preservation (or temporary exhibition) 
of the objects (or places).224 Consequently, while the Burra Charter is best suited to 
the determination of the heritage status of sites, it can be adapted to assess the 
cultural significance of heritage objects. 
 
The Burra Charter proposes a three-stage process for the conservation and 
management of cultural heritage places. The first of which is understanding the 
cultural significance of a place. The Burra Charter requires that studies of the place 
be conducted in order to understand the cultural significance of the place.225 Then, 
written statements about the cultural significance and management of the place 
should be prepared.226 Groups and individuals who have connections to the place 
should be allowed to contribute to the understanding of a place’s cultural 
significance as well as to contribute to the management of such place.227 If 
 
221  Zancheti et al 2009 City &Time 48. 
222  Burra Charter Art 1.2. 
223  Burra Charter Art 1.1 and 1.14. Australia uses the term cultural heritage for buildings, sites, 
structures, ruins, archaeology, industrial archaeology, movable objects and shipwrecks. Brooks 
1992 Places 86. 
224  Burra Charter Art 10 and 11. 
225  Burra Charter Art 26.1. 
226  Burra Charter Art 26.2. 
227  Burra Charter Art 26.3. 
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appropriate the statements of cultural significance should be reviewed to ensure 
continued appropriateness and efficiency.228  
 
The Practice Note: Understanding and assessing cultural significance elaborates 
the ideals set out in the Burra Charter. It details the first step in management and 
conservation of cultural heritage places, i.e. understanding and determining the 
cultural significance.229 Both experts (such as art historians and archaeologists) and 
other stakeholders (the community, businesses, the tourism industry, etc.) should 
contribute to the determination of cultural significance.230 
 
Regarding the aesthetic value, the Practice Note requires six considerations. The 
first, considers whether the place has, ‘special compositional or uncommonly 
attractive qualities involving combinations of colour, textures, spaces, massing, 
detail, movement, unity, sounds, scents’.231 Two, whether the place is distinctive in 
its location or whether it is a prominent visual landmark. Three, it must be considered 
whether the place has inspirational qualities or whether it evokes strong emotions 
or distinct meanings. Four, the value of its symbolic status should be noted, i.e. has 
the place inspired artistic or cultural responses; is it represented in various forms of 
media such as art, photography, and literature? Five, does the place display 
characteristics of an identifiable style or fashion? And six, does the place display a 
high degree of creative or technical achievement?232 Again, while the Burra Charter 
is referring to sites it is easy to see how these considerations may be used to value 
the aesthetic significance of a movable object.  
 
The historic value can mean any historic values of the place. This may include 
aesthetic history, scientific history and so forth; such that the historic value may re-
enforce or underscore the other values associated with cultural significance. A place 
 
228  Burra Charter Art 26.4. 
229  ICOMOS Australia (Practice Note) (hereinafter referred to as the Practice Note). As previously 
stated, cultural significance is determined by the aesthetic, historical, scientific, social, and 
spiritual value of a place. 
230  De la Torre and Mason Introduction 3. 
231  Practice Note 3. 
232  Practice Note 3. 
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may have historic value because it is associated with an historic event or theme. It 
may have historic value because it shows the historical development of a 
community, or a region, or a country, or of the world. Alternatively, the historic value 
of a place may result from the high degree of creative or technical achievement 
during a specific time. Alternatively, the place may be connected to a specific 
individual or community that has historic meaning.233  
 
A place may have scientific value if it is worthy of investigation and examination, 
and if doing such would result in the acquisition of new or more information about 
the past. The value in this instance may depend on the quality of the information, its 
rarity, importance, representativeness, and the potential to increase information 
regarding the place, people, processes, or practices.234  
 
A place may have social value if it has social or cultural meanings for a community 
or group, as a marker of identity and it may have developed meaning to a group or 
community over time.235 Further, a place may have social value because the 
spiritual meaning of the place contributes to recollection or understanding of a 
community’s or individual’s relationship with the metaphysical realm. Another 
consideration is whether the spiritual values of a place are expressed in cultural 
practices, human-made structures, or artwork.236 
 
Finally, a place may be culturally significant because of its spiritual value. There are 
many considerations for determining spiritual value. Among these being that a place 
may enhance a community’s spiritual identity or beliefs, and may contain traditional 
knowledge, artwork, or lore relating to a spiritual practice of a community.237 
 
While the Practice Note, like the Burra Charter, is focussed on places it is easy to 
see how these considerations can be applied to objects. The aesthetic value of an 
 
233  Practice Note 3. 
234  Practice Note 3–4. 
235  Practice Note 4. 
236  Practice Note 3. 
237  Practice Note 4. 
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object may be culturally significant for the same reasons that a site may be, and this 
is evidenced in examples of fine art, sculpture and so forth. A movable object can 
hold historical value, such as an aircraft from the Battle of Britain. The Rosetta Stone 
is an example of a movable object that has scientific value. Objects such as 
traditional clothing can hold social significance. For many people, spiritual value can 
be held in objects, such as a crucifix. So, the Burra Charter and Practice Note may 
also be used by SAHRA to determine the cultural significance of objects. 
 
Zancheti et al. highlight that understanding the cultural significance of a place is a 
contested issue. Value may be inherent in a site, and if so, the value can be 
objectively determined. Alternatively, value may be attributed to places by 
individuals and communities. Thus, value is not inherent in the object, and the 
determination of its value is not objective. Rather, it is the subjective interpretation 
of the individuals and communities. Further, the value of a place may be different 
for different people and may change and develop with time.238  
 
An example of the difficulty in the interpretation of cultural significance can be seen 
in the Voortrekker monument in Pretoria. The monument may have inherent value, 
from an architectural and historical perspective. However, there are various 
subjective interpretations of the cultural significance of the monument. To some the 
Voortrekker monument is a symbol of victory over adversity; it is a symbol of human 
achievement. To others, the monument is a symbol of pride for the Afrikaaner 
people. Another interpretation is as a symbol of Apartheid. Moreover, the monument 
has re-interpreted value; with its inclusion in the Freedom Park campus it has been 
re-interpreted as a symbol of reconciliation and/or as a symbol of the repositioning 
of the Afrikaaner identity in post-Apartheid South Africa.239 
 
 
238  Zancheti et al 2009 City &Time 50. 
239  Grundlingh 2001 Radical History Review 95; Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008 Journal of Material 
Culture 153; Mare 2007 SAJAH 36; Autry 2012 Theory, Culture and Society 146, Durbach 
Cultural Heritage as Transformation 217. 
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A heritage resource may exhibit only one or a few of these values, or a resource 
may be multivalent.240 Mason argues that there are so many different types of values 
that it is necessary to define a typology (classification according to general type) of 
values to determine cultural significance effectively and fairly.241 Mason divides 
values into two categories: sociocultural and economic. The sociocultural values are 
similar to those used in the Burra Charter; namely historical; cultural/symbolic; 
social; spiritual/religious and aesthetic values.242 Economic values, while they may 
overlap with sociocultural values, are distinct because they are seen through the 
eyes of a consumer (it is a valuation of utility) and are most often expressed in 
financial value.243 Economic value can include the value of the thing itself, as well 
as the economic impact of the resources (how much money is invested in the 
resource and what economic gain the investment has led to, such as through job 
creation). Economic value may also be found in the hedonic value of a resource 
(such as how the value of properties has increased due to their proximity to the 
resource) and travel cost gain (the economic gain associated with the costs of travel 
to see the resource; this includes transport and accommodation amongst others).244 
While economic values do not replace or subvert sociocultural values, they can 
promote heritage conservation and development.245 
 
Thus, when determining cultural heritage resource status, and in line with the 
requirements of s3(3) of the NHRA, SAHRA should consider the aesthetic, 
historical, scientific, social, and spiritual values of the resource and take into 
consideration the economic value of the resource. 
 
 
240  Mason Assessing Values 8. 
241  Mason Assessing Values 9. 
242  Mason Assessing Values 11–12. 
243  Mason Assessing Values 12. Mason spends some time reflecting on economic value that cannot 
be expressed in terms of a price, however for this study the contribution of economic values as 
expressed in financial terms is sufficient. See also Mourato and Mazzanti Economic Valuation 
51 for more on non-use economic value. 
244  Mason Assessing Values 22. 
245  Mourato and Mazzanti Economic Valuation 68. 
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3.6 Street art as cultural heritage resources 
As can be seen from the discussion so far, there is no exhaustive definition of 
cultural heritage resources. Just as heritage can be ubiquitous, so can cultural 
heritage resources; more and different objects, places and practices are being 
deemed to be heritage resources.246 It is recognised that ‘[h]eritage is a living entity. 
It is constantly renewing itself and taking on different forms and modes’.247 Notably, 
‘[a]rt constitutes one of the primary manifestations of culture: one the state has a 
particularly close relationship with’.248 There is no question that certain artworks can 
be part of a country’s heritage. Indeed, several artworks are already listed as 
heritage objects by SAHRA; these include works by South African artists: Irma 
Stern, Jakob Hendrik Pierneef, Maggie Laubser, Gerard Sekoto, Vladimir 
Griegorovitch Tretchikoff, amongst many others.249  
While heritage resources in the form of art may be thought of in a more traditional 
sense, that concept can be expanded to include new and different forms of art. For 
instance, various dance forms are identified as cultural heritage resources such as 
capoeira in Brazil. Admittedly, this is a form of intangible cultural heritage but, since 
it is possible to copyright choreography, there is potential for a video recording or a 
notation of a capoeira piece to be awarded heritage status as a cultural heritage 
object.  
In this line, post-1994 the Iziko National Gallery decided to take a transformative 
approach to their collection, to begin to collect and preserve African art, and for the 
national art collection to reflect our diverse cultures.250 This transformation quest 
has also been adopted by South African museums, particularly because many black 
South Africans were not visiting museums as they did not think that the museums 
 
246  Harrison Heritage 3, 5 – 7. 
247  Al Naboodah 2011 Museum International 70. Holtorf discusses the issue of how much heritage 
should be preserved, suggesting that when too much is preserved the significance it devalued. 
Holtorf 2007 IJCP 37. In another article Holtorf discusses the reason why some heritage may 
not or should not be preserved. Holtorf and Kristensen 2015 IJHS 313. 
248  Roodt Cultural Heritage 16. 
249  These can be explored on the register maintained by SAHRIS at https://sahris.sahra.org.za/ 
(Date of use: 2 May 2020). 
250  Kaufmann 2014 SAMAB 15. 
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represented their past.251 Despite this new outlook, presently recognised cultural 
heritage objects still tend to represent, ‘old, traditional, colonial and/or rare forms of 
‘high culture’.’252 However, the Zeitz MOCCA as a recent member of the South 
African heritage industry has and is developing what types of art and what artworks 
South Africans consider to have cultural value. While an independent organisation 
the museum has received support from the Public Investment Corporation (a 
government-owned investment management company). Thus, while no street 
artists are represented in the national gallery, the indirect state funding to the Zeitz 
MOCCA demonstrates state support for contemporary art. 
As South African heritage bodies seek to diversify and transform cultural heritage 
resources, it is possible that street art, whether located on immovable or movable 
property, could be considered as a heritage object. Indeed, Holtorf suggests that 
destruction and damage can be part of heritage; noting that, ‘[v]aluable heritage 
often emerges out of destructive conditions.’253 Holtorf specifically refers to street 
art as an example of this form of heritage creation.254 Merril also supports this idea 
by stating that, 
 ‘the notion stands that some graffiti … represents heritage that is 
culturally significant for its artistic value and also for the socio-political 
commentary it offers about the world we live in today and others will 
strive to understand in the future.’255  
Moreover, this would follow the international trend of recognising the cultural value 
of some street art as discussed in 3.1.  
‘As Banksy and other similar artists have demonstrated, street art has 
become an important artistic mode, and has achieved critical 
recognition and praise by fine art critics and the public alike. Like 
 
251  Nomvuso Tembe (once public relations officer at the National Cultural History Museum in 
Pretoria) as quoted in Barnabus 2016 IJHS 698. 
252  Deacon, Mngqolo and Prosalendis 2003 SAMB 34. 
253  Holtorf and Kristensen 2015 IJHS 315. 
254  Holtorf and Kristensen 2015 IJHS 316. 
255  Merrill 2011 Time and Mind 67. 
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historically significant works of architecture or cultural artefacts, street 
art deserves consideration as cultural property. Without such 
additional protection, important works of art may be lost to future 
generations.’256  
Like any potential heritage resource, an application for consideration of a street 
artwork must follow the procedure set out in the NHRA. This includes the 
consideration of whether the artwork has the cultural value required to be a declared 
heritage resource. The application for heritage status must be accompanied by a 
written motivation detailing how the site or object meets the standards set out in 
s3(3) of the NHRA i.e., the importance to a community or pattern of South Africa’s 
history, its uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of South Africa’s cultural 
heritage, whether it provides information relevant to South Africa’s heritage, its 
aesthetic characteristic, the level of creative achievement, the community or social 
group’s association with the work and who the artist is.257  
Further, to ensure the success of an application, it would be worthwhile to include 
the cultural significance of the street art as explained in the Burra Charter and 
Practice Note (rather than limiting it to the consideration in s3(3) of the NHRA). The 
sociocultural values (aesthetic, historical, scientific, social, spiritual) of the artwork 
should be detailed in the motivation. A statement on the economic value (both the 
value of the artwork itself and the hedonic value of the artwork) would be a 
recommended inclusion in the motivation. 
In addition, whether located on private or publicly owned property, street art can 
become a landmark of a neighbourhood. This can occur due to the age of the work, 
the history of the work, its popularity or fame, the notoriety of the artist, through an 
event such as being used in a film or being the site for an event such as 
demonstration or march.258 This type of artwork can become symbolic of and for a 
 
256  Barnett 2013 Chi-Kent J Intell Prop 216. 
257  NHRA s3(3)(a)-(h). 
258  Smith 2016 St John’s Law Review 370 and 380-381. Smith limits her comment to art which is 
affixed to property with express or implied permission, so she excludes illegal art, however the 
comment still applies because both legal and illegal public art can have such meaning for the 
public. 
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community, it can define the group’s culture and identity, it can define the social 
relationships and sustain the social rules of that community, as well as their social 
values.259 This perspective of street art highlights the accessibility and the 
democratic and egalitarian nature of street art; a viewer does not have to visit a 
gallery, have an understanding of art history, pay a fee, or even travel to view the 
work.260  
It is submitted that there are South African street artworks that should be considered 
as cultural heritage resources. There are street artworks that meet the qualifications 
set out in s3(3) of the NHRA and extend to exemplify the values set out in the Burra 
Charter and Practice Note. 
Artwork such as Faith47’s Freedom Charter Project could be considered to fall 
within this category. Following the comprehensive structure set out in the Practice 
Note there are several motivations to be made for the existing artworks in this 
project. First, Faith47’s artwork is considered to have aesthetic value; the existing 
pieces of the project comprise calligraphic writing and, in some, images.261 The 
aesthetic value is also justified by her multiple national and international art 
exhibitions, and because well-known galleries represent her, such as David Krut 
Projects. Her work is respected within the art industry and considered to be 
collectable. Further many of the pieces are distinctive in their locations. They are 
landmarks for the communities in which they are sited. The artwork The People 
Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth (circa 2010) is located at one of the entrance 
roads to Khayelitsha in the Eastern Cape. This area was one of the last townships 
created in terms of the Group Areas Act, and many of the first residents were forcibly 
removed from their homes and relocated to Khayelitsha. Thus, the meaning of the 
artwork in its location is significant as a reminder of the separation of the races 
especially, the financial inequality of the races (Khayelitsha remains one of the 
Cape’s poorest communities), and the promise of equality and opportunity of the 
 
259  Smith 2016 St John’s Law Review 383. 
260  McCormick et al Trespass 11. See also Hansen 2016 Crime Media Culture 289 on the 
accessibility of street art. 
261  Francis Re-facing Societies 12. 
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new South Africa.262 Thus, from an aesthetic perspective not only is the work 
culturally significant because of the typography and Faith47’s stature, it also meets 
the qualifications because it is distinctive in its location, its prominence as a visual 
landmark because it is inspiring, emotive and symbolic.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Faith 47’s The People Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth 
 
Second, the Freedom Charter Project holds historical value. The artworks in the 
project are representative of a specific time in South Africa’s history, the signing of 
the Freedom Charter which was adopted by the African National Congress in 1955, 
as well as being representative of the forming of the South African democracy in 
1994 and the development of the South African Constitution (completed in 1996) 
which was influenced by the declarations contained in the Freedom Charter. Francis 
describes her work as a,  
‘campaign against political babouresness that still lingers in post-
Apartheid South Africa, she tackles the repressive politics of space 
 
262  Nippard http://www.dw.com/en/south-african-street-artists-paint-for-the-people/a-14902960 
  (Date of use: 24 November 2015).  
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used by nationalist Afrikaaners by claiming said space. By converting 
these spaces of deprivation into territories of inclusion and beauty 
through art, Faith47 reclaims the space for the populace. This function 
of art as a way of bridging the cultural gaps of human experience is 
what I believe makes Fath47 a leader in this new construct. She not 
only restores the hope for change through her art, she goes (sic) a 
step further and actively mends the wounds still bleeding from 
Apartheid…Faith47’s Freedom Charter series … encompasses the 
goal of South Africa’s 1955 system to give all South Africans equal 
rights.’263 
Consequently, the artworks are a record of South Africa’s historical development.  
 
Third, the artworks may have scientific significance because there is educational 
value in the pieces; it contributes to the understanding of this period of South Africa’s 
history. Admittedly, it is not increasing our knowledge, but it does provide a fresh 
perspective. Francis highlights that, 
 
‘Faith47 brings the still active battle for equality to the forefront of 
society. By going back in history, Faith47 brings the past back to life 
and by doing so places herself and her viewer into an enlightened 
understanding of the issues still at hand.’264 
Fourth, the project also has social significance. As suggested The People Shall 
Share in the Country’s Wealth has special significance to the Khayelitsha 
community where it is located. The artwork represents the community’s identity as 
one which has been historically disadvantaged and for whom the Freedom Charter 
was an imperative part of many (if not most) of the resident’s history. Moreover, it 
may also be argued that the artwork holds social significance for South African 
 
263  Francis Re-facing Societies 10-11. Francis is referring to Faith47’s work in general not the 
Freedom Charter Project specifically, but this quote is especially applicable to this project. 
264  Francis Re-facing Societies 12-13. 
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identity in that South Africa is a country that seeks economic transformation and 
economic equality.  
 
An argument is not submitted herein for the spiritual value of the project however it 
is not necessary to argue for all the value that may give a resource cultural 
significance. Sufficient evidence of a single value would be satisfactory. 
 
Whereas neither s3(3) of the NHRA or the Burra Charter require economic value, a 
consideration of such will further motivate the cultural value of the Freedom Charter 
Project. Faith47’s project holds economic value, not just because the artworks may 
have value in and of themselves, but also because they contribute to the South 
African economy in many ways, such as through tourism and creating employment 
through such tourism. For instance, some tourist operators host graffiti walking tours 
which include some Faith47 works.265 
 
A strong motivation could be presented for declaring any of the artworks in the 
Freedom Charter Project as heritage resources or even for declaring the project as 
a collection as a heritage resource. The artworks and the project satisfy many of the 
values required in s3(3) of the NHRA (as guided by the Burra Charter and the 
Practice Note).  
 
When considering the grade listing of South African heritage resources, it is 
somewhat more difficult to see where such a project (or artwork within the collection) 
could be categorised. As previously discussed, a grade I listed resource must have 
outstanding significance in terms of any of the characteristics set out in s3(3) of the 
NHRA. The project could be considered to be, ‘an outstanding example of the work 
of a person, group of community which is of importance to South African history’.266  
It is also authentic in regard to design and is symbolic (such that it contributes 
 
265  See for example, Past Experiences http://pastexperiences.co.za/?page_id=815 (Date of use: 
16 May 2018) and Anima Tours 
  http://www.animatours.co.za/activities/woodstock-street-art-tour/ (Date of use: 16 May 2018). 
266  NHRA s3(3)(h). 
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towards human understanding and nation-building). Further, the international 
reputation of Faith47 could substantiate the requirement that the resource is of 
universal value.267 In terms of a grade II listing, none of the artworks in the project 
are significant to specific province or region (unless region can be defined as a 
community); rather they are symbolic of the country.268 However, in terms of grade 
III listing the artworks in the project could be deemed worthy of conservation.269 For 
grade III listing the projects and/or artworks fulfil many of the qualifications in s3(3) 
of the NHRA. They can also be viewed as contributing towards the cultural 
significance of an area. Plus, the argument that they are outstanding examples of 
Faith47’s work and are historically relevant may also justify grade III listing.270  
 
Admittedly, the wording of the Heritage Resources Act and s3(3) in particular is quite 
limiting, and this may be why heritage authorities have turned to the Burra Charter 
for guidance as to the characteristics of culturally significant resources. Thus, when 
including the cultural significance detailed in the Burra Charter the Freedom Charter 
Project can be considered as aesthetically, historically, socially, and arguably 
scientifically valuable. And, of course, there is also the economic value of the various 
pieces (although economic value is not among the considerations listed in the 
NHRA). In a sense, the Freedom Charter Project is an embodiment of the cultural 
rights, and thus the artworks that comprise the Freedom Charter Project are 
culturally significant. When looking at both the considerations of the NHRA and the 
Burra Charter, the Freedom Charter Project should be considered for 
acknowledgement as a cultural heritage site or object (depending on whether the 
individual artworks would best be preserved in situ or within a museum or gallery 
collection) with at least a grade III listing. 
 
Similar arguments can be made for Shepard Fairey’s The Purple Shall Govern. 
Shepard Fairey’s work remains popular in the art world. He had a distinct and easily 
 
267  GG 24893 s43(1).  
268  NHRA s7(1) (b) and GG 24893 s43(2). 
269  NHRA s7(1) (c). 
270  NHRA s8(4) and GG 24893 s43(3). 
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recognisable style.271 The artwork represents an important, although lesser known, 
anti-Apartheid protest. There is no doubt that the artwork is an outstanding example 
of the work of a person, a group, or community which is of importance to South 
African history, and because Shepard Fairey is one of the most internationally 
renowned street artists, there is also universal value in the piece.272  
 
The piece also holds considerable educational value. It highlights an anti-Apartheid 
protest of which many South Africans may be unaware. The artwork also holds world 
educational value because Shepard Fairey designed Barack Obama’s campaign 
poster, so it can serve to educate and inform audiences with regards South African 
and American history and has particular significance for black history. The artwork 
depicts South Africa’s first black president, and it links (through Shepard Fairey) to 
America’s first black president. This links South Africa’s anti-Apartheid history to the 
fight for emancipation and civil rights in the USA. It also links South Africa’s protest 
history to other countries where coloured dye has been used to deter protestors and 
identify participants.273 Because of the educational potential of the piece, it can be 
said to ‘provide[s] information relevant to South Africa’s natural or cultural 
heritage’.274 Further, the artwork is also representative of resistance graffiti art and 
thus, ‘holds importance to a community or pattern of South Africa’s history’.275  
 
It may also be argued that because Shepard Fairey is American the piece 
constitutes an ‘uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of South Africa’s natural or 
cultural heritage’.276 There may be no new South African Shepard Fairey works, and 
there are a limited number of his works that still exist, and because of the 
 
271  NHRA s3(3)(d). 
272  NHRA s3(3)(a)-(h). 
273  Friedman  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/24/why-do-police-douse-protesters-with-colored-water/ (Date 
of use: 8 November 2017). Indeed, the used of water cannons with coloured dye was so 
common during the American civil rights protests in the 1960’s that the tactic is rarely used in 
the USA today because of the connotations of such practice. Leibenluft 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/06/purple_water_cannons.htm
l (Date of use: 8 November 2016). 
274  NHRA s3(3)(c). 
275  NHRA s3(3)(a). Archer and Stent 2011 Visual Communication 125-126. 
276  NHRA s3(3)(b). 
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unprotected nature of street art, these pieces are endangered. Further, the artwork 
is a landmark for Johannesburg CBD, and this suggests ‘that a community or social 
group has a strong social, cultural … association’ with the piece.277 
 
The artwork has aesthetic, historical and social value, as well as inherent and 
hedonic economic value. The Purple Shall Govern is an artwork by an internationally 
renowned artist, and, like the Faith 47 pieces, it has the potential to make a 
scientifically valuable contribution to the knowledge of Apartheid resistance and the 
process towards democracy in South Africa. It also contributes to knowledge by 
drawing parallels between the South African and American civil rights campaigns, 
and potentially, links to other civil rights campaigns.  
 
Due to the vast cultural significance of this artwork and that it holds both national 
and international value a motivation for grade I listing should be made. The Purple 
Shall Govern should be afforded the protection and preservation in situ that comes 
with such status. 
 
To summarise, it is possible that certain examples of South African street art could 
be considered as heritage resources. It is argued herein that, the existing works in 
the Freedom Charter Project by Faith47 (or the project as a collection) and The 
Purple Shall Govern artwork by Shepard Fairey should be awarded the status of 
cultural heritage resources and receive the protection and preservation that is 
intended to be provided with such status. Further, the lack of protection of these 
artworks presents a threat to South African cultural heritage. These and other 
potentially culturally valuable South African street artworks need to be evaluated to 
determine if they meet the qualifications for cultural significance and warrant 
heritage status. Doing so fulfils the purpose of several of the statutes relating to 
culture; the Culture Promotion Act, the National Arts Council Act, National heritage 
 
277  NHRA s3(3)(h). 
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Council Act and the NHRA. These, in turn, contribute towards the constitutional 
commitment to culture. 
However, heritage status comes with responsibilities. The sites and objects that are 
recognised as heritage resources need to be preserved for future generations. The 
owner of a heritage site or object is responsible for the protection and preservation 
of the resource, and this places a burden on private and legal persons who own 
cultural heritage sites and objects.  
The following chapter considers the limitations placed on private ownership by the 
declaration of a site or object as a heritage resource. The next chapter considers 
whether these limitations are too burdensome on private owners, or whether these 
limitations cannot ensure the protection and preservation of street art heritage 
resources. Further, if the limitations placed on private ownership are too 
burdensome or if the limitations cannot achieve the purpose, then perhaps private 
ownership of these forms of cultural heritage resources may not be preferable. 
Instead the state may be the preferred owner of these resources and it should 
expropriate the property in order to ensure their protection and preservation. 
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CHAPTER 4 LIMITING PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR CULTURAL HERITAGE 
RESOURCES 
4.1 Introduction 
The private ownership of street art heritage resources can be problematic because 
private ownership entitles one to control, to use and benefit from, to encumber and 
to alienate their property.1 Indeed, private ownership can be problematic for cultural 
heritage resources regardless of the form they take because they are not ordinary 
private property.2 As Sax puts it, ‘some objects are so intrinsically linked to the 
community that they merit special consideration.’3 Owning property that has been 
declared as a cultural heritage resource requires a duty of care. Unlike ownership 
of other forms of property, owning a cultural heritage resource carries an additional 
responsibility to protect and preserve the resource on behalf on the South African 
public. The abovementioned entitlements of ownership cannot be exercised as fully 
for heritage resources as they can for other forms of property. Unfortunately, not all 
owners are responsible heritage resource caretakers. 
An interesting, although perhaps macabre, example of the authority to control what 
happens to culturally significant heritage objects can be found in their burial with 
their deceased owners. Notably, the president of the United States of America John 
F Kennedy was buried with a piece of scrimshaw, engraved with the presidential 
seal by the artist Milton Delano. The actor Bela Lugosi was buried in the Dracula 
costume from his famous portrayal of Count Dracula in the 1931 film, and reggae 
artist Bob Marley was buried with his Gibson Les Paul guitar (these are arguably 
cultural heritage objects).4  
In as much as property owners can do what they wish with their property they may 
not appreciate and respect the cultural heritage value of their property. For instance, 
below are several examples of cultural heritage resources that were destroyed, 
 
1  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 48. 
2  Sax 1990 Cal L Rev 1557. 
3  Sax 1990 Cal L Rev 1558. 
4  Daugherty http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/nine-famous-people-and-what-theyre-
buried-180953186/ (Date of use: 13 February 2017). 
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damaged or lost because the owners did not appreciate their heritage status. For 
instance, Van Gogh’s Portrait of Dr Gachet was lost; upon the owner’s death, the 
painting could not be located.5 Likewise, the painting named Return from the 
Conference by Courbet was destroyed when it was bought by a Catholic who was 
offended by the paintings anticlericalism connotations.6 Diego Riviera’s mural in the 
Rockefeller building was destroyed due to its communist sentiments.7 This issue 
was again highlighted when Chinese artist Ai Weiwei painted the Coca-Cola logo 
on a Han dynasty vase and created a photographic triptych of himself dropping 
another Han dynasty vase. 8 All of these examples of cultural heritage resources 
have been lost to future generations because the owners did not appreciate or 
respect the heritage value of their property; they did not fulfil the role of caretaker 
that is required for this form of property. 
Like other art forms, street art is also subject to the whim of their owner. For 
example, the famous graffiti site in New York known as 5Pointz was destroyed 
because the owner demolished his factory building to build residential property on 
the land.9 A Banksy mural in Calais, France titled The Raft of Medusa (circa 2015) 
was painted over by the owner because he felt it looked shabby and neither local 
authorities nor interested parties had stepped in to help preserve the artwork.10  
 
5  Wilkes 2000-2001 Colum-VLA JL & Arts 179. 
6  Wilkes 2000-2001 Colum-VLA JL & Arts 186. 
7  Sax Playing Darts with Rembrandt 13-15. 
8  Chin-Chin 2012 artasiapacific 80-81. The artworks and artist were criticised because it resulted 
in the destruction of the vases which were Chinese cultural antiques dating from as far back as 
206BCE. Hypothetically, in applying South African law to the case, since Weiwei owned the 
vases he had the right to destroy the property but had the vases been expropriated by the state 
prior to the creation of the artwork they would have been saved, and arguably since Weiwei 
intended to destroy the vases compensation would not be necessary. Perhaps, an argument 
could be made that Weiwei lost potential earnings from the art that would have been created 
and that this should be compensated for, but it would be very difficult to prove the amount and 
that such earnings would have occurred. 
9  Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P. Case Nos. 13-CV-05612 & 15-CV-3230, 2017 WL 1208416 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017). See Lukas https://www.grossmanllp.com/judge-awards-damages-in-
connection-with-graffiti- (Date of use: 15 May 2018) for a discussion of this case that arose from 
the destruction of the building. 
10  Samuel https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/11/banksy-mural-calais-painted-walls-
owner-found-shabby/ (Date of use: 18 May 2017). 
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Further, owners may not take adequate steps to protect the cultural heritage 
resources they own.11 There are several examples of Banksy street art which have 
been defaced or damaged or destroyed because the owners of the property on 
which they were located did not take adequate steps to ensure their protection or 
were negligent in the care of the property. For instance, one of Banksy’s earliest 
works titled The Mild Mild West (circa 1999) is accessible by the public, and there 
are no barriers or protective covering for the artwork. Consequently, it has been 
defaced twice and this led to further damage caused in the restoration process.12 
Another image of Banksy’s Gangsta Rat (2) (circa 2004) painted on the side of a 
warehouse was destroyed because the owners employed an inexperienced builder 
to remove it unmonitored (intending to remove the image intact so that it could be 
sold).13 
Furthermore, owners may also not be aware of the cultural significance of the street 
art and destroy or damage the artwork because of this ignorance. This was the case 
for Banksy’s work, Gorilla in a Pink Mask (circa 2007) which was painted over by 
the owner of the building on which it was located. The owner was unaware of Banksy 
and his fame and thought the artwork was worthless vandalism.14  
Often, cultural resources are owned by people who are not experts in the field that 
the property represents. An owner may have a culturally significant artwork but not 
have expertise in the preservation and/or restoration of artworks. When a person 
acquires an artwork, it does not come with a service plan, and art restoration and 
preservation experts cannot be found as easily as a motor service centre can. 
 
11  Caprio 2006 IJCP 287. 
12  Revolvy 
https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Works%20by%20Banksy%20that%20have%20be
en%20damaged%20or%20destroyed (Date of use: 15 May 2018). 
13  Evans  
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qbzyjd/i-destroyed-banksys-rat-
58477f096a07b201e0f2671f (Date of use: 18 May 2018). 
14  Bates https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2011/jul/15/banksy-gorilla-mask-painted-
over (Date of use: 15 May 2018). In another example, the owner of a garage on which Banksy’s 
artwork Little Snowflake is situated was unaware that the artwork was a Banksy or of Banksy’s 
popularity until after the artwork gained popularity and Banksy acknowledged that the artwork 
was his. Davies  
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/19/banksy-claims-port-talbot-mural-latest-work/ 
(Date of use: 9 April 2019). 
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Understanding what is required to maintain the property requires knowledge in 
specific fields that an owner of a cultural resource may not have. 
The lack of recognition for culturally significant street art can also result in the 
national loss of the art through export. This was the case for Banksy’s Kissing 
Coppers mentioned earlier.15 Awarding heritage status to such artwork may have 
ensured that it was retained for the benefit of British cultural heritage because it 
would have been subject to export controls. 
Another problematic aspect of private ownership of cultural heritage resources is 
access.16 When these forms of property are privately owned, they are often not 
accessible to the public, and the owner can decide who may have access to the 
resource. This defeats an aspect of the purpose of the Department of Arts and 
Culture with respect to heritage resources (as well as many of the statutes enacted 
to fulfil this purpose) namely, to make culture and the resources that represent 
culture accessible to all South Africans.17 Afterall, the management of heritage 
resources as set out in the NHRA includes the presentation of heritage resources, 
which requires access to heritage resources.18 This issue also limits the purpose of 
the constitutional rights to culture because, to an extent, culture cannot be enjoyed 
or participated in if people cannot access the objects of such culture. Further, it 
undermines the purpose of the cultural rights in the process of self-determination; 
being able to access cultural objects assists in developing an individual’s sense of 
self, in knowing where they come from and the culture of which they are a part.19  
 
15  Topping https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2011/apr/21/banksy-kissing-copppers-
sold-america (Date of use: 1 January 2019). 
16  Wilkes 2000-2001 Colum-VLA JL & Arts 187. 
17  Benson and Prinsloo 2013 SAMAB 36. 
18  NHRA s2(xxxvi). 
19  This is not an argument against the private ownership of cultural heritage resources. It is only 
raised to highlight one of the many issues that arises from the private ownership of cultural 
heritage resources. The Banksy artwork Season’s Greetings which was located on a garage in 
Port Talbot is intended to be relocated to a street art museum in the town where it should be 
displayed for three years. However, after this period, the continued public display of the artwork 
is uncertain. It is unknown what the private owner (who purchased the artwork from the owner 
of the garage for a six-figure sum) will do with the artwork even though he has acknowledged 
that Banksy, ‘gave it to the people of the town”. Morris 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2019/apr/03/port-talbot-banksy-moved-new-street-
art-museum-south-wales (Date of use: 23 October 2019). 
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An example of this issue can be found in the Campbell Smith Collection. This 
privately-owned art collection contains artworks dating from the 1920s to present. 
The collection includes works by black artists who were not valued, respected or 
represented due to Apartheid. The collection is described as, ‘this country’s most 
comprehensive, coherent and valuable database of artists that suffered from 
systematic neglect during the Apartheid era.’20 While there has been an exhibition 
of some of the Campbell Smith artworks at the Iziko National Gallery the collection 
remains private and is physically inaccessible to the public.21  
This conflict surrounding private ownership versus public access to cultural heritage 
resources is a worldwide concern. A particularly well-known example of this conflict 
is found in the now famous Republic of Austria v Altmann case concerning the Nazi 
spoliated artwork of the Austrian artist Gustav Klimt.22 The case revolved around six 
artworks which had belonged to the uncle of Maria Altmann, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer. 
The artworks had been given to the Bloch-Bauer family by Klimt himself as the wife 
of Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, Adele, was the subject depicted in the paintings. The 
artworks were seized by a German collector shortly before the outbreak of the 
Second World War, and after the war were in possession of, and on public display 
by, the Belvedere gallery in Vienna (the Austrian national gallery).23 In the court 
case, Maria Altmann successfully claimed the paintings from the Belvedere gallery. 
After the Altmann case was concluded the paintings were returned to the ownership 
of Maria Altmann who then sold them at auction in 2006. One of the artworks titled 
Adele Bloch-Bauer II was bought by TV mogul Oprah Winfrey and was only 
displayed publicly again at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 2014. In 2016, 
 
20  Van Robbroeck http://www.revisions.co.za/ (Date of use: 26 March 2018). Digital reproductions 
of the collection are accessible on this site. 
21  The exhibition resulted in a publication that details the collection and the meaning and impact 
of the collection. Proud Revisions. For an example of a private property owner limiting access 
to street art see Grieg http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2468174/Building-owner-installs-
plexiglass-metal-shutters-security-guard-protect-1-million-Banksy-work-property-Williamsburg-
imposes-viewing-times.html (Date of use: 26 November 2015). Access to many cultural heritage 
sites is also limited because these sites are located on privately owned land; for instance, the 
various archaeological sites that are now part of the Mapungubwe National Park were located 
on privately owned farmland (prior to being incorporated into the national park). Carruthers 2006 
Koedoe 2 and 6. 
22  Republic of Austria v Altmann 541 US 677 (hereinafter referred to as the Altmann case). 
23  See in general Murray 2004 Colum JL and Arts 301. 
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the painting was sold to an unidentified buyer who lent it to the Neue Galerie in New 
York for a Klimt exhibition. However, in 2017 the painting was returned to the private 
purchaser’s possession and is no longer publicly accessible. While there has been 
much controversy regarding the ownership of these paintings and the ethical issues 
surrounding Nazi spoliated art, it is an example of a famous Austrian painter’s work, 
a piece of Austrian and global cultural heritage, which is no longer publicly 
accessible.24 The finding of the court in the Altmann case, whilst legally correct and 
arguably morally correct, has resulted in this situation. Private ownership 
outweighed the importance of this artwork as an example of Austrian culture.25 Like 
the Banksy examples mentioned earlier in the Problem Statement (part 1.4), such 
as Kissing Coppers, Slave Labour, and No Ball Games private ownership of 
artworks can result in the public being prevented from accessing artworks of culture 
heritage.  
Consequently, there is a need to balance private property rights against the public’s 
interest in cultural heritage resources. 
‘[A] property owner should not have the absolute right to destroy a 
community’s heritage, so should a community not have the absolute 
right to permanently preserve all public art without regard to whether it 
constitutes a part of the community’s cultural heritage worthy of 
protection. Indeed, there are inherent problems with forcing a property 
owner to become a permanent curator of art’.26 
The precarity of heritage resources is especially overt for street art.  This includes, 
the lack of recognition for street art and its artists. As well as the criminality  of the 
artform(that it is a public nuisance/vandalism/anti-social behaviour). In addition, the 
location of street art is often accessible or public land,  which may be derelict. Plus, 
 
24  Jayme includes an anecdote about how one Austrian viewed the restitution of art to be a 
permanent public loss. Jayme 2005 Vand J Transnat’l L 942. 
25  For more discussion on balancing the interests of heirs and the public in Nazi spoliated art cases 
see Skinner 2013 Vand J Ent & Tech L 697-702, Thompson 2011 Hastings Comm and Ent L J 
407, The Central Registry of Information on Looted Cultural Property 1933-1945 
http://www.lootedart.com/NFVA1Y581441 (Date of use: 4 April 2018). 
26  Smith 2016 St John’s Law Review 408. 
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the transient nature of street art amongst other aspects all increase the likelihood of 
damage or destruction of the pieces of street art that are culturally significant. Street 
artists are often anonymous, and they exist on the fringes of the art industry, many 
owners would not be aware of the significance of an image located on their property. 
That, graffiti and street art is considered to be a public nuisance and that the art 
form has been viewed from a criminal framework for centuries means that an owner 
is likely to view a street artwork as defacement of their property. Consequently, an 
owner may damage or destroy a culturally significant artwork in the process of 
restoring their property.  
Recognising street artworks that are culturally significant as heritage resources is 
important because of the potential protection that such status can bring. A simple 
declaratory plaque (or blue plaque as is used in Britain) would have prevented 
Gorilla in a Pink Mask from being painted over by the owner. The resources and 
potential protection that cultural heritage resource status can provide for those 
identified pieces of street art such as the remaining works in the Freedom Charter 
Project and the Purple Shall Govern could guarantee the preservation of these 
artworks for South Africans. 
4.2 Limitation of ownership through the NHRA 
Admittedly, where cultural heritage property is concerned, the law already limits 
private rights in property in the public interest.27 The interest of the South African 
community limits the entitlements of the owner of a cultural heritage resource to a 
greater degree than many other forms of property; the private owner has the role of 
responsible steward.28 The general principles for heritage resource management 
require that people (who have power over heritage resources such as owners) must 
 
27  Evans Principles of Environmental and Heritage Law 17. 
28  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 50, Smith 2016 St John’s Law Review 379 and Sax 
1990 Cal L Rev 1554. Sax describes this type of property as, ‘patrimonial property that in some 
respects “belongs” to the nation and to posterity.’ Sax 1990 Cal L Rev 1545. See also Sax 1989-
1990 Mich L Rev 1142. For more on the clash between private owners and the public interest 
see Sax Playing Darts with Rembrandt. Hall Powers and Obligations 73. 
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recognise that heritage resources should be carefully managed in order to ensure 
their survival.29  
The NHRA limits private property rights for property that is declared to be a cultural 
heritage resource in many ways. For instance, first SAHRA is responsible for the 
management of the national estate which includes any sites and objects (if 
amended) which form part of such (grade I and grade II an potentially grade III 
resources), thus when property is declared a cultural heritage resource it 
immediately falls under the management of SAHRA.30 The management of heritage 
resources includes the conservation, presentation and improvement of a resource.31 
Second, no one is allowed to inter alia destroy, damage, deface or alter heritage 
sites, or destroy, damage, disfigure or alter a heritage object without a permit (which 
is issued by SAHRA or the relevant heritage authority).32 Third, a heritage authority 
may regulate the conditions of use and regulate the admission of the public to a 
heritage site.33 Fourth, the NHRA requires that owners or custodians of resources, 
listed in part 2 of the SAHRA register, keep the resource in good condition and 
secure.34 Fifth, an owner or custodian can be issued with a compulsory repair order 
for heritage sites.35 Six, the Minister of Arts and Culture (having consulted with the 
Minister of Finance) can expropriate heritage resources provided the owner is 
compensated for the loss.36 Seventh, the governing heritage resources authority 
can issue a repair order for heritage sites and, with the amendment, heritage 
objects.37 Eighth, the export of cultural heritage objects is limited; an object can only 
be exported when SAHRA has granted a permit to do so, and in the case of heritage 
objects which are of outstanding significance or are especially important to South 
 
29  NHRA s5(1)(a). 
30  NHRA s46(5)(d). 
31  NHRA s(xxiii). 
32  NHRA s27(18) and 32(13). 
33  NHRA s27(19)(b)-(c). 
34  NHRA s32(15) read with s32(7)(a). These resources include objects listed in the inventories of 
public museums, or those displayed or kept in secure conditions and other specific heritage 
objects (although it is unclear what, ‘other specific heritage objects’ are). 
35  NHRA s45. 
36  NHRA s46(1). 
37  NHRA s45. 
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Africa the export of the object may not be allowed.38 Should SAHRA consider the 
object to be so significant because of its association to South African history or 
culture, its aesthetic qualities, or its value in terms of the arts and sciences they can 
refuse to grant a permit and thus, prevent the export of the object. SAHRA may also 
prevent the export of a heritage object should it be of such a degree of national 
importance that its loss would significantly diminish South Africa’s cultural 
heritage.39 The impact of this is that it prevents the owner from accessing the 
international art market and thus diminishes the economic value of the object.40 
Although, SAHRA is required to purchase the object from the owner, the owner 
cannot be prevented from exporting the object and be expected to maintain the 
status quo.41 Finally, there are the penalties implemented for offences and non-
compliance with the NHRA as discussed above.  
While the intention of the NHRA is to preserve and protect South Africa’s heritage 
resources, 
‘[i]n South Africa it is difficult for a heritage authority to require an 
owner adequately to manage property and the legislation instead 
focusses on the requirement that the state set an example in the 
maintenance of its own heritage properties. A large part of section 9 of 
the NHRA deals with the setting of minimum standards for 
maintenance of properties that are owned by Public Works 
Departments.’42 
As such, it may be a good idea for the state to assume ownership of culturally 
significant street art sites in order to set an example for private owners of such 
subsequently identified resources. After all, the SAHRA council must have, ‘among 
them qualifications or special experience or interest in fields relevant to heritage 
resources’.43 These include architecture, history, town and regional planning, 
 
38  NHRA s32(19)-(31). 
39  NHRA s24. 
40  De Clippele and Lambrecht 2015 IJCP 260. 
41  NHRA s32(21)-(31). 
42  Hall Powers and Obligations 73. 
43  NHRA s14(2)(a). 
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archaeology, anthropology, palaeontology, indigenous knowledge systems and 
geology.44 This suggests that SAHRA is better equipped than an ordinary property 
owner (as opposed to an owner who has the resources and knowledge to fulfil the 
requisite duty of care) in understanding the responsibilities of protecting and 
preserving these heritage resources and, thus are better able to fulfil this duty. 
Further, as noted, there is no minimum standards clause for heritage sites. The 
responsibility for the preservation of heritage sites is not placed on a heritage 
authority or the owner, and there are no provisions that require owners to take 
specific action to protect a heritage object. A private owner (who does not follow the 
general principles) can let a heritage resource degrade to such an extent that the 
damage becomes permanent. The owner may do this intentionally or because they 
are negligent in their duty of care or because they simply cannot afford to fulfil the 
responsibility.45 In addition, many people are ignorant of the law regarding cultural 
heritage resources whilst others choose to ignore the law. Moreover, in some 
instances, it is very easy to evade the requirements, and there is a general lack of 
capacity amongst relevant authorities to enforce the law.46. 
Normally, the protection and preservation of heritage resources can be achieved 
through the cooperation of the heritage authority and the owner by agreeing to the 
conditions of the declaration of heritage status. However, in instances where cultural 
resources are only accessible to the owners there is little point to these resources 
being identified as cultural heritage resources. This is also true when SAHRA or the 
relevant heritage authority have been unable to come to an agreement regarding 
the protection and preservation of the resource, or the conditions of the declaration 
are not being fulfilled. In these cases, the intention of the NHRA cannot be fulfilled, 
and thus the utility of these resources as cultural heritage is limited.47 Thus, again, 
 
44  SAHRA http://www.sahra.org.za/about-us/council/ (Date of use: 15 June 2018). 
45  See as an example Henley 
  https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2008/jul/08/heritage.britishidentity (Date of use: 19 
May 2017). Hills and Worthing also touch on this idea in relation to listed buildings. Hills and 
Worthing 2006 Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 203. See also Lesley 2001 SAMAB 
13 and Wilkes 2000-2001 Colum-VLA JL & Arts 178. 
46  Lesley 2001 SAMAB 13. 
47  Wilkes 2000-2001 Colum-VLA JL & Arts 180-181. 
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to protect, preserve and ensure access to cultural heritage resources, it may be 
preferable for these resources to belong to the state or to be in possession of the 
state. After all,  
‘the state is responsible to the population for making qualitative 
judgements about what does and does not constitute cultural 
patrimony as well as for providing widespread access to the works that 
do qualify…’48 
Even if SAHRA unilaterally declares the heritage status of a site or object, this may 
not guarantee the protection and preservation of the resource. An owner will most 
likely disagree with the unilateral declaration and, as discussed, it is unlikely that an 
agreement regarding any conditions for the protection and preservation of the 
resources will be agreed to, post the declaration. Further, in the case of heritage 
sites, it is unlikely that an owner will consent to any work being conducted on the 
site. Plus, expecting private owners to take on the responsibility and cost of ensuring 
the protection and preservation of cultural heritage resources and/or limiting what 
the owner can do with their property, may interfere with their property rights to an 
unfair extent.49 Consequently, the owner may challenge the decision as an unfair 
administrative action and an unjustifiable limitation of their property rights, which 
may warrant a constitutional enquiry. There are situations in which SAHRA and the 
NHRA cannot ensure the protection and preservation of the resource and, state 
ownership may be more appropriate in achieving this goal. 
The failure of a state to use its powers to acquire cultural heritage property can have 
unfortunate results. This is evidenced in the auction of André Breton’s collection of 
surrealist art in Paris to private buyers; wherein the French public’s interest in the 
collection as an example of French culture was superseded by private ownership.50 
It also serves as an example of a state incurring increased costs in order to ensure 
the protection of cultural heritage resources because they failed (or in this case 
 
48  Bivar 2006 IJCP 269. 
49  Holtorf 2007 IJCP 35. 
50  The Code du Patrimonie is the French heritage legislation wherein resources which are declared 
as national treasures are protected. 
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refused because the French government declined to declare the collection as a 
cultural heritage resource) to use state powers to protect cultural heritage resources 
prior to those resources being offered for sale at public auction.  
André Breton was, arguably, the most influential actor in the surrealist movement. 
He died in 1966 leaving a collection of surrealist art which was valued at over £20 
million prior to the auction in 2003. The collection, described as a ‘virtual museum 
of the international surrealist movement’, was located in the 42 rue Fontaine Paris 
apartment that Breton rented (upon his death the rental was taken over by his widow 
and then daughter). The collection included works by Man Ray, Arp and Dali, 
amongst others. Apart from the collection being that of the leader of the Surrealist 
movement, many of the artworks were the work of French artists and artists who 
had worked in France, and also included artefacts of French history, particularly 
French colonialist history.51 The collection was undeniably significant to French 
culture. ‘Breton’s apartment was a work of art in and of itself, whose value lay in its 
unexpected juxtapositions, its ingenious disorder, and its unique spirit … [its] worth 
as a collection far exceeded the sum of its parts’.52  
Despite the importance of the collection as a whole, the individual pieces that 
comprised the collection were put up for sale at private auction. The costs of 
maintaining the collection and keeping the apartment were beyond the means of 
Breton’s heirs, plus the organisation and administrative responsibilities for the 
collection had become too burdensome. Although, there were attempts to keep the 
collection together as well as an anti-sale petition and protests at the auction, all 
were unsuccessful.53 Only the collection from one wall of the apartment was donated 
 
51  Conley 2015 South Central Review 8-9. For more on surrealist collections representation of 
colonialism see Tythacott Surrealism and the Exotic. 
52  DuPuis at quoted in Israël 2012 Art Antiquity and Law 100. See also Bivar 2006 IJCP 265-267. 
53  McMillan 2003 Umbrella 77. Breton was himself against the commercial trade in cultural objects, 
seeing his collection as, ‘an act of rescue from certain neglect and destruction and as a noble 
act of protection of such things from the capitalist market where they would be traded for 
financial advantage only, and not their poetic value’. Conley 2015 South Central review 18. A 
record of Breton’s collection can be found at Association Atelier André Breton 
http://www.andrebreton.fr/en/ (Date of use: 14 February 2018). 
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to the Centre Georges Pompidou where it is preserved and displayed as it was in 
the apartment.54  
Whilst the French government did not opt to protect the collection by declaring it to 
be a national treasure, they did exercise the right of pre-emption to acquire some of 
the artworks sold at the auction to prevent the dispersal of French cultural heritage 
objects. The French right of pre-emption allows the state to ‘pre-book’ any artworks 
sold at auction; once an auction of a lot is concluded, the state replaces (pre-empts) 
the purchaser and pays the amount of the winning bid.55 At the Breton auction, 
artworks sold far above the estimated prices, partly because the French minister of 
culture had announced their interest in the artworks. Although the state is not 
supposed to reveal their interest in an auction (their intention to pre-empt any sales) 
in practice this is unlikely to happen, and consequently their interest in the artworks 
drove up the prices as it confirmed the cultural value of the objects.56 The total 
amount of all the items sold amounted to 50% more than the estimated value of €20 
million. Therefore, the state spent €13 million pre-empting lots that were sold at the 
auction. This was more than double the department’s yearly budget for acquisitions 
(although only €7 million short of the pre-auction valuation). Of the 6 249 lots at the 
sale, the French state acquired 335 items.57 Had the state exercised their right to 
declare the apartment as a national treasure and expropriated the property (thus 
preventing the auction in the first place) the resulting costs may have been less than 
what was spent at the auction because Breton’s heirs had been willing to negotiate 
with the state to keep the collection intact. Alternatively, the state could have 
acquired significantly more items for the same amount they ended up spending.58 
 
54  Bivar 2006 IJCP 266. 
55  Cornu 2006 Art Antiquity and Law 158-159. 
56  Israël 2012 Art Antiquity and Law 92,100. Code du Patrimoine 1921 L123-1. 
57  McMillan 2003 Umbrella 78, Israël 2012 Art Antiquity and Law 100, Bivar 2006 IJCP 260. 
58  Bivar 2006 IJCP 260–263, 274. It should be noted that the state considered the costs of 
maintaining the apartment as a museum to be prohibitive; although it is thought that doing so 
would promote commercial development in the 9th arrondissiment where the apartment was 
located (at 268). The potential for authentic reconstruction of the apartment was also in doubt 
(at 273). The expropriation of property is controlled by the Code de l’expropriation pour cause 
d’utilité publique. 
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Alternatively, had the state negotiated with the heirs, it could have reached an 
agreement on an amount between what was spent and the pre-auction estimate. 
By not declaring Breton’s apartment to be a national treasure or expropriating the 
property, the French state ignored the egalitarian call of cultural property. Instead of 
ensuring that the collection was accessible to all French nationals and the global 
public, the collection has largely become accessible to the rich only because the 
bulk of it is now privately owned.59  
Perhaps learning from this experience, in 2017 the French state declared some lots 
due to be sold at auction to be national treasures; these included the Marquis de 
Sade’s 120 days of Sodom, along with four items of Bretons collection including his 
1924 manuscript of the Surrealist Manifesto. Doing so prevented the items from 
being sold at auction, and the then French Ministry of Culture then committed to 
buying these items at market rates, thus, avoiding the inflated auction prices as it 
occurred at the 2003 Breton auction.60 
Consequently, in order to ensure the protection and preservation of South Africa’s 
cultural heritage resources (in the instances where it is necessary for the state to 
step in) it is necessary to explore when the unilateral limitation on private property 
ownership is acceptable. Further, whether such a limitation can achieve the 
protection of a heritage object and whether it would be more appropriate for the state 
to acquire ownership of heritage resources to ensure their best protection.  
For site-specific street art, it needs to be considered whether the unilateral 
deprivation of property could be an acceptable approach to the protection and 
preservation of the piece. The location of street art is rarely arbitrary, instead 
locations are chosen to suit the work. For instance: a political piece should be 
 
59  Bivar 2006 IJCP 271 and 271. Further as the artworks were not declared to be national 
treasures, they are not subject to trade and export restrictions and thus need not be kept in 
France. Jayme 2005 Vand J Transnat’l L 934. 
60  Stillman February 2018 Rare Book Monthly, Samuel  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/18/france-declares-marquis-de-sades-sex-filled-120-
days-sodom-national/ (Date of use: 20 February 2018), Thomasine 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/18/120-days-de-sodom-made-national-treasure-
by-french-government (Date of use: 20 February 2018). 
175 
 
 
located such that it is visible to many people and the buildings surrounding it (such 
as government buildings) may increase the poignancy of the work.61 Indeed, Young 
considers the site of the artwork to be essential in understanding street artwork in 
that, the location affects the work, the viewing of the work and the intention of the 
artist.62 Consequently, protecting and preserving these artworks in situ is integral to 
preserving the authenticity of the works.  
And as noted above, it is important to consider whether the property should be 
expropriated such that ownership vests in the state and the responsibility for the 
management of such site would fall upon the relevant national, provincial or local 
body.63 For street art objects it needs to be considered whether the unilateral 
deprivation may be acceptable, or if the expropriation of the object would better 
ensure the protection and preservation of the object, and whether such action would 
be justifiable. 
Consequently, this study continues with an exploration of the limitation of property 
rights in heritage resources through deprivation and expropriation.64 
4.3 The constitutional right to property 
In South Africa, private property ownership is protected by s25 of the Constitution, 
but the clause also allows the state to deprive private owners of their property or to 
expropriate such property in specific circumstances. The property clause is a 
combination of the protection of private property rights and the recognition of the 
public’s interest in transforming and reforming the property regime.65 In 1988, 
Didcott J envisioned that the soon-to-be Bill of rights should not, ‘protect private 
property with such zeal that it entrenches privilege’.66 However, ‘[w]hat we can’t do 
 
61  Halsey and Young 2002 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 171 – 172.  
62  Young Street Art 8. 
63  Daly argues that a strategy aimed at protecting graffiti is prone to failure due to the ephemeral 
nature of graffiti. Daly 2012 Planning News 8. This suggests that it may be impractical to attempt 
to protect street art in situ; that to ensure the preservation of the artwork it may have to be 
removed or new methods of protecting street art in situ will have to be explored. 
64  These will be discussed further at The difference between deprivation and expropriation of 
property. 
65  Van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause 8 and 16. 
66  As quoted in Ntsebeza Land Redistribution 118. 
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is to confiscate because by confiscating we shall be depriving certain people of their 
rights as reflected in the Constitution’.67 The property clause thus ensures that, when 
the state does interfere with private property rights, they do so in accordance with 
the law.68  
Section 25 (1) is phrased negatively, as follows: 
‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law of general 
application, and no law may permit, and no law may permit the arbitrary 
deprivation of property.’69 
Such negative phrasing ensures that private property rights are not absolute; the 
clause legitimises the deprivation of property whilst providing that such modification 
must be effected fairly and with due process.70 Further, s25 (2) and (3) state that 
property may be expropriated in terms of a law of general application for a public 
purpose, or in the public interest, and that the expropriation of property must be 
compensated for.71 The inclusion of the expropriation clause in the Constitution is a 
balance between the desire to retain and protect private property ownership and the 
need to transform property (and the ownership of property) in democratic South 
Africa.72  
These clauses make the deprivation of privately-owned cultural heritage resources, 
as well as the transfer of ownership of those resources from private owners to the 
state, a possibility. This would allow the state to acquire possession (but not 
 
67  Ntsebeza Land Redistribution 120 quoting Thomas G form the proceedings of the Land Tribunal 
held in Port Elizabeth in 2003. 
68  Van der Walt and Pienaar Property Law 347. 
69  The Constitution s25(1). 
70  Van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause 18. 
71  The Constitution s25 (2) (albeit that this section may soon be amended). Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa  
https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-approves-process-amend-
section-25-constitution (Date of use 11 April 2019). 
72  Interestingly, the late Prof Van der Walt argued against the inclusion of a property right in the 
constitution because, he felt, doing so would prevent or at least hamper the transformation, ‘to 
a new land law that is characterised by social justice’.72 Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 43. See also 
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 in this regard. Indeed, the protection of private property rights in 
a state with a history of racial disposition risks the entrenchment of past privileges. Claassens 
1993 SAJHR 423, see 424 for an example of such dispossession. 
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ownership) through a deprivation when the private owner is not fulfilling the duty of 
care towards the resource and/or is not willing to provide access to the resource. 
Alternatively, the state could take ownership of the cultural heritage resource 
through expropriation. It would also provide a recourse where the resource is of 
such importance to cultural heritage that state ownership would be more appropriate 
than private ownership, and the private owner has not been willing to part with the 
object.  
The deprivation of property by acquiring possession, or the expropriation of cultural 
heritage resources could be a way of ensuring that South Africa’s cultural heritage 
resources can be accessed by all South Africans and that examples of South 
Africa’s cultural heritage do not remain or become the property of the rich and 
privileged. Considering South Africa’s segregated past and the remaining wealth 
inequality, the role of the Department of Arts and Culture in ensuring that all South 
Africans have access to our cultural heritage is crucial to South Africa’s 
transformation project. 
As was highlighted in the Breton auction, there is the risk of cultural heritage 
resources being sold at auction (or even through private sales) for inflated values. 
Should the state not exercise its right to expropriate cultural heritage resources at 
market value, and the resource is sold at public auction or private sale, the market 
value of the property may increase (more than the rate of inflation). Should a 
heritage authority then wish to acquire the property they will need to spend more 
(taxpayers) money to do so. Thus, the deprivation or expropriation of heritage 
resources could ensure more egalitarian access to these resources and better 
ensure their protection and preservation than the current limitations achieve. 
However, ‘ownership is the strongest and most complete real right one can acquire 
or hold’, and, in South Africa is often treated by the courts as if it is, ‘absolute, 
complete and inviolate in principle’.73 The result of this tendency to give considerable 
weight to private ownership means that any interference with private ownership 
 
73  Van der Walt 2002 Stell LR 405 and 414 respectively, see also 408 and 410, and Van der Walt 
2008 Stell LR 345. 
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needs to be substantially justified. Further, even though s25 is not limited to land, 
much of the jurisprudence on deprivation, expropriation and the need for the 
transformation of South Africa’s property regime concerns land (as opposed to other 
forms of property).74 Thus, the existing jurisprudence on deprivation and 
expropriation needs to be interpreted such that it also applies to movable property.75 
Moreover, the limitation on property rights due to the recognition of cultural heritage 
status has not been scrutinised from the perspective of a constitutional infringement. 
Consequently, investigating the justifiability of such limitation is worthwhile. 
4.4 The difference between deprivation and expropriation of property 
The deprivation of property does not involve the acquisition of property by the state 
(or any other party), rather it restricts the manner in which the property can be used. 
Furthermore, deprivation does not require payment of compensation by the state.76 
Thus, rather than the transfer of property rights, a deprivation is an interference in 
the exercise of another’s property right; it is a limitation on the entitlements of 
ownership.77 Van der Walt describes deprivation of property as the, ‘non-acquisitive 
regulatory controls over the use and exploitation of property’.78  
In contrast, expropriation means that the expropriator (usually the state) acquires 
the property either for its own estate or to transfer to another party.79 In addition, the 
expropriation of property must (currently) be compensated for. In First National Bank 
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 
(2001) Conradie J stated that, ‘[t]he effect of expropriation is to vest ownership (of 
land) in the government.’80 Van der Walt initially disagreed and amended this 
statement by noting that expropriation was not restricted to land, nor was it restricted 
 
74  See for instance Lewis 1992 SAJHR 389. The impending change in the legislation regarding 
expropriation without compensation may change this. 
75  The Constitution s25(4)(b) 
76  Currie and de Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 393. 
77  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 349, Van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause 
102. 
78  Van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause 103. 
79  Currie and de Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 393. 
80  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Service and Another 2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C) 732 (hereinafter referred to as FNB 2001). See 
also Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 350. 
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to ownership (limited real rights and mineral rights may also be expropriated); he 
further suggested that an expropriation need not transfer ownership to the state.81 
However, Van der Walt later recognised that expropriation is only, ‘those 
deprivations that amount to expropriation or forced sale of the property’ and that it 
is, ‘characterised by state acquisition of the property’.82 
In some cases, the line between deprivation and expropriation can be difficult to 
determine; the imposition placed on a property owner by a deprivation may be so 
excessive that it amounts to expropriation, that is the interference with the private 
property owner’s right is such that they cannot exercise any of the entitlements of 
ownership.83 Pienaar and Mostert describe these constructive expropriations as, 
‘actions [that] … effectively destroy the economic viability of the property or a core 
element of the property right, whilst (additionally) affording no direct benefit to the 
authority affecting the imposition on the property.’84 A constructive expropriation 
focuses on the practical effect of the infringement; not on the intention of the 
deprivation.85 The concept of constructive deprivation was discussed in Steinberg v 
South Peninsular Municipality.86 In this case the SCA debated whether deprivations 
which, ‘had gone too far’, should be subject to the requirements of s25(2) for 
expropriations, especially the obligation to compensate the owner of the property.87 
Whilst Cloete AJA recognised that there is a clear distinction between s25(1) and 
25(2), (as put forward in Harksen v Lane) he submitted that there may be a need to 
develop the concept of constructive expropriation in South Africa,  
‘particularly where a public body utilises a regulatory power in a 
manner which, taken in isolation, can be categorised as a deprivation 
 
81  Van der Walt 2001 SAJHR 104. Van der Walt also argues that ownership need transfer to the 
government upon expropriation treating a state department, a minister, the state and 
government as separate entities; or ownership may not invest in anyone (when the effect of the 
expropriation is to destroy the property). See also Pienaar 2015 PER 1480.  
82  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 354. See also Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and 
Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
83  Mostert 2003 SAJHR 569. 
84  Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 657. 
85  Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 657. 
86  Steinberg v South Peninsular Municipality 2001 ZASCA 93 (hereinafter referred to as 
Steinberg).  
87  Steinberg [6]. 
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of property rights and not an expropriation, but which has the effect, 
albeit indirectly, of transferring those rights to the public body…’88 
Despite these obiter dicta, the court in Steinberg v South Peninsular Municipality did 
not venture into interpreting the property rights clause to include constructive 
expropriation.89  
Recognising the concept of constructive expropriations could prove beneficial to the 
property owner by ensuring compensation. Alternatively, it could potentially allow 
courts to declare a deprivation (which amounts to a constructive expropriation) as 
invalid because the limitation is too extensive to be fair.90 
There have been different approaches by the courts in interpreting the requirements 
for a justifiable deprivation or expropriation. The first approach requires a strict 
separation between deprivations and expropriations. With a strict separation an 
infringement is either a deprivation (and need only meet the requirements of a law 
of general application and non-arbitrariness) or an expropriation (and need only 
meet the requirements of public purpose or public interest as well as compensation). 
With the strict separation approach, a deprivation which amounts to a constructive 
expropriation is an unjustifiable limitation. This strictly separated understanding of 
the two clauses was the approach taken in Harksen v Lane.91 In this case, the 
Constitutional Court determined that the difference between a deprivation and an 
expropriation is the duration of the transfer of the property to the state. Where the 
transfer is permanent it is an expropriation, where it is temporary it is a deprivation.92  
However, Van der Walt questions this understanding because it favours the property 
owner; it supports the tradition of protecting property rights and requiring strong 
 
88  Steinberg [8]. 
89  In the Steinberg case the appellant argued that the intention of the respondent to build a road 
across her land (as part of an approved provincial road scheme) amounted to the constructive 
expropriation of the property and that she should be compensated for such (as opposed to not 
being compensated because the road scheme amounted to a deprivation of the property). The 
claim failed on the facts of the case. The court found that the infringements were not significant 
and therefore there was no need to investigate the concept of constructive expropriation. 
90  Mostert 2003 SAJHR 569. 
91  Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as Harksen). 
92  Harksen [36] – [37]. Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 862- 863, Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 136.  
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justifications for an infringement of such and potentially limits the development and 
transformation of property as envisaged in the Constitution.93 Another consequence 
of this strict difference between deprivation and expropriation is that a claimant can 
only bring a case under one or the other; if a claimant argues for unlawful 
expropriation and fails, they have no recourse to a claim for unlawful deprivation 
even if this would have been successful.94  
The second approach to the two clauses views expropriations as a form of 
deprivation i.e. they are read as two parts of the same clause instead of separately. 
This is the approach favoured by Van der Walt, 
‘The simplest solution is to assume that every restriction on property, 
no matter how small or insubstantial, constitutes a deprivation in terms 
of s25(1) and is therefore subject to its requirements.’95 
And, 
‘[a] good idea is to see all state interferences with private property as 
deprivations, and to regard deprivations that place a very unfair burden 
on one person as expropriations.’96 
In the second approach, the deprivation and expropriation clauses interact with each 
other. An expropriation is an extensive deprivation and therefore a de facto 
expropriation must meet the requirements of a law of general application and non-
arbitrariness as well as the public interest/public purpose and compensation 
requirements.  
In First National Bank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services (FNB 
2002) the Constitutional Court discussed expropriation as a form of deprivation, in 
that s25(1) includes all deprivations and expropriations, and as a form of deprivation, 
 
93  Van der Walt 2002 Stell LR 409. 
94  Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 862- 863, Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 136. 
95  Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 80. 
96  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 349. 
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must also satisfy the requirements of this clause.97 Thus, both deprivations and 
expropriations would require that any interference with the rights of the private 
property owner must arise from a law of general application. A law of general 
application cannot be unequal or arbitrary in application, the law cannot be focused 
on individuals instead it must be drafted such that it is, ‘generally applicable, non-
arbitrary, specific and accessible’.98 The court viewed a deprivation that de facto 
amounted to an expropriation to be arbitrary. The deprivation was unjustifiable 
because the infringement affected too many elements of ownership, it was not 
specific enough and therefore arbitrary.99 Further, any benefits that occur from such 
law should affect the general public equally.100 This decision ensures that 
constructive expropriations will (most likely) not succeed because they fail the non-
arbitrariness requirement as required in s25(1) and a court will not consider the 
possibility of the deprivation actually being an expropriation (and the requirements 
for such). 
FNB 2002 is one of a few cases where the interpretation of s25 has concerned forms 
of property other than land. The court in FNB 2002 decided that an enquiry for both 
deprivations and expropriations should start by determining whether the limitation is 
arbitrary; like a deprivation, an expropriation cannot be arbitrary.101 This interactive 
approach to the two clauses was followed by the Land Claims Court in the Nhlabathi 
and Others v Fick case.102 However, this interactive interpretation of the property 
clause does not necessarily conflict with the strict approach taken in Harksen, since 
it is still possible to distinguish between the two clauses by applying the additional 
public purpose and compensation requirements for an expropriation.103 Therefore, 
 
97  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Services and Another: First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 
(7) BCLR 702 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as FNB 2002) [57] – [59]. 
98  Van der Walt The Constitutional Property Clause 106. 
99  FNB 2002 [114]  
100  Currie and de Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law 340, Van der Walt and Pienaar 
Property Law 349. 
101  FNB 2002 [58] – [60]. See also Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 656 – 659 and Van der Walt 
2001 SAJHR 86 – 87. 
102  Nhlabathi and Others v Fick 2003 (7) BCLR 806 (LCC) (hereinafter referred to as Nhlabathi). 
103  Van der Walt 2004 SALJ 867. Although this does not contradict Harksen it does allow a claimant 
to pursue a claim based on both deprivation and expropriation. 
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both deprivations and expropriations are subject to s25(1), that the limitation is in 
terms of a law of general application hence cannot be arbitrary. Only expropriations 
are subject to the requirements of s25(2), a deprivation which is a de facto 
expropriation will fail because it is arbitrary. 
It is submitted that the two-stage approach used in FNB 2002 and Nhlabathi cases 
and supported by Van der Walt is the preferred approach because it is the most 
comprehensive reading of the two clauses requiring that the more extreme 
interference with property rights (expropriation) passes the strictest requirements.  
4.4.1The test for arbitrariness 
In the cases where the heritage authority and the owner cannot reach an agreement 
concerning the declaration of a resource (regarding the automatic limitations that 
NHRA imposes with such status and/or specific conditions) and SAHRA deems the 
resource to be worthy of heritage status, then they may advise the Minister to pursue 
a deprivation or expropriation of the property.104 If the owner of the property believes 
the action to be unfair, they may challenge the deprivation or expropriation in court. 
In addition, if SAHRA has exercised their veto power regarding the property, an 
owner could challenge this as an unjustifiable deprivation or expropriation. 
To determine whether the action taken by either the Minister or SAHRA is an 
arbitrary infringement of property, a court may consider whether ‘there is a lack of 
criteria governing the exercise of a deprivation’, and whether there is an ‘absence 
of a rational connection between the interference with property and its purpose’.105 
In the FNB 2002 case, this meant that deprivation was arbitrary because the law of 
 
104  During the process for declaring heritage status an owner may make representations regarding 
the declaration. NHRA s27(8)(d) and s32(3). The process for enacting an expropriation (from 
notification to the payment for compensation) is set out in s7-s11 of the Expropriation Act. There 
is no specific legislation detailing how a deprivation occurs i.e. when notice must be served, how 
the possession is physically acquired etc. However, the Expropriation Act also refers to, ‘take 
the right to use temporarily’ and thus the process for expropriations could be followed in so far 
as they can be applied to deprivations. 
105  Mostert 2003 SAJHR 586 – 587.  
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general application was procedurally unfair or it did not provide sufficient reason 
(substantive unfairness) for the deprivation.106  
Regarding procedural unfairness, Van der Walt states that if the deprivation occurs 
due to an administrative action, then the fairness of such must be adjudicated in 
terms of the PAJA as this would circumvent the need for a s25(1) enquiry.107 
Whereas, if the deprivation is imposed by legislation, then a s25(1) enquiry is 
required. However, such an enquiry should still use the principle of procedural 
fairness developed in administrative law.108 
Regarding substantive unfairness, the court in FNB 2002 deliberated on what would 
amount to sufficient reason for a deprivation. The court considered: whether the 
means used achieves the purpose (the means-end test), the relationship between 
the purpose of the deprivation and the person whose property is affected, the 
relationship between the purpose and the type of property, and the extent of the 
limitation.109 Further, the depth of this investigation depends on the effect of the 
deprivation on the owner, the more significant the deprivation, the stricter the 
scrutiny.110 The court also stressed that the justification for the purpose of the 
deprivation would need to be especially convincing for land and corporeal movables. 
Since the traditional view of ownership is such a strongly held and enforced 
perspective in South African law, any attempt to limit the property right is going to 
need to provide substantial justification and courts have taken a very conservative 
approach.111 The converse of this is that, it is possible that the justification of a 
deprivation may not be subjected to such scrutiny if the purpose aligns with South 
Africa’s transformation goals such as protecting, promoting, and benefiting minority 
groups or previously disadvantaged groups.112  
 
106  FNB 2002 [100]. See also Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 88. 
107  For a definition of administrative action and the requirements of procedural fairness see PAJA 
s1(i) and s3 respectively). Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 89, 91. 
108  Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 91-93. 
109  FNB 2002 [100]. Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 648, Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 78. 
110  Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 82. 
111  FNB 2002 [100]. Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 648, Van der Walt 2002 Stell LR 409. 
112  Van der Walt 2002 Stell LR 406. 
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‘Depending on such interplay between variable ends and means, the 
nature of the property in question and the extent of its deprivation, 
there may be circumstance where sufficient reason is established by, 
in effect, no more than a mere rational relationship between means 
and ends; in others this might only be established by a proportionality 
analysis closer to that required by s36(1) of the Constitution.’113 
The meaning of arbitrary is not constant and must be examined on a case by case 
basis; some deprivations will only require, ‘‘no more than a mere rational relationship 
between means and ends’, whilst in other circumstances it will call for a full-blown 
proportionality review similar to s36(1) of the Constitution’.114  
Section 36(1) of the Constitution requires that the nature of the right, the importance 
of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the 
relationship between the limitation and the purpose, and whether the purpose could 
be achieved through less restrictive means, all be considered to determine whether 
a limitation of a right is justifiable or not. These factors are very similar to the 
substantive fairness requirements set out in FNB 2002.115 
The outcome of this is that, where a limitation of a property right is extensive, or the 
property is land or corporeal, the non-arbitrariness requirement of s25(1) (which 
includes s36(1)-like considerations) must be satisfied. The limitation of a property 
right is thus a two-part process; the ambit and internal modifiers of s25 are 
considered in a limitation enquiry, and a s36(1)-like analysis is used to test the 
proportionality of the burden.116 This means that the justification for and the 
rationality of the limitation will be assessed and the interests of the two parties 
(property owner and the state) balanced on the basis of the specific requirements 
of s36(1)(a)–(e).117  
 
113  FNB 2002 [100(g)]. 
114  Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 648 quoting Ackermann J FNB 2002 [65]. 
115  FNB 2002 [100]. 
116  Mostert 2003 SAJHR 586. 
117  Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 648. 
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Once a property owner has proved that the infringement is a deprivation, and that 
the deprivation is unconstitutional (due to arbitrariness or for not arising from a law 
of general application), the state may still have recourse to s36(1) to prove that the 
limitation is justifiable.118  
This was the approach followed in the FNB 2002 case wherein Ackermann J noted 
that if the property owner proves that the deprivation is arbitrary, a limitation-like 
enquiry is required to ensure that the deprivation cannot be justified in terms of 
s36(1).119  
‘A limitation analysis can only take place once it has been established 
that there is a constitutionally protected right at stake and that an 
infringement of that right has taken place. In the context of the property 
clause this means that a limitation analysis … can only take place once 
it has been established that a property right had been infringed in 
conflict with the requirements in s25(1) and 25(2).’120  
Roux and Davis point out that this test for arbitrariness conflates s25(1) and (2) with 
s36(1).121 Admittedly, Van der Walt notes that ‘it is difficult to conceive of instances 
where an infringement which falls fouls of s25 will pass the justification test under 
s36.’122 So, it is unclear as to what circumstances would extend to a limitation 
enquiry for a deprivation and expropriation. 
The arbitrariness investigation was also examined in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality, wherein it was stated that 
‘[t]he nature of the relationship between means and ends that must 
exist to satisfy the section 25(1) rationality requirement depends on 
 
118  Van der Walt 2002 Stell LR 411. This part of this process is problematic because it lays the 
burden of proof on the property owner. 
119  FNB 2002 [70]. 
120  Van der Walt 2002 Stell LR 410-411. 
121  Roux and Davis Property 20-8. 
122  Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 78 and the sources quoted therein. Van der Walt notes that this 
remains a concern with the interpretation used in the FNB 2002 case, however, he submits that 
at this point it is the best interpretation available (at 877). See also Van der Walt 2002 Stell LR 
411. 
187 
 
 
the nature of the property and the extent of the deprivation. A mere 
rational connection between means and ends could be sufficient 
reason for a minimal deprivation. However, the greater the extent of 
the deprivation the more compelling the purpose and the closer the 
relationship between means and ends must be’.123 
Further on, Yacoob J summarised the test for arbitrariness, 
‘there would be sufficient reason for the deprivation if the government 
purpose was both legitimate and compelling and if it would, in the 
circumstances, not be unreasonable to expect the owner to take the 
risk of non-payment’.124 
For expropriation, the deprivation requirements must also be met since all 
infringements on property should be viewed as a deprivation, then the requirements 
of s25(2) must be complied with. If the property owner proves that either of these 
requirements have not been satisfied the state can still rely on s36(1) to justify the 
limitation of the property right (although as already pointed out as the non-
arbitrariness requirement includes a proportionality test a s36(1) inquiry is practically 
obsolete for a property right limitation).125  
The requirement of s25(2)(a) that the infringement be for a public purpose or in the 
public interest may also be subsumed in the s25(1) analysis. A law of general 
application that regulates property, inherently is for a public purpose or in the public 
interest.126 As Van der Walt points out, there is a propensity in foreign law to require 
that a deprivation should be for a public purpose or in the public interest. Thus, it is 
unlikely that an expropriation which is not arbitrary would fail a s25(2)(a) analysis. 
 
123  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bisset v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 (1) 
SA 530 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as Mkontwana) [35]. See also Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 87-
89. 
124  Mkontwana [51]. 
125  Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 656. 
126  Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 81. 
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4.4.2 Public purpose and public interest 
None of the cases discussed in this chapter deal with expropriation in depth. For 
instance, the FNB 2002 process determines whether there has been a justifiable 
deprivation but does not expand into the realm of expropriation. Consequently, the 
concepts of public purpose and public interest have not been discussed in significant 
detail in any of the cases. 
Whilst the terms public purpose and public benefit are broad, the Constitution does 
clarify that an expropriation is for a public purpose or for the public benefit where the 
expropriation serves the, ‘nation’s commitment to land reform’, or it is intended to, 
‘bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources’.127 However, 
these categories are not exclusive, and expropriation can still occur for other 
purposes.128 Unfortunately, there is no accepted definition of a public purpose or the 
public interest in South African law.129 The Expropriation Act states that ‘public 
purpose includes any purpose connected with the administration of the provisions 
of any law by an organ of state.’130 In White Rocks Farm v Minister for Community 
Development, public purpose was described as, ‘things whereby the whole 
population or the local public are affected and not only matters pertaining to the 
State or Government’.131 However, other than this (and the few guidelines provided 
in the Constitution) legislation does not make it clear what a public purpose is and 
how this differs to the public interest. 
Slade suggests that public purpose refers to government purposes (such as road 
building or railway building amongst many others) whilst public interest refers to 
 
127  The Constitution s25(4). See also Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 356. Expropriation 
is also governed by the Expropriation Act.  
128  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 356. 
129  Cote and Van Garderen 2011 SAJHR 178. Cote and Van Garderen attempt to explain what the 
public interest is at 178 – 182. However, instead of attempting to define public interest they 
discuss what a public interest action is, who can bring such a case to court, and the factors that 
affect NGO’s in determining whether to take on a public interest case. Badwaza also sets out to 
define what the public interest is but also discusses public interest litigation. Badwaza Public 
interest litigation 6 – 11. See also Kathree 2002 Advocate 32 – 40. 
130  Expropriation Act s1. 
131  White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Community Development 1984 3 SA 785 (N) 793I. 
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purposes that benefit the public.132 He argues that, in the case of expropriation, the 
two terms can be used interchangeably.133 The meaning of public purpose may be 
broad or narrow depending on the circumstances of the case. In the broad sense, a 
public purpose must have a connection to the entire population or to a community. 
With a narrow meaning, public purpose refers to things with which the state is 
concerned. But in both definitions, it can refer to government purposes.134 The term 
is vague.135  
The term public interest is used in a significant number of contexts, and no single 
definition applies in all situations.136 Unfortunately, despite being a constitutional 
requirement for fair expropriation, the Expropriation Act does not define public 
interest. Public interest litigation has covered vast areas of the law, and there does 
not appear to be a limit as to what may fall within the realm of the public interest.137 
Marcus and Budlender highlight that litigation in the public interest issues occurs 
when ‘the assertion of fundamental rights is being used to redress unfairness and 
inequality rather than perpetuate it and that there are countless real people being 
affected on a daily basis.’ 138 Although South African courts have not clearly 
distinguished between public purpose and public interest, it is generally considered 
that the public interest is broader category than a public purpose.139  
Internationally, cultural heritage legislation is a long-established justification for the 
limitation of property rights, i.e. the limitation of property rights for cultural heritage 
 
132  Slade 2014 PER 187. Slade discusses the South African legislative and case history, dealing 
with the differences between public purpose and public interest, to arrive at this conclusion at 
174 – 188. 
133  Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman's Law of Property 567. Van der 
Walt also supports this stance. See Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 462. 
134  Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (4) ALL SA 109 (T) 111. 
135  Rondebosch Municipal Council v Western Province Agricultural Society 1910-1911 (4) Buch AC 
461 (Cape) 467. 
136  Corruption Watch http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/what-constitutes-public-interest-2/ 
(Date of use: 8 December 2015). 
137  See, for example, the range of public interest topics in the article contained in Klaaren, Dugard 
and Handmaker (eds) 2011 SAJHR 1 – 205. See also Marcus and Budlender A Strategic 
Evaluation 8 -15. 
138  Marcus and Budlender A Strategic Evaluation 138. 
139  Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2009 (5) SA 661 (SE). 
Slade 2014 PER 171. 
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purposes is an acceptable limitation because it is for the public benefit.140 Arguably 
the NHRA is enacted to fulfil a public purpose because it aims to protect and 
preserve South Africa’s cultural heritage for current and future generations. 
However, it will remain a judicial responsibility to determine when and if an 
expropriation effected for the purpose of preserving cultural heritage resources is 
for the public benefit or is in the public interest on a case-by-case basis. 
4.4.3 Case law 
As noted, the deprivation (by acquiring possession) or expropriation of cultural 
heritage resources may be a good solution for the Department of Arts and Culture 
in fulfilling their mandate to promote South African arts and culture. As well as 
fulfilling the legislative responsibilities to inter alia develop arts and culture through 
acquiring and maintaining property, to protect national heritage, and to promote 
access to cultural heritage resources.141 Deprivations may be particularly attractive 
to the state considering budget limitations. Through deprivation, the state can 
acquire possession (not ownership) of cultural heritage resources and can do so 
whilst still requiring the owner to cover the costs of maintenance. For instance, a 
deprivation could limit a private property owner’s possession of an artwork by 
requiring that such artwork be kept in a state gallery or museum for protection and 
preservation as well as for presentation. This would be a limitation on the owners 
right to physically control the property, to benefit from or encumber the property and 
could be extended to prevent the transfer of ownership of the property. However, 
the individual still owns the artwork and could still be held responsible for the costs 
of its maintenance. Further, this possession can be viewed as temporary as the 
artwork can be returned to the owner at any time.142  
Thus, from the perspective of Harksen v Lane, the state can acquire possession by 
deprivation (which may practically amount to ownership) without having to incur the 
 
140  Smith 2016 St John’s Law Review 377. 
141  Culture Promotion Act s2(1) (a), read with the Culture Promotion Amendment Act, s1. National 
Heritage Council Act s4(a) and (c). Benson and Prinsloo 2013 SAMAB 36. 
142  This was important in Harksen v Lane where it was viewed that the state did not take away 
property, they merely took temporary control of the property. 
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costs of purchasing or expropriating the artwork or the responsibilities arising from 
ownership.143 
Taking possession of heritage resources through deprivation could go some way to 
circumvent some of the issues with private ownership of heritage resources 
highlighted in the previous chapter. Issues such as preservation, security and 
access can be better managed if the resource is in possession of a relevant heritage 
authority whose purpose is, amongst others, to fulfil these functions. However, 
would such limitation be justifiable deprivations in terms of s25(1) because they 
practically destroy a core element (use) of the property right?144 
Unfortunately, there is no South African case law where an owner has challenged 
the infringement of their property rights over a cultural heritage resource due to the 
NHRA. There is also limited case law where a property right has been infringed by 
the cultural rights. However, the few cases that have balanced the property rights 
against the cultural rights do offer some guidance. 
In the Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town 2002, Oudekraal 
Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town 2004, The City of Cape Town v Oudekraal 
Estates (Pty) Ltd and Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town 2009 
cases a private property owner was significantly affected by a limitation of their 
property rights because of the cultural rights of the Cape Islamic community 
(amongst other reasons).145 The cases revolved around an application to develop a 
township on a portion of the Oudekraal land which had been granted in 1962. In 
1996 the owners submitted civil engineering services plans to the City of Cape Town 
in order to proceed with the development and announced the development of the 
 
143  Harksen [36] – [37]. 
144  Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 657. 
145  Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town 2002 (6) SA 573, Oudekraal Estates (Pty) 
Ltd v The City of Cape Town 2004 (4) SA 222, The City of Cape Town v Oudekraal Estates 
(Pty) Ltd 2007 JOL 20887 (C) and Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town 2009 
ZASCA 85 (hereinafter referred to as Oudekraal 1, Oudekraal 2, Oudekraal 3, and Oudekraal 4 
respectively). See Beukes 2009 IJCP 67 for a detailed discussion of the first 3 cases. The cases 
all revolve around the same facts, and in Oudekraal 4 Navsa JA details the case law leading up 
to his judgement. Consequently, Oudekraal 4 as the final decision provides the main foundation 
for the sources. However, where a judge has dealt with an issue in more detail or stated an 
issue with greater clarity the previous cases will be referred to. 
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township to the media.146 As the site is located in Camps Bay on the Western Cape 
peninsula, there was potential for significant financial gain for the property owners. 
As it stood the land had a value of R20 million but if development of a township on 
the property were allowed the value would have increased to R570 million (this value 
is only the value of the land with development rights, the value of the land after 
subdivision and development would have been significantly more substantial).147 
Public outcry concerning the development led the City of Cape Town to investigate 
the original application, and concluding that the 1962 application had lapsed and 
thus, the development could not begin.148  
Consequently, the owners applied to the Cape High Court for declaratory relief to 
the effect that the original application had been lawfully granted.149 In order to 
support the refusal to proceed with development the City of Cape Town (as first 
respondent) highlighted inter alia that Islamic gravesites and shrines were located 
on the land, and the development of the land would infringe the cultural rights of the 
Cape Islamic community, and, if development was allowed, it could result in the 
destruction of South African cultural heritage resources. SAHRA was the third 
respondent in the cases because of its potential interest in the site (as the site 
included places of cultural significance, historical graves, and sites of importance to 
South Africa’s slave history) despite the site not being a declared heritage site.150 
The property owner countered that the denial of the development rights was an 
extensive limitation of their property rights, was extremely prejudicial, and amounted 
to an expropriation of the property. However, the courts did not consider this 
argument or explore the possibility of expropriation deciding that the case did not 
concern expropriation.151 The owner also suggested a compromise (which 
amounted to a deprivation of the property) in that development would be permitted, 
but the development would have to be suitable and careful so that the cultural sites 
could be protected (and accessed) in situ. The courts did not consider this argument 
 
146  Oudekraal 4 [16]-[18]. 
147  Oudekraal 4 [43] and [61]. 
148  Oudekraal 4 [19]-[21]. 
149  Oudekraal 4 [24]. 
150  Oudekraal 2 [10].  
151  Oudekraal 1 27 and Oudekraal 4 [43] and [68]. 
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to be genuine, thought it was too vague and therefore did not explore the possibility 
of such a compromise.  
To summarise the decisions of the courts, in Oudekraal 1 the property owners’ 
request for declaratory relief was denied due to procedural errors in the original 
development grant.152 In Oudekraal 2 the property owner appealed the previous 
decision but was again denied because the existence of shrines and graves on the 
land was not disclosed in the application for development.153 In Oudekraal 3 the City 
of Cape Town requested an order declaring the original planning permission invalid; 
the court found for the City and granted the order as requested.154 In Oudekraal 4 
(an appeal against the decision in Oudekraal 3) Navsa JA upheld the previous 
judgement agreeing with the reasons for that decision but also noted that the 
decision promoted, ‘the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’155 There were 
other reasons provided by the courts for not allowing the development to proceed, 
such as environmental conservation and further procedural issues.156 
In all four of the Oudekraal cases, the courts paid attention to: 
‘The right to freedom of religion and culture of members of the Muslim 
community, as well as the right of the broader community to have a 
heritage and environmental area of high significance preserved.’157 
Over and above this, in Oudekraal 4 Navsa JA stated that: 
‘It had to be borne in mind that the overwhelming majority of Muslims 
were previously politically, socially and economically disadvantaged 
because of … Apartheid policies … To refuse the order sought would 
be to keep intact an invalid decision, the implementation of which 
 
152  Oudekraal 4 [27]. 
153  Oudekraal 4 [28]-[29]. 
154  Oudekraal 4 [49]. 
155  Oudekraal 4 [82]. 
156  Oudekraal 4 [67]. 
157  Oudekraal 4 [39]. 
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would violate the Muslim community’s fundamental rights and offend 
against present-day conservation principles.’158 
Although the courts in the Oudekraal cases did not expand on the deprivation or 
expropriation of property issue, what is important from the judgements, is that the 
court did limit property rights to fulfil the purpose of the cultural rights. Thus, because 
the NHRA is legislation that embodies the cultural rights, it recognised that the 
protection and preservation of cultural heritage is a justifiable limitation of the 
property right. 
The limitation of a property right due to a cultural belief and practice was again 
discussed in Nhlabathi, and in this case, the court did consider the possibility of the 
limitation being an expropriation.159 The appellants requested a court order 
permitting them to bury a deceased relative, in a family graveyard, on a farm which 
belonged to the respondent because the respondent had refused the appellants’ 
request to continue this practice. Bam P and Gildenhuys J concurred that allowing 
the appellants to bury the deceased on the respondent’s land would deprive the 
landowner of their property.160 The judges noted that the appropriation was brought 
about by a law of general application (in this case s6(2)(dA) of the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act161) and relied on the guidance of the FNB 2002 case to 
determine whether the infringement was arbitrary.162 The court found that the 
infringement was not arbitrary based on: weighing up the right to appropriate a grave 
against the respondent’s property right, the fact that there was an established 
practice of burying the appellant’s family members on the land and that the 
infringement was a minor disturbance to the respondent’s property right. Further, 
the court found that the purpose s6(2)(dA) of the ESTA fulfilled a legitimate 
 
158  Oudekraal 4 [48]. 
159  Nhlabathi [16], [25] and [30]. 
160  Nhlabathi [29]. 
161  Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
162  Nhlabathi [29]–[31]. Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as 
the ESTA). The judges do not use the term deprivation rather they refer to the appropriation of 
the property; it is submitted that the word deprivation would have been more appropriate, and 
that case should be read as if the judges used deprivation instead of appropriation. 
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government purpose.163 The respondent also argued that the infringement 
amounted to an expropriation of his property and that he was entitled to 
compensation as guaranteed in s25(2)(b) of the Constitution.164 The court noted that 
if the implication of a statutory clause was to result in the expropriation of property, 
it could imply that compensation should be paid.165 However, the court concluded 
that, in this case, even if the infringement amounted to an expropriation without 
compensation it would be justifiable. One of the reasons provided to substantiate 
this finding was that the infringement allowed the appellants to comply with a 
religious or cultural belief, and that giving recognition to that belief aligned with the 
constitutional mandate to institute land reform measures.166  
Thus, even if the infringement did amount to expropriation without compensation, 
the infringement of the respondent’s property right was a justifiable limitation. 
Therefore, the Nhlabathi case recognised that a deprivation or expropriation of 
property might be justifiable to allow a person/s to practice and enjoy their cultural 
rights.167 But, as the case also concerned graves, and the infringement was 
considered to be insubstantial, Nhlabathi does not provide much guidance for other 
or different limitations of property rights due to the cultural rights or for the limitation 
of property rights for different types of property.168  
Nhlabathi used the process set out in the FNB 2002 case and provided an example 
of how to apply the FNB 2002 process where culture is a concern. Thus, to 
determine whether the deprivation of a heritage resource by acquiring possession 
or the expropriation of the property is a justifiable limitation of the property right it is 
necessary to follow the enquiry set out in the FNB 2002 case. It is also beneficial to 
use this process to highlight the seriousness of the issues with the NHRA pointed 
out in the previous chapter.  
 
163  Nhlabathi [31]. 
164  Nhlabathi [32]. 
165  Nhlabathi [33], Van der Walt 2008 Stell LR 343. 
166  Nhlabathi [35]. 
167  Nhlabathi [16] and 35[a]. 
168  See Nhlabhati [30]-[33] for the process. 
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4.4.4 Applying the FNB 2002 process to cultural heritage 
resources 
In the first stage of the enquiry, it is patent that the NHRA, as national legislation, is 
a law of general application. Whilst the effect of the act may be the infringement of 
an individual’s property rights (a limitation will affect the individual who owns the 
cultural heritage resource) what is intended is that the statute which allows for the 
limitation be of general application i.e., not the effect. The NHRA does not specify 
individuals or classes of people to be affected by the limitation; rather it applies to 
any member of the public who owns a cultural heritage resource. Thus, an 
infringement of a person’s property right in a cultural heritage resource would pass 
the first stage of a constitutional enquiry – it is a law of general application. 
The second aspect is to determine whether the limitation is arbitrary. This requires 
that there are criteria governing the exercise of the limitation and that there is a 
rational connection between the effect of the limitation and the purpose of the 
limitation. The NHRA sets out criteria governing the exercise of a limitation. The 
types of property that may be identified as cultural heritage resources are detailed 
in s3 and s7. SAHRA and its functions and duties are detailed in s13 and s25, and 
the creation of provincial heritage authorities (who can also implement a limitation) 
and their functions and duties are detailed in s24 and s25. Further, the identification 
and process for declaration for heritage sites is set out in s27 and for heritage 
objects in s32. Thus, the rational criteria requirement of the test is complied with.  
It might be argued that a deprivation for acquiring possession may fail a 
constitutional challenge because there are no specific guidelines for acquiring 
possession of a heritage resource, there is no differentiation between circumstances 
that would require acquiring possession or circumstances that warrant lesser 
infringements (such as maintenance). Though SAHRA is empowered to acquire 
possession, a court may find that there are insufficient criteria governing the 
exercise of this form of deprivation, especially since the use of property is a core 
element of the property right. It is submitted, for the purpose of this investigation, 
that there are sufficient criteria for the acquisition of possession. However, it may be 
worthwhile for the NHRA to provide guidelines as to the circumstances in which 
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acquiring possession is necessary, possibly also the circumstances in which 
expropriation would be the appropriate action. 
The second part of the test for arbitrariness requires a consideration of whether 
there is a rational connection between the limitation of a property right (as envisaged 
in the NHRA) and the purpose of the limitation. For a deprivation or expropriation to 
be fair, to be rationally connected to the purpose of the limitation, it must be 
established that the limitation followed due process (procedural fairness) and that 
the limitation is substantively fair.169 For procedural fairness, the action needs to be 
fair administrative action. The NHRA details the requirements for fair administrative 
action in several different sections. Essentially, provided that the heritage 
association implementing the limitation follows the process set out in s27 (for 
heritage sites) or the process set out in s32 (for heritage objects) as well as the 
requirements of the Expropriation Act then, due process will have been complied 
with. The limitation will be procedurally fair.  
Substantive fairness is more complex. As previously stated, in FNB 2002 the court 
considered: whether the means used (the limitation) achieves the purpose (the 
means-end test), the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the 
person whose property is affected, the relationship between the purpose and the 
type of property, and the extent of the limitation.170 Further, where the limitation is 
extensive these considerations will be strictly scrutinised; is the infringement on the 
property excessive?171 And since the infringement will affect land (heritage sites) or 
corporeal property (heritage objects) the justification for the limitation will have to be 
substantially justified.172 
It is difficult to assess these considerations in general because an investigation may 
differ depending on the type of cultural heritage resource and the type of 
infringement; an infringement caused by a clause of the NHRA regarding heritage 
sites will be different to an infringement caused by those for heritage objects. As 
 
169  Mostert 2003 SAJHR 586 – 587. 
170  FNB 2002 [100]. Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 648, Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 78. 
171  Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 658, Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 82. 
172  FNB 2002 [100]. Pienaar and Mostert 2005 SALJ 648. 
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would an infringement caused by acquiring possession versus the infringements 
caused by the declaration as a heritage resource.  
In a hypothetical enquiry, regarding the means-ends test, the infringements are 
intended to preserve and protect South Africa’s heritage resources as well as to 
allow the public to access these resources, to promote research, education, and 
tourism and so forth.173 The means used ensures the end; the various infringements 
embody the purpose of the NHRA. ‘[I]t may be legitimate for a state to take 
‘measures designed to facilitate in the most effective way wide public access to [the 
works of this artist], in the interest of universal culture.’’174 Both the acquisition of 
possession or, for instance, the requirement to look after and secure a cultural 
heritage resource and expropriation may ensure the protection and preservation of 
the resource for future generations.175 Thus, it appears prima facie that an 
infringement effected in terms of the NHRA is intended to achieve the purpose of 
the Act, and therefore the means are justified by the ends.  
The relationship between the purpose and the owner will be satisfied where the 
person is the owner of a cultural heritage resource.176 The purpose is to ensure that 
the owner preserves and protects the cultural heritage resource belonging to them 
or that the owner of the cultural heritage resource is affected by the limitation(s). 
Consequently, it must be established that the person concerned is the legal owner 
of the property, and then this aspect of the test is satisfied (hence establishing who 
should be the owner of street art in chapter 2 was essential to this process).177 
The relationship between the purpose and the type of property is determined by the 
type of resource. As the purpose of the limitation is to protect and preserve the 
property, the limitation will be easier to justify for a grade I resource which is of 
 
173  NHRA s5(5). 
174  de Clippele and Lambrecht 2015 IJCP 272 quoting Beyeler v Italy 2001 (33) EHRR 52 [113]. 
175  de Clippele and Lambrecht 2015 IJCP 271-272. In the European Court of Human Rights the  
purpose of the limitation of private property rights over cultural heritage resources is assumed 
to be legitimate and the owner must prove that the limitation is unjustifiable 
176  A custodian of the property could also be affected; however, this study is concerned with the 
effect on private owners. 
177  See part 2.2. 
199 
 
 
national importance. An equal or more substantial justification would have to be 
presented for grade II and III resources; as these resources are of provincial or local 
significance, a court may require more evidence proving the need of the limitation 
(justifying the interference in the property rights) as to resources of national 
significance.178  
The investigation into the extent of the limitation also depends on the type of 
infringement. The power to physically control, and to use and benefit from the 
property may be affected, if access to the resource is limited or if the resource is 
removed from the owner’s possession and/or because the owner may not do what 
they wish with the property because they are burdened with the duty to preserve 
and protect the property. And the extent of the limitation is total where an 
expropriation is pursued.  
The responsibility placed on the owner to preserve, protect and secure a resource 
may be minimal or especially burdensome. For example, the responsibility to 
preserve an artwork (a heritage object) may be a substantial responsibility, requiring 
a temperature-controlled environment and so forth. The maintenance of the artwork 
may also be burdensome and, depending on the qualities of the artwork, it may 
require considerable security. Indeed, the responsibility on a homeowner to maintain 
a heritage house (a heritage site) can be significantly onerous, requiring 
maintenance by service providers knowledgeable and skilled in the craftsmanship 
of the particular period in which the house was built. However, the responsibility of 
an owner to not paint over a street artwork is not onerous. The ability to encumber 
or alienate the property may also be affected. For instance, s32(13) of the NHRA 
prevents an owner from dispersing a grade II collection without a permit issued by 
SAHRA. Section 32(14) allows SAHRA to make regulations concerning the trade in 
heritage objects. Likewise, s32(19) prevents the export of heritage objects without 
a permit to do so. The acquisition of possession could be interpreted to be an 
excessive limitation and require substantial justification, as will the justification for 
expropriation. Consequently, the extent of the limitation needs to be assessed on a 
 
178 Refer to the discussion on grade of cultural heritage resources in 3.1. 
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case-by-case basis. Thus, it would depend on the type of resource and the form of 
the limitation as to whether the extent of the limitation is justifiable. 
However, the problems with the NHRA highlighted in the chapter 3 may mean that 
a deprivation may fail the substantive fairness enquiry. An owner may present some 
of the problems highlighted to a court as a reason for why the deprivation or 
expropriation is not fair. For instance, an owner of a heritage object could challenge 
the infringement because their property is not covered by the NHRA. This argument 
would rely on the confusion regarding whether or not heritage objects fall under the 
management of SAHRA; if SAHRA is not responsible for the management of 
heritage objects, it is debatable whether they can perform any action regarding such. 
Admittedly, this may be viewed as a highly restrictive reading of the NHRA. 
However, an owner may also suggest that the confusion regarding management as 
well as the inconsistencies in the definitions could be interpreted to be insufficient 
criteria governing the exercise of the limitation. A private property owner challenging 
the deprivation of their property could argue that their property is not covered by the 
act because it is not included in the definitions or because it does not fall under the 
management of SAHRA.  
Further, the power to declare a site or object to be a heritage resource without the 
consent of the owner may also suggest a lack of governing criteria. Indeed, in the 
case of heritage objects, SAHRA is not even required to provide the owner with the 
opportunity to make representations regarding the declaration. The NHRA only 
states that SAHRA may provide the owner with the opportunity to make submissions 
and emphasises that there is no obligation for SAHRA to do so in urgent 
situations.179 What qualifies as an urgent situation is not defined, and thus a property 
owner could argue that there are not sufficient criteria governing the limitation for it 
to be justifiable. Further, this issue may also mean that the limitations caused by 
such unilateral declaration would be arbitrary because this power is too extensive. 
 
179  NHRA s32(3). 
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If the deprivation is to allow for the presentation of a resource, this may also be 
arbitrary because empowering SAHRA to use ‘any means necessary’ to ensure the 
effective presentation of a resource may be too extensive and/or not specific 
enough.180 What does ‘any means necessary’ include? Could SAHRA interpret this 
clause to include the use of force? And when is it appropriate to use ‘any means 
necessary’?  
There is confusion about which resources are covered by ‘management’ and a lack 
of clarity as to what ‘management’ means. In addition to this confusion, the 
extensive powers of heritage authorities to interfere with a heritage resource may 
mean that the limitation of a property right over a cultural heritage resource may be 
found to be substantively unfair and arbitrary.  
This finding is extremely problematic as it renders significant portions of the NHRA 
ineffective, if not the entire purpose of the Act. Thus, for SAHRA to ensure the 
protection and preservation of cultural heritage resources, particularly cultural 
heritage objects, these resources either need to be protected by the conclusion of 
a heritage agreement or the legislation needs to be amended as per the 
recommendations included herein.181 
The NHRA does allow expropriation of cultural heritage resources for a public 
purpose or in the public interest and notes that the Expropriation Act applies to 
expropriations under the NHRA.182 Section 46 is not strictly necessary because 
expropriations are covered by s25 of the Constitution as well as the Expropriation 
Act. Essentially, the section is re-enforcing that cultural heritage resources fall within 
the forms of property that can be expropriated. However, even with the inclusion of 
the expropriation section, a limitation of a person’s property rights of a cultural 
heritage resource (in the form of an expropriation) may still fail for the same reasons 
as a deprivation. The inclusion of the section on expropriation does not supersede 
the constitutional requirements for a justifiable expropriation. 
 
180  NHRA s44(1)(e). 
181  See part 3.3.5.10. 
182  NHRA s46(1)-(2). 
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Therefore, unless changes are made to the NHRA, the limitation of property rights 
caused by the declaration of property as a cultural heritage resource may fail 
because the declaration is an unjustifiable limitation on the grounds of substantive 
unfairness. 
4.5  A National Arts Council Act intervention 
The National Arts Council (NAC) is empowered to,  
‘purchase or otherwise acquire, or possess, … or otherwise, encumber 
movable and with the approval of the Minister, granted with the 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance, immovable property’.183  
This clause is much simpler than those in the NHRA because there are no 
contradicting definitions.184  
The clause provides the NAC with the authority to deprive (included within, 
‘encumber’) and to expropriate (included within, ‘otherwise acquire’) property. 
Further, whilst the National Arts Council Act does not delineate the types of property 
this may include, it could include cultural heritage resources which are art, or which 
promote the arts and so forth. This would likely include many cultural heritage 
objects as they are often artistic expressions of culture such as inter alia paintings, 
pottery and beadwork. It can also be extended to immovable property (heritage 
sites) that falls within the realm of art, such as sites containing rock art or sites 
displaying street art.185  
The National Arts Council Act does not set out any guidelines on what types of 
property fall within the ambit of the clause, nor does it provide any processes or 
criteria as to how the property should be encumbered or otherwise acquired. Nor 
has the Department of Arts and Culture issued any regulations or guidelines in this 
regard. The NAC may rely on the Expropriation Act in order to acquire property, but 
 
183  Arts Council Act s6(n). 
184  Indeed, there are no definitions provided for the words used in this clause in the National Arts 
Council Act 
185  There are also many heritage resources that could not be included such as national parks, 
botanical gardens or objects like historical mining machinery.  
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it would be beneficial for the NAC to provide criteria governing the exercise of a 
deprivation or expropriation.186 
These regulations would be similar to those of the NHRA such that the specific 
instances when private property rights may be limited are delineated, the 
appropriate limitation for the purpose is set out, and there is a system of due process 
to be followed in order to effect the limitation. This will ensure that a limitation of 
private property rights caused by the National Arts Council Act will not fail the 
constitutional enquiry. Thus, should the Department of Arts and Culture / the NAC 
produce regulations for the limitation of property as enabled by s6(1)(n) of the 
National Arts Council Act, there remains the possibility that certain types of cultural 
heritage resources, including examples of street art, could be protected and 
preserved. 
Indeed, the National Arts Council Act is, perhaps, the more appropriate legislation 
for the management of significant street art pieces because it is a form of art. And, 
the Act with the regulations may also provide a route for the protection and 
preservation of street art which does not qualify as a cultural heritage resource, but 
the NAC still deems worthy of protection. It could offer a first, or backup solution for 
the protection and preservation of selected pieces of street art through deprivation 
or expropriation. 
4.6 Limiting property rights for street art through national legislation 
Provided that the recommended amendments are made to the NHRA and 
regulations are published to this effect, and/or regulations for the limitation of 
property in terms of the authority of the NAC, are produced then there is potential 
for the protection of street art through the limitation of property rights using either 
piece of legislation. However, there may still be occurrences where the resource 
authority and the owner have not managed to come to terms, and the heritage 
authority may have to supersede the owner. This will be achieved either by using 
 
186  FNB 2002 [100], Mostert 2003 SAJHR 586 – 587.  
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their veto-like authority enforcing the deprivation of the property or by pursuing the 
expropriation of the property.  
Having discussed that there are potential street artworks that should be considered 
as cultural heritage resources (or which are forms of art worthy of protection in the 
case of the National Arts Council Act) it can now be considered whether the 
limitation of the property rights in such artworks is a justifiable deprivation.187 
Further, whether the expropriation of such property is a possibility, and, if so, is the 
owner compensated for the loss of their property? In other words, if the owner of the 
property disagrees with the enforced deprivation or the expropriation of their 
property, they can challenge the action in court. 
4.6.1 Cultural heritage sites 
For the purpose of this investigation, Shepard Fairey’s piece The Purple Shall 
Govern will be considered as a cultural heritage site.  
The artwork The Purple Shall Govern is located on the north external wall of a high-
rise building in Braamfontein, Johannesburg. Thus, the potential heritage site is a 
building (because the artwork accedes to the building).188 The Braamfontein area 
has been subject to considerable development over the past two decades, and as 
a growing business hub, there will most likely be further development.189 The 
artwork is visible from the road and could be accessible to anyone with access to 
the building or with access to some of the surrounding buildings. As such, it is at risk 
of defacement, and, due to exposure, deterioration. It may also be at risk of 
destruction should the property owner decide to develop the property further or alter 
the property (such as putting in windows on that wall). This artwork has cultural 
significance, and, as previously argued, should be preserved by being declared as 
 
187  This investigation will be based on an application made in terms of a hypothetical amended 
NHRA or the Arts Council Act. 
188  This is important to clarify because, with the accession of the artwork to the building it is the  
building which is the heritage site. 
189  Johannesburg Development Agency “Braamfontein”  
https://www.jda.org.za/braamfontein/ (Date of use: 14 June 2019)). 
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a cultural heritage site to avert these risks. But would doing so be a justifiable 
limitation on the owner? 
Again, following the process set out in FNB 2002, the owner must first prove that 
their right has been infringed. This may be proved through a notice of declaration of 
heritage status or through a notice of expropriation or the listing of a site in a heritage 
register.  
As previously noted, the identification of a site as cultural heritage resource is 
governed by the NHRA which is a law of general application. It is not unusual for 
buildings to be cultural heritage resources. There are various reasons why a building 
may be declared as a heritage site: the style of architecture, the notability of the 
architect, the age of the building and so forth and in this case the building is identified 
as a cultural heritage site because it displays a significant piece of street art.190  
In the situation where SAHRA has unilaterally declared the property to be a heritage 
site (a deprivation), the court should consider the form of the limitation. For instance, 
the infringement may limit the owner’s entitlement to use the property, and/or the 
authority to alienate the property. Therefore, in this instance, ownership could be 
limited by amending the title deed such that the north wall of the property cannot be 
changed. Alternatively, the entitlement to use the property could be interfered with 
by requiring the owner to secure the artwork by ensuring that the artwork is not 
easily accessed by the public (so that the artwork cannot be damaged or defaced). 
Otherwise, the owner could be required to protect the artwork by maintaining the 
existing protective varnish and/or covering the image in Perspex (thus reducing the 
risk of defacement and reducing deterioration due to exposure). As suggested, in 
part 3.3.5.10 SAHRA could be restricted in relation to the limitations they can 
enforce in these situations, including a financial limit to the costs that the owner can 
be held responsible for, thus limiting the extent of the infringement. Further, when 
using the veto-like authority, SAHRA should present the owner with the conditions 
 
190  See part 3.6. 
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for the maintenance of the resource. This could ensure that there are criteria 
governing the unilateral authority of SAHRA. 
Thus, the limitation will be enacted by a law of general application. Further, there 
are criteria governing the exercise of the application (which will become more 
detailed if the recommendations are implemented). Additionally, provided all the 
steps required by s27 have been complied with (i.e. followed the criteria for declaring 
heritage status) then limitation will not be arbitrary due to procedural unfairness 
provided due process is followed. What remains is the substantive fairness enquiry. 
First, will the limitation achieve the purpose; the preservation and protection of the 
site? The limitations requiring the owner to secure the artwork and protect it will 
achieve the purpose, as will an expropriation of the property. Both ensure that the 
artwork is protected and preserved since there is a clear relationship between the 
means and the ends.  
The purpose of the limitation affects the owner of the property which is correct; there 
is a direct relationship between the purpose and the owner. It may be argued that 
because the building is used as office apace, there is also an indirect relationship 
between the purpose of the limitation and the occupiers. However, the 
considerations set out in FNB 2002 specifically state, ‘the relationship between the 
purpose and the person whose property is effected’.191 This wording suggests that 
the judges intended for the person affected to be the owner because it is not the 
property of an occupier which is affected since they do not own the property. 
Therefore, their property is not affected.192  
 
191  FNB 2002 [100]. 
192  The limitation may also affect the owners of the buildings surrounding this site. They may also 
be affected if they are unable to develop their properties because such development would 
impede the view or would physically impact on the artwork. However, these considerations 
would have to be noted in the request for planning permission to develop the buildings and the 
owner of the artwork and/or the heritage authority may object to the development or suggest 
work arounds that will not impact the artwork. 
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There is a clear relationship between the purpose and the type of property. If the 
property has been identified as a potential cultural heritage site or is a significant 
artwork, then it is the type of property that the limitation was designed for. 
The extent of the limitation is more concerning. The limitation may have an extensive 
effect on the owner especially, if the owner intends to develop the property. As 
previously recommended, the regulations need to include the stated interventions 
that are required to be fulfilled by the owner and the financial limit to which the owner 
can be held responsible. In the case of The Purple Shall Govern artwork, the 
limitations would mean that development cannot affect one wall of the building 
which, depending on the type of development, may have a marginal or significant 
effect. Thus, if the owner intends to develop the property, the court would have to 
look at the scope of the potential development and how extensively the deprivation 
limitations would affect those plans. If the limitation extends to amending the title 
deed to the property, then the limitation could be viewed as extensive. As noted in 
the case of Harksen, a deprivation is intended to be temporary whereas amending 
the title deeds is permanent. However, amending the title deed would not amount 
to such a significant limitation that the deprivation would amount to an expropriation. 
Implementing the recommendations on including specific forms of interventions and 
limiting the costs an owner can incur, could go some way to ensuring that a 
deprivation of the cultural heritage resource is not unfairly extensive.  
Alternatively, if SAHRA is pursuing an expropriation, the effect of the limitation is 
total. The court would have to consider whether the expropriation is a necessary 
limitation of the property right and whether the purpose could have been achieved 
through less invasive means. There is no single solution in these types of cases. In 
any event, it is debatable whether expropriation is the appropriate method for 
protecting street art attached to immovable property. The sheer scale of some 
works, such as The Purple Shall Govern, and the fact that these works accede to 
the building, would probably make the expropriation an impossibility for the state as 
it would be too costly to acquire ownership. Further, expropriation of these large-
scale artworks may not ensure their protection and preservation any more than the 
deprivation limitations would. This is because the state would only be able to protect 
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the artwork to the same degree as an owner. Due to the size of these pieces, there 
are limited methods available of protecting and preserving them; it may be 
impossible to remove largescale street artworks without damaging them. Plus, the 
site-specific nature of many of these artworks would make removal questionable, 
the artwork may lose significant meaning if it was displayed in a different context. 
Therefore, in these cases, it is likely that an expropriation would be an unjustifiable 
limitation because there are less invasive means (via deprivation) to achieve the 
purpose.  
Thus, the deprivation of these forms of cultural heritage resources is more 
appropriate, and this comes with the added benefit of the state not having to 
compensate the owner although the owner may apply to SAHRA for funds to pursue 
maintenance work.193 
There are, of course, examples of street art where it cannot be preserved in its 
original location, or where the street art is not site-specific, and where it is possible 
to remove the artwork without damage. In these cases, it may be preferable to 
remove the artwork to protect and preserve the work better. The artwork could then 
be included in the National Gallery Collection (or any other state-owned collection 
as a heritage object). Here, the deprivation would involve removal of a portion of the 
wall which will probably have a significant impact on the owner both temporarily 
affecting the owner’s use of the property and affecting the owner financially if 
SAHRA does not take on the cost.194 Therefore, it is important to have guidelines 
about the form that a limitation can take and limit the financial responsibility of the 
owner. If there is no monetary ceiling, it is impossible to determine whether the 
deprivation would be excessive. 
With the accession of The Purple Shall Govern artwork, the building has become a 
representation of the cultural rights, it has become a cultural heritage site reflecting 
 
193  NHRA s32(18) for funding for heritage objects.  
194  It is noted that the fact that a street artwork can be removed does not affect the finding in part 
2.2.2 that the artwork accedes to the building. With the accession of movables to immovables 
the manner and degree of attachment should be permanent. However, this does not mean that 
the accessory thing cannot be removed, just that the removal will cause damage. Van der Walt 
and Pienaar Property Law 120. See also Standard Vacuum 677E-679E. 
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a significant piece of South African art. This public art has become connected to the 
Braamfontein community’s identity as well as South Africa’s identity, and this loss 
would be a loss of heritage. The purpose of the deprivation limitations (which protect 
and preserve the artwork in situ) outweigh the concerns regarding the effect of the 
deprivation on the owner. Plus, whilst the identification of the building as a cultural 
heritage site and the limitations that come with that identification may be 
burdensome on the property owner, the identification of the artwork as a cultural 
heritage resource could potentially add financial value to the property. Thus, it could 
benefit the property owner should they sell the property. Consequently, it is 
submitted that should SAHRA have to act unilaterally to declare the heritage status 
of this site on which The Purple Shall Govern is located, the deprivation that comes 
with such identification is not arbitrary and therefore, the declaration of the building 
to be a cultural heritage site and the imposition of conditions regarding the protection 
and preservation of the site are a justifiable deprivation of the owner’s property. 
4.6.2 Cultural heritage objects 
It is difficult to identify a specific South African piece of street art which qualifies as 
a cultural heritage object. There are currently no examples similar to Banksy’s 
Gangsta Rat (1).195 Whilst Faith47 has created some works that would qualify as 
movable property, such as work painted scrap metal, plywood, and unused concrete 
drainage pipes. However, these pieces may not be culturally significant. Plus, it is 
unknown which, if any, of these pieces, still exist. 
However, considering the argument made in favour of street art heritage sites, it is 
likely that the deprivation of such resources would offer avenues for the protection 
and preservation of street art objects. Therefore, if amended the NHRA’s unilateral 
declaration of identified street artworks located on movable property as cultural 
heritage objects could create justifiable limitations on the private property rights over 
such object. It would be a justifiable limitation provided that the correct processes 
are followed. Namely, that the form of the limitation is specified, that the limitation 
 
195 See discussion of this artwork at 2.2.3. 
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may ensure the protection and preservation of the object (the purpose) and that the 
limitation is not excessive (the purpose cannot be achieved by lesser means) or 
where it is excessive it is necessarily so. This could extend to removing the object 
from the possession of the owner to the possession of a heritage authority so that it 
may be better protected and/or displayed to the public. 
There is perhaps more scope for expropriation to apply to cultural heritage street art 
objects than deprivation. Especially in instances where the deprivations limit the 
owner’s right to use and enjoy the property, and when their possession of the 
property has been affected. In this event, the possibility of expropriation and the 
payment of compensation could be explored. And, in the cases where the 
expropriation of the object is necessary to ensure the preservation and protection of 
the resource (and this cannot be achieved through lesser interference) and where 
the nature of the resource is extremely significant to cultural heritage then an 
expropriation is likely to be justifiable. 
Admittedly, calculating the amount of compensation that would be appropriate in the 
case of heritage objects is difficult. The Constitution requires that the current use of 
the property, the history of the acquisition and use of the property, the market value 
of the property, state investment and/or subsidies applied to the property and the 
purpose of the expropriation be considered when calculating compensation.196 The 
existing jurisprudence on compensation for expropriation does not provide much 
guidance because the cases concern compensation for land expropriation. 
Therefore, determining the amount of compensation for a heritage object will have 
to draw on this jurisprudence and develop it.197 
The state uses a variation of the Gildenhuys formula to determine compensation for 
the expropriation of land.198 The Gildenhuys formula considers the market value of 
the property and takes into account any past state subsidies or investments.199 The 
 
196  The Constitution s25(3). 
197  It should be noted that compensation can be calculated before or after the expropriation has 
taken place. Haffejee NO and others v eThekwini Municipality and others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC), 
Boggenpoel 2012 SALJ 620. 
198  Department of Land Affairs Policies and Procedures at 1.7.1.1. 
199  Department of Land Affairs Policies and Procedures at 1.7.1.1.1. 
211 
 
 
variation used by the state starts with the current market value of the property but 
adjusts that value by deducting the increase in value due to inflation of the value of 
the property from the time of acquisition.200 Then, further deductions are made due 
to historical infrastructure and interest rate subsidies and the corresponding inflation 
for these subsidies.201  
For these reasons this calculation needs to be adapted for the expropriation of 
cultural heritage objects using the guidelines set out in s25(3) of the Constitution. 
First, an independent assessor knowledgeable in street art would need to determine 
the current market value of the artwork. Then the current use of the property (which 
considers the extent of development of the property) will be considered. In the case 
of land which is underutilised the amount of compensation will likely be lower than 
productive land.202 Although it is unlikely that heritage sites will be expropriated, for 
heritage objects, this suggests that an object which is not used by the private owner 
(for instance art that is not displayed but rather kept in storage) or is owned with the 
intention to sell at a profit (due to the potential increase of, say, an artist’s desirability 
or popularity resulting in increased value) will be compensated, upon expropriation, 
for less than an object that is used and enjoyed and is owned for its intrinsic qualities. 
How the property was acquired may also be taken into consideration. In the case of 
land, the fact that the land may have been acquired during colonial or Apartheid rule 
to the detriment of black South Africans who were disposed of that land, could result 
in lower compensation.203 Regarding heritage objects, there may be, for example, 
tribal artefacts that were acquired by colonialists, some simply stolen or looted and 
others acquired at a price far below the actual value.204 In the case of street art 
 
200  This value is calculated by comparing the market value of the property at the time of acquisition 
and the actual price paid at that time 
201  For an example of this formula in practice see Department of Land Affairs Policies and 
Procedures at 1.7.1.1.1. This formula is also included in the Expropriation Bill. 
202  Zimmerman 2005 SALJ 408, Badenhorst 199 De Jure 261. 
203  Zimmerman 2005 SALJ 408 – 409. As the transition from the Apartheid government to a 
democratic one approached many state-owned resources were transferred from state 
ownership to private white owners, thus becoming the private property of the privileged. 
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 408. 
204  This is not just a South African issue or a national issue for countries. For instance, the British 
Museum knowingly possesses many artefacts which were looted from other countries. The 
British Museum possesses over 6 000 South African artefacts, and whilst the circumstances 
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heritage objects the acquisition of ownership will be considered, i.e. did the current 
owner acquire ownership through the common law of original acquisition or did the 
current owner acquire the property from a previous legal owner. If the provenance 
of the object cannot be traced, then the amount of compensation is likely to be lower. 
Thus, it is likely that compensation for the expropriation of culturally significant street 
artworks painted on movable property will be lower because the owner did not 
intentionally acquire the property they were just lucky enough to have the right street 
artist paint their property which made it a heritage resource. 
The amount of compensation may also be affected by the number of state subsidies 
and state investment in the property. For land, this is a concern, but it is probably 
less of a concern for heritage objects other than where the state has provided 
funding for maintenance and repair work.205 
Then the purpose of the expropriation is considered. If, on balance, the public 
interest or public purpose of the expropriation is significant this may result in less 
compensation.206 Further, the resources the state has available to effect 
transformation regarding property may also be considered. If the state's resources 
are limited then the amount available for compensation will be limited. For land, the 
lack of resources cannot impede the state’s responsibility for land reform, and thus 
the amount of compensation paid will be influenced by the state's resources.207 
Consequently the Department of Arts and Culture’s budget and the amount reserved 
for acquisitions will be a consideration in determining the amount of compensation 
for heritage objects. 
 
surrounding the acquisition of these artefacts are unknown it is not impossible that some of 
these artefacts were acquired dubiously. See for example Her Majesty’s Attorney-General v The 
Trustees of the British Museum [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1089 (Eng). See for instance Reppas 2007-
2008 Denv.J.Int’lL&Pol’y 93.  
205  Zimmerman 2005 SALJ 409. 
206  See discussion in part 3.6. 
207  Zimmerman 2005 SALJ 410. 
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Thus, the variation of the Gildenhuys formula would need to be developed to 
calculate the amount of compensation payable for the expropriation of cultural 
heritage objects. 
4.7 Summary 
In the instances where SAHRA and an owner cannot agree to terms concerning the 
declaration of a heritage resource and SAHRA proceeds with the declaration, this 
results in the deprivation of an owner’s property. In other cases where state 
ownership of a resource would best ensure the protection and preservation of the 
resource then SAHRA can pursue the expropriation of the property. There is 
potential with the recommended amendments to the NHRA and the publication of 
guidelines that the deprivation/expropriation could be justifiable should an owner 
challenge these interferences with their property right. 
However, it is unlikely that expropriations of heritage sites will be practicable. 
Further, if the protection and preservation of the resource can be achieved through 
lesser means (deprivation), then the expropriation of the res will be unjustified. 
Consequently, SAHRA should pursue the deprivation of heritage sites (through the 
unilateral declaration of the status) particularly in instances when an agreement with 
the owner cannot be reached. 
For heritage objects, both deprivation and expropriation offer potential routes to 
protecting and preserving these resources. Whilst deprivation is less of an 
interference with an owner’s property rights, in the situations where the resource is 
at serious risk of loss or destruction, then the expropriation of the street art is a more 
appropriate strategy for the state to ensure the protection and preservation of the 
piece. 
 
214 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
This study was inspired by the artwork of Banksy and the conflict between the 
private owners of the property upon which his artworks are situated and the public 
who have an interest in preserving the artworks as public art. Several of Banksy’s 
artworks have been at the centre of this conflict. In the cases of Spy Booth, Mobile 
Lovers, Slave Labour, Kissing Coppers, No Ball Games, The Raft of Medusa, and 
Gangsta Rat (2) amongst others, the public has lost these artworks. The artworks 
have either been defaced, or destroyed by the owners of the property on which they 
were situated, or they have been sold to private collectors and are no longer publicly 
visible. Several of these artworks were part of British culture and yet they are no 
longer accessible by the British public.  
The public’s loss of these artworks as well as others that have been destroyed (such 
as Little Diver and Gorilla in a Pink Mask) may have been prevented if the relevant 
cultural heritage authority had recognised the cultural significance of the artworks 
and taken steps to protect and preserve the artwork. 
The loss of these British artworks highlights the potential threats that could face 
South African street art especially those which have cultural significance. The study 
has focussed on the remaining works in Faith47’s Freedom Charter Project (such 
as The People Shall Govern and The People Shall Share in the Country’s Wealth) 
and the Shepard Fairey piece The Purple Shall Govern which are at risk of damage, 
defacement and destruction.  
Faith47’s Freedom Charter project is an artistic expression of the anti-Apartheid 
movement. It is a commemoration of the Freedom Charter itself, it is a testimonial 
of the South African Congress Alliance1 and the history of the attending parties and 
it is a memento of the 1955 Congress of the People where the Charter was adopted. 
Further, it is a memorial to the South African anti-Apartheid icons such as Nelson 
Mandela, Ruth First and ZK Mathews. Her artwork has become an artistic 
 
1  Consisting of the African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the South 
African Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People’s Congress. 
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expression of South Africa’s post-1994 democracy; it is a reminder of the ideals we 
seek to achieve, and of the values of our constitutional state. It is also the personal 
expression of one South African artist's beliefs, which represents the beliefs of many 
South Africans.  
The existing artworks from this project need to be preserved as part of South Africa’s 
cultural heritage resources to ensure the continuation of this egalitarian expression 
of this cultural heritage. To protect the artwork for future generations, for whom 
South Africa’s Apartheid history may not be as poignant as it is now. 
Shepard Fairey’s The Purple Shall Govern also speaks to these expressions of 
South Africa’s cultural heritage. However, it also holds international value as a 
heritage resource because he is a world known and respected graffiti artist. These 
artworks are a reaffirmation of the democratic and revolutionary ideals on which 
democratic South Africa was founded.2 They are examples of South Africa’s cultural 
heritage and deserve to be protected and preserved as cultural heritage resources.  
5.1 The purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study was to determine who should own South African street 
art. However, this question devolved into two parts. First, the study analysed who 
owns South African street art from the perspective of property law. Second, the 
study analysed whether this determination of ownership was preferable for culturally 
significant street art from the perspective of South Africa’s cultural heritage 
legislation. In instances where the street art is a cultural heritage resource, the study 
considered what protection such status affords the property (as detailed in the 
NHRA). Further, whether the deprivation of privately-owned property through such 
declaration is a justifiable limitation of an owner’s property right. Finally, in the few 
instances where the deprivation of property through the NHRA would not or could 
not ensure the protection and preservation of the property the study considered 
whether the state could expropriate the property. 
 
2  Bivar 2006 IJCP 271. 
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5.1.1 The original acquisition of ownership investigation 
The popularity of street artists and the significant aesthetic, financial and cultural 
values of some street artworks is a phenomenon. The Roman law regarding the 
original acquisition of ownership of pictura could not have foreseen this 
development. Yet, accessio is still the law that governs the original acquisition of 
ownership of paintings in South Africa.  
Admittedly, this phenomenon may not negatively affect the ownership of street art 
attached to immovable property. The accession of the street art to immovable 
property does not change the nature of the immovable property. Ownership of the 
artwork transfers to the owner of the immovable. However, the consequences for 
the owners of movable property is contra boni mores. The function of accessio as it 
is currently applied, will result in ownership of the new res and will as a result transfer 
from the owner of the movable property to the artist. The street artist who is 
committing a crime benefits from it.  
Thus, it is necessary to develop the common law so that good faith is required for 
the transfer of property via accessio in the case of pictura. Grotius already 
recognised this in 1631 albeit that he thought that original acquisition of ownership 
of paintings should ascribe via specificatio. Should the requirement of bona fides be 
included for the original acquisition of movable property via accessio then movable 
property which has been painted on by a street artist (without good faith) will remain 
the property of the owner of the movable.  
Ownership of street art attached to immovable property belongs to the owner of 
such property, whereas there is the possibility of ownership of street art which is 
attached to movable property being transferred via accessio from the owner of the 
movable property to the artist. However, it has been argued that the common law 
be developed so that good faith is required for the transfer of property via accessio 
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in the case of pictura and thus movable property which has been painted on by a 
street artist without good faith will remain the property of the owner of the movable.3  
Consequently, in response to the question of who owns South African street art in 
terms of property law, it is the owner of the property on which the street art is located, 
regardless of whether that property is immovable or movable. 
5.1.2 The cultural heritage law investigation 
The result of this finding is that street art belongs to the private owners of the 
property on which it is painted (not the artist) and as such the owner is entitled to 
control physically, use, benefit from, encumber, alienate, and vindicate such 
property.4 Importantly, the entitlements of ownership allow the owner to change, 
destroy or sell (alienate) the property – to change, destroy or sell the street art. 
These aspects of ownership are problematic where the street art is an example of 
South Africa’s cultural heritage (as either a cultural heritage site or a cultural heritage 
object).  
The examination of the selected artworks such as Faith47’s Freedom Charter 
Project and Shepard Fairey’s The Purple Shall Govern recommends that there are 
street artworks that should be declared as cultural heritage resources. That these 
pieces deserve the protection that heritage status affords. 
The NHRA is intended to ensure the protection and preservation of cultural heritage 
resources by limiting the entitlements of ownership but, as discussed, it is difficult to 
monitor how these resources are being used, protected and preserved by their 
owners. Private owners may not be aware of the law and their duties arising from 
the NHRA regarding cultural heritage resources. They may even choose to ignore 
the law. Or perhaps an owner may not be able to afford to fulfil the responsibility or 
 
3  See part 2.2.3. 
4  Van der Walt and Pienaar Law of Property 48. 
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is unable to, for various other reasons. Additionally, private property ownership can 
limit public access to cultural heritage resources.  
Further, whilst the intention of the NHRA is to ensure the protection and preservation 
of South Africa’s cultural heritage resources, there are several concerns with this 
piece of legislation. The recommendations made in chapter 3 could assist in 
ensuring that the NHRA functions better and that the intention of the Act is more 
likely to be achieved. 
5.1.3 The deprivation and expropriation investigation 
The NHRA intends to achieve the protection and preservation of cultural heritage 
resources through the deprivation of property; by placing limitations on the 
entitlements of ownership. However, even with the recommended changes to the 
NHRA there are many risks and problems with private ownership of these resources 
which the NHRA cannot control. It may be better for certain cultural heritage 
resources to belong to the state i.e. where the protection and preservation of a 
resource cannot be achieved through the deprivation of property. Consequently, this 
study looked at the potential for the expropriation of property to achieve this aim. In 
exploring the expropriation of cultural heritage resources, it was first necessary to 
explore whether the deprivation of property (via the NHRA) is a justifiable limitation 
of the property right. 
This investigation highlighted that the concerns regarding the NHRA highlighted in 
chapter 3 could mean that, should a deprivation of such property ever face a legal 
challenge such challenge will likely succeed. As it currently stands, the limitations 
on property that arise with the declaration of property as a cultural heritage resource 
are unjustified because it is substantively unfair. Thus, if a deprivation is unjustifiable 
an expropriation will also be unjustifiable (as the requirements for expropriation are 
more strenuous than deprivation). 
As it currently stands, there are too many challengeable aspects to the deprivation 
or expropriation of cultural heritage resource property (via the NHRA) to be confident 
that the legislation can achieve the purpose of protection and preservation. SAHRA 
and the state need to ensure that the purpose of the NHRA is fulfilled in disputed 
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cases. Consequently, the recommended changes are essential in preventing future 
legal disputes from succeeding. 
This is true for street art but will also affect other forms of heritage resources, should 
an owner dispute the heritage status of their property or should the state need to 
expropriate the property. 
5.2 Closure 
The protection and preservation of cultural heritage resources is an honourable 
ideal. All cultural resources suffer from the ravages of time, and they all carry the 
risk of damage or destruction (whether accidental or intentional). The NHRA is 
merely an attempt to do the best that can be done, to try to protect these resources 
as much and for as long as possible. The unique nature of street art accentuates 
the risks which the NHRA attempts to reduce. These risks are also increased by the 
generally unacknowledged value of street art. Consequently, the application of an 
amended NHRA to street artworks that are identified as having cultural heritage 
value, or the conclusion of heritage agreements between the relevant heritage 
authority and the owner of the street artwork is critical. 
This study has contributed to the jurisprudence on South African law in a few ways. 
First, the study has recommended that the common law of accessio be developed 
to include bona fides for the original acquisition of pictura. Second, the study has 
made several recommendations to improve the functioning of the NHRA (and 
thereby better ensure the preservation and protection of all South African heritage 
resources). Third, the study has recommended the recognition of selected South 
Africa street art as cultural heritage resources; namely the remaining works in 
Faith47’s Freedom Charter Project and Shepard Fairey’s The Purple Shall Govern. 
Fourth, the study has shown that in the event of the heritage status of a site or object 
being challenged by the owner, or in the need to expropriate a heritage resource, 
the law as it currently stands is ineffectual. An owner has several grounds on which 
they can challenge the deprivation or expropriation. Therefore, the 
recommendations to the NHRA need to be implemented to ensure the legislation 
can achieve its purpose in challenged cases. 
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